# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION
AND WORKER HEALTH

+ + + +

61st MEETING

+ + + + +

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2009

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The meeting came to order at 9:00 a.m., in the Coral Room of the Doubletree Hotel Albuquerque, 201 Marquette Avenue Northwest, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Paul L. Ziemer, Chairman, presiding.

#### PRESENT:

PAUL L. ZIEMER, Chairman

JOSIE M. BEACH, Member

BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member

MICHAEL H. GIBSON, Member (via telephone)

MARK A. GRIFFON, Member

JAMES E. LOCKEY, Member

JAMES M. MELIUS, Member

WANDA I. MUNN, Member

JOHN W. POSTON, SR., Member

ROBERT W. PRESLEY, Member

GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER, Member

PHILLIP M. SCHOFIELD, Member

THEODORE M. KATZ, Acting Designated Federal Official

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# PROCEEDINGS

9:08 A.M.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Good morning everyone. We're ready to begin our deliberations this morning I'll ask so be we everyone to seated and will get underway.

First of all, I have a couple of regular housekeeping reminders. The first is a reminder to register your attendance with us today in the registration booklet out in the corridor.

Also, if you are a member of the public who wishes to address the assembly later today at the public comment period, please sign up in the sign up sheets that are also at the table just outside of the room.

And finally I'll remind you that there are copies of the agenda and of the related documents that pertain to this meeting on the table in the back of this room. And please help yourself to those as appropriate.

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Let me ask our Designated Federal

Official, Mr. Katz, if he has any additional

comments for us this morning.

MR. KATZ: Yes, thank you, Dr.

Ziemer. Welcome everybody to the second day of the Board meeting.

I just want to -- this is really addressed to the people on the phone in particular. Yesterday we had a lot of audio problems. Even in the room it wasn't particularly pleasant at times with feedback and so on.

But the people on the phone had, I think, a quite terrible experience with the sounds of wind blowing through and so on and shuffling papers and so on. And the set up -- I think they've worked to improve the audio set up today. I think it should work out.

But please, folks on the phone, if you find that it's not working for you still, let us know and we'll try to make other arrangements. But I apologize for the bad

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experience that you had yesterday.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And perhaps I might add to that a reminder to mute your phone when you're not speaking because we did have some sidebar conversations which you may not have realized were broadcast to the group here.

And not only to protect your own privacy but to keep the lines clear so others can hear, please mute your phone when you're not speaking which, during the regular session, should be most of the time.

MEMBER MELIUS: Paul?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, comment, yes, Dr. Melius?

MEMBER MELIUS: Could I make one comment? We finished up late last night and we're all pretty tired including everybody left in the room was pretty tired. But I would just like to thank the petitioners for their presentation yesterday as well as the people who spoke on behalf of the petitions

last night.

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Ι thought it some was very compelling information actually \_\_\_ very disturbing to hear what had happened to some of the claimants. But I thought much of the information was very useful to use. And I think will be useful to the Board in going forward with the evaluation of this petition.

So I really, at least speaking personally and I think on behalf of other members of the Board also, I'd really like to thank you for the effort that you put into bringing the group together and getting this information to us.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Certainly your comments are completely in order and I think reflect the thanks of the full Board for those who participated, not only for their participation but for the clear and compelling statements that many of them did make. So, indeed, we do thank you very much.

And, again, we will have another

public comment period later today as well.

We have several other petitions before us this week to consider. And the first of those is the Westinghouse Atomic Power Development petition. That will be -- the evaluation report will be presented by LaVon Rutherford of NIOSH.

Then we will have an opportunity to hear from the petitioners. And then we will proceed from there.

So, LaVon, welcome.

MR. RUTHERFORD: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. Again, I'm LaVon Rutherford. I am the Special Exposure Cohort Health Physics team leader for NIOSH. And I'm going to talk about Westinghouse Atomic Power Development and the SEC Petition.

This petition was received on August 13th, 2007. We had petitioner-proposed class of testers, laboratory researchers at the L Building, including the K Building from 1942 through 1944.

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The petition qualified for evaluation on October 16th. And the basis was no monitoring data.

During our initial evaluation of this petition, we recognized that there was information that supported that the covered activities that were previous described by the Department of Energy for this site were actually not -- did not occur at this facility.

They had, on the Department of Energy's site; it indicates that Westinghouse Atomic Power Development produced the uranium for Enrico Fermi's stacked fuel experiment. Based on our review, the uranium was actually produced at the Bloomfield site, not at the East Pittsburgh site.

In February 2008, we contacted the Department of Energy with this concern and provided them reference material to support our conclusion.

In June of 2008, the Department of

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sent a letter to NIOSH and the concurring with Department of Labor our assessment that yes, we agree with NIOSH that it appears that the work, the actual uranium production for the Enrico -- the stacked fuel experiment was actually produced at Bloomfield and not at the East Pittsburgh site.

September 2008, In of of Labor issued letter Department а Department of Energy and NIOSH concluding that without public revocation of the documentation the considered site's on database as being erroneous, it would not be appropriate to remove the years from 1942 through 1944.

And during this time period, we continued to research and look for activities that may have occurred during that time period. We had recognized that there was a lot of information about Westinghouse and their work for MED during that time period.

And although we had concluded that

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the activities of uranium production were not conducted at the East Pittsburgh site, we felt like there were probably other activities.

In October of 2008, we sent correspondence to the Department of Energy and Department of Labor concerning evidence of uranium enrichment work that was potentially occurring at the East Pittsburgh site during the indicated covered time period.

If we all remember, 1942 through 1944 was the time period we were working to produce the atomic bomb and we were analyzing four different uranium enrichment options.

NIOSH decided to proceed with the evaluation based on these uranium enriching activities during the time period. We felt we had enough documentation that supported that it was clear that those activities had occurred at the East Pittsburgh site.

We issued our approved evaluation report on January 22nd, 2009.

A little background, Westinghouse

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1 Atomic Power Development is located in East 2 Pittsburgh. It is located within the original 3 Westinghouse Electric Company/Electric and Manufacturing Company facility. 4 5 Westinghouse The research 6 laboratory is located in East Pittsburgh. 7 Forest Hills is also considered to be part of the site. 8 9 So there are two separate areas. 10 There is the East Pittsburgh and then a short distance away, there is the Forest Hills site. 11 12 They are all considered part of Westinghouse 13 Atomic Power Development under the facility designation. 14 15 Documentation supports that 16 Westinghouse Atomic Power Development was involved pilot scales/laboratory 17 in studies of uranium enrichment work using a 18 19 method with an ionic centrifuge, which is a 20 modified magnetron. The sources that we went to to look 21

for information about the activities were the

site profiles, existing site profiles, and technical information bulletins. We had an interview with a former Westinghouse Atomic Power Development employee.

We looked at existing claim files, documentation provided by the petitioner and I would like to say the petitioner, Dr. Sandy Kramer, is in the audience, up front.

And the documentation provided by the petitioner really was what led us to the uranium enrichment activities in the beginning. There was a lot of good information provided there.

We looked at our site research database. We also did data captures. Our data capture efforts, we did a number of data captures. We had the Westinghouse collection at Senator John Heinz History Center. We picked up, if I remember correctly, 30 or so documents about the facility there.

The Department of Environmental Protection in Pennsylvania, DOE Germantown,

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DOE Legacy Management, NNSA, the NRC, a lot of these are standard searches because what we've learned over time during these petition evaluations, there are some of these sources that have information not only about their existing facility but also about other facilities, AWEs, and such.

And so we do a lot of searches through their electronic databases, Washington State University, Washington University libraries, our DOE Opennet, internet searches, CDER, and various DOE locations.

Our previous dose reconstructions, we have 17 claims right now for Westinghouse Atomic Power Development. Now we have 14 that meet the class definition of 1942 through 1944. The other three claims are outside of the current covered period.

And I'll answer the question now before it comes up, we are exploring why we have those claims.

We completed one dose

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reconstruction for an individual within this class. However, that dose reconstruction was based on internal and external dosimetry from a period outside of our evaluated covered period.

Talking about Westinghouse's side operations, Westinghouse was deeply involved in 1942 through `44 period with a number of other companies and universities in researching various uranium enrichment processes.

They provided the centrifuges for the pilot studies and work on the mechanical centrifuge. They did a lot of the electrical work for the electromagnetic calutron at Y-12.

Gaseous diffusion, they supported Kellex/Pierpont and the initial pilot studies of the gaseous diffusion process and then the ionic centrifuge.

The ionic centrifuge, don't ask me to go into details on this because that's one of the reasons why I'm going to recommend a

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class because I don't have a lot of good process description on this.

But it's generally Ι what understand by this is that it is modification of a magnetron and uses a very similar process to the calutron operations at Y-12 in that the magnetic flux and deflection of the U235 mass versus a 238 allows you to separate them out.

There's no indication that the work with radioactive material occurred at Westinghouse Atomic Power Development for any of the enrichment methods with the exception of the ionic centrifuge.

As I had mentioned, we have found documentation that supports there are a number of things that Westinghouse was producing at that time in support of the enrichment but we only have clear documentation that the ionic centrifuge work was done at the East Pittsburgh site.

Based on documentation available to

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NIOSH, again I mentioned that they were involved in the ionic centrifuge uranium enrichment method. And as I had mentioned, it is very similar to the calutron operation.

have detailed We no process information about this. We have -- we don't even have a good process description of how this actually worked. We have no information -- if you look back on the facility database website, it talks about K and L and actually identified the petitioner had K  $\mathbf{L}$ and buildings as potential location for the work that occurred.

what been able From we've to uncover, K and L building were contaminated with uranium and thorium. However, they were contaminated with uranium and thorium because of the early filament work that was done at Westinghouse in the 1920s at the East Pittsburgh site, earlier period.

In 1918 and 1919, they were looking at uranium as a filament. They also looked at

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-- they were using thorium as well. And so there was a lot of work that was done at the East Pittsburgh site during that period.

In 1920s, early `20s, that work actually shifted to the Bloomfield site where the actual lamp division was moved from Westinghouse East Pittsburgh to the Bloomfield site at that time. So that what we believe is the contamination that existed in K and L could have easily come from the early filament work that was occurring in the 1920s.

So we cannot specifically -- and we have no clear documentation that outlines the exact location this work occurred. As I had mentioned earlier, the Forest Hills site has a number of laboratories.

It could have occurred there. But there are also places within the existing site at East Pittsburgh that the work could have occurred.

Also, source material, we have no information. We have one document that

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indicates that the work may have been laboratory-scale quantities.

However we also have an interview that talks about a number of different runs trying to increase the enrichment process or trying to increase the enrichment process using the gas material. And so I can't be for sure if it was -- what is pilot-scale quantities.

Our internal sources of exposure, the work associated with the electromagnetic enrichment separation used a uranium tetrachloride. It was converted -- heated and converted into a gas from.

We had potential inhalation from that conversion as well as the work involved in the separation. External sources, we have photon and beta exposures from the electronic magnetic separations and we have potential neutron exposures from alpha-N reactions with the chlorine.

We also could have, again, not

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knowing the details but knowing the Y-12 operation, there were X-rays produced in the calutron operations. Those may have been an exposure concern here, too. It is not clear.

Internal monitoring data, we have no bioassay data for the class period and we

have no general area breathing zone air sampling for the class period.

External monitoring data, we have no film badge or pocket dosimeter data and no area radiation surveys. Again, this is a unique operation.

We looked at the calutron operations. Can we use some of the activities associated with the calutron?

But knowing the specific details of And also the process was one concern. recognizing from the 1942 through 1947 period at Y-12, we have an SEC because calutron internal exposure. So it made it very difficult using that as a surrogate.

Our evaluation process is a two-

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prong test, which was employed many times. Is it feasible to estimate the level of radiation dose with sufficient accuracy? If that answer is no and then is there a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have endangered the health of members of the class.

We've found that the available monitoring records process description and source-term data are not adequate to complete dose reconstruction with sufficient accuracy for the evaluated class.

We use existing procedures to reconstruct external exposures from medical X-rays for non-presumptive cancers or cancers or claims that do not meet the SEC criteria.

Our table, again, internal cannot be reconstructed, exposures external can't, medical X-rays, we will reconstruct for those cancer claims that come back to us. our feasibility determination is the August 13th, 1942, which is the date associated with the establishment of MED, Manhattan the

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Engineering District, and December 31st, 1944, which is the end of the covered period.

Again, the health endangerment, evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates some workers in the class may have received chronic exposures through intakes of radionuclides and direct exposure to radioactive materials. And consequently we find that health may have been endangered for those workers.

Our proposed class, we looked at -because we knew this was pilot work and -- or
at least we thought it was pilot work from the
information that we had, we looked at ways to
try to limit this class and try to get it to
specific locations.

In the documentation that we had, we could not come up with a good argument and a good reason to isolate it to specific locations within the facility.

We also had talked about do we want to look at specific job titles but after three

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1 years of SECs, we recognize that 2 specific job titles are very tough. 3 Not only are they tough because somebody has got to make that determination 4 5 but job titles change over time. And it is 6 not clear that we could even come up with job 7 titles. talked to the Department of 8 Labor about a proposed class definition of 9 using researchers and scientists involved in 10 ionic centrifuge operations and they could not 11 12 administer that class. Therefore, we came up 13 with all AWEemployees who worked at Westinghouse Atomic Power Development, August 14 15 13th, 1942 through December 31st, 1944. 16 And, aqain, our recommendation. The feasibility, we cannot reconstruct for 17 that period. And health was endangered. 18 19 Questions? 20 Thank you very CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: much, LaVon. 21

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Dr. Lockey?

1 MEMBER LOCKEY: One question. 2 couldn't they identify a class? 3 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Use the microphone please. 4 5 MR. RUTHERFORD: The question comes 6 down to how you are going to be able to 7 determine -- it's not clear, especially if you That was one of the titles 8 look at testers. individuals in that 9 that was used 10 involved in the operation. And the records that they had, it was not clear that they 11 12 could identify testers, researchers. 13 And then the other question also upon -- okay, who cleaned up 14 up 15 material at the end of the day? Was it the 16 maintenance workers? Was it the scientists? Was it this -- and you start realizing okay, 17 how can I separate those individuals out? 18 19 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler? Of the people you 20 MEMBER ROESSLER: have identified so far, so they all fulfill 21 the 250-day requirement? 22

1	MR. RUTHERFORD: You know, I
2	apologize. I did not look at that. I can
3	find that answer out quickly. And get back to
4	you. I know that most of them I believe
5	most of them do. And most of them continued
6	employment well beyond the `44 period.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, and also,
8	you didn't mention this, but were there any
9	indications of quote, incidents, that were
10	identified in that period?
11	MR. RUTHERFORD: No.
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you.
13	MR. RUTHERFORD: There was an
14	incident with the there was an atom smasher
15	at Westinghouse in the early years but that
16	was before the covered period.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And also, on the
18	medical X-ray are you just assuming annual X-
19	rays or did Westinghouse have a practice that
20	you could identify?
21	MR. RUTHERFORD: No, we had no
22	documentations so we're just assuming an

1	annual X-ray.
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So that you are
3	assuming that did have that, right?
4	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Actually it was
6	fairly common during those days. Okay. Thank
7	you.
8	Mr. Presley?
9	MEMBER PRESLEY: You said you had
10	three individuals outside of the petition.
11	How far outside the petition dates?
12	MR. RUTHERFORD: 1950s, 1960s I
13	think if I remember correctly, because I just
14	looked at these this morning, all three of
15	them were in the `60s period. And some
16	actually had went early into as well into
17	the late `50s.
18	MEMBER PRESLEY: Were they there
19	when this work was being done?
20	MR. RUTHERFORD: No, they were not.
21	And, you know, recognize Westinghouse was
22	doing a lot of in the `50s, `60s, a lot of

commercial work, fuel work at the time. 1 2 MEMBER PRESLEY: Thank you. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Bradley Clawson? 3 4 MEMBER CLAWSON: Do we know when they tore this down? 5 6 MR. RUTHERFORD: We have a document 7 that supports that at the end of the 1944 period, that they ceased all activities with 8 And we don't have documentation that this. 9 10 says that all the material was removed at that time, you know. 11 But based on the documentation that 12 13 -- it's called the Smyth Report, some of the HPs will probably remember that report, it is 14 15 a pretty detailed summary of the activities 16 that occurred during the production of the first atomic bomb. 17 And in the Smyth Report, it talks 18 19 about the activity shifting to the 20 Pittsburgh site because that actually -- the ionic centrifuge was actually started at the 21

University of California at the same time that

2 And they stopped the work at the 3 University of California and shifted [Identifying information Redacted] 4 for 5 Westinghouse actually took that activity back 6 to the East Pittsburgh site to continue pilotscale studies and that is discussed in the 7 Smyth Report. 8 it says in the Smyth Report 9 10 that at the end of 1944, that that activity -that all operations with the ionic centrifuge 11 But I don't know about disposition of 12 ceased. 13 materials. 14 MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, Ι was 15 wondering about when the centrifuge was torn 16 out or anything else like that, if we knew. MR. RUTHERFORD: I can't tell you. 17 18 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Or was there a 19 decommissioning at all or a clean up of this 20 site to your knowledge? MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, there is a 21 22 decommissioning work that was done on this

the work was done with the calutron.

1	site. And I can't remember the period but I'm
2	believing that the site itself, if I remember
3	I don't even want to say because if I say
4	it, I'll be wrong.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Was that a FUSRAP
6	site?
7	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, it was
8	actually for a short period. And then they
9	took it off the FUSRAP.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
11	MEMBER BEACH: Paul, I was just
12	looking at the ER report.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, Josie, I
14	missed your sign there. Go ahead.
15	MEMBER BEACH: No problem. Page
16	17, 1946, it said Westinghouse and other
17	companies coordinated with MED for the
18	disposal of the centrifuge equipment.
19	MR. RUTHERFORD: Now the centrifuge
20	recognize that that centrifuge equipment
21	was actually the centrifuge the mechanical
22	centrifuge that was being tested for at the

1	Standard Oil facility. That was not the
2	centrifuge that
3	MEMBER BEACH: So it was a
4	different one. Thank you.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Yes, Mark?
6	MEMBER GRIFFON: LaVon, I do
7	appreciate that you are pretty good at
8	anticipating our questions and the one that I
9	had underlined before you started was the
10	laboratory scale because I know I'll remind
11	the rest of us that
12	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right.
13	MEMBER GRIFFON: in the past,
14	we've excluded some buildings in Y-12
15	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes.
16	MEMBER GRIFFON: because it was
17	lab-scale operations. So I'm appreciative to
18	hear the distinction
19	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right.
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: that it could
21	have been a bigger pilot or you just don't
22	know

1	MR. RUTHERFORD: We don't know. We
2	don't know.
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: because
4	otherwise I would be wondering why in this
5	case
6	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes. And that was
7	like you mentioned, there was a lot of
8	detailed discussion on that Y-12. And because
9	of the fact that we had good descriptions of
10	those laboratory-scale quantities, we were
11	able to exclude those. And the Board
12	concurred with this. But we just do not know
13	the exact quantities.
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: I think that is an
15	important point in this one so I appreciate
16	you pointing that out.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Jim Neton?
18	DR. NETON: Just to clarify, I
19	think the laboratory-scale operations that
20	were exempted at Y-12 were truly like
21	analytical laboratories, not production
22	laboratories. So that is really the

distinction in my mind.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you, Jim.

Okay, again, LaVon, thank you very much.

And I think we're ready to hear from the petitioner. And Sandy Kramer is here. Sandy, welcome. And we're pleased to hear from you. You can use either mic that you are comfortable with. Use the podium.

DR. KRAMER: I'm not going to have too much to say because most of anything I could say was said much better by Mr. Rutherford, much better than I could say.

I was introduced by Mr. Rutherford as Dr. Kramer. I do have a Ph.D., however it is in political science so my knowledge and understanding of anything that has to do with chemistry and physics is limited to the one course I took in physics at Princeton. And may I say that was the hardest course, as far as I was concerned, that I have ever experienced.

So I'm not going to ask for any questions because I don't think I'll be able to answer them if they are scientific in nature. However, if anyone that has a question that is not scientific in nature, I would be happy to address it.

The reason I'm here today ladies and thank the Board, primarily to gentlemen of the Board, and the other individuals who are involved in the proceedings to this point, thank them for the work that they did in putting together presentation.

I also want to thank Denise Brock, who could not be here today due to [Identifying information Redacted], and Ι [Identifying especially want to thank information Redacted], who is co-petitioner, who is unable to be here today because she is bedside vigil [Identifying holding a for information Redacted] who is [Identifying information Redacted] of [Identifying

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information Redacted]. And otherwise 1 she 2 would be here. 3 As far as the other petitioners, I have never spoken to them or met them. 4 5 think must that Ι Mr. say 6 Rutherford covered а lot of ground. Ι encountered similar ground but I did not have 7 the wherewithal to obtain the reports that he 8 did obtain. 9 10 So, therefore, I would suggest that 11 should you have any questions on any of the covered, 12 material that that thev was addressed back to Mr. Rutherford. 13 But at this point in time, other 14 15 than once again saying thank you, I will ask 16 if there are any questions of a general nature specific nature, specific to 17 or of а my particular petition that you might wish to 18 19 ask. 20 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, apparently We do thank you for being here and for 21 participating in this. 22

1	Board members, do you have any
2	further discussion on this? This appears to
3	be a fairly straightforward petition and
4	recommendation.
5	Ms. Munn?
6	MEMBER MUNN: I have no comments.
7	I'm prepared to make a motion if the Board is
8	ready for it.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I maybe have a
10	comment here. Dr. Melius?
11	MEMBER MELIUS: I'm prepared to
12	offer a friendly amendment to the motion.
13	(Laughter.)
14	MEMBER MUNN: Why don't you go
15	first?
16	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay, well
17	MEMBER MUNN: Do go ahead, Dr.
18	Melius.
19	MEMBER MELIUS: Oh, no, no, no.
20	MEMBER MUNN: Please provide the
21	amendment.
22	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think his

1	tongue is still in his cheek. Why don't you
2	go ahead with your motion?
3	MEMBER MUNN: I move that the Board
4	accept the recommendation of NIOSH that this
5	SEC be accepted as written and that the
6	petition be granted and rescind our
7	recommendation to that effect to the
8	Secretary.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. The motion
10	basically is to recommend to the Secretary
11	that this petition be granted and that an SEC
12	class be added.
13	Dr. Melius?
14	I need a second. Okay. There is a
15	second.
16	Do you have a comment or
17	MEMBER MELIUS: I have actually a
18	rather lengthy friendly amendment.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: It might speed up
21	the process.
22	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Is this the

1	official wording?
2	MEMBER MELIUS: This is the
3	official wording.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Just for
5	clarification for those particularly who may
6	be new here, we actually have some official
7	wording that goes to the Secretary of Health
8	and Human Services. I guess in this case it
9	will still be an Acting Secretary.
10	But in any event, the motion, as
11	presented by Ms. Munn, was a general motion.
12	What will actually go to the Secretary and
13	Dr. Melius has graciously served as our
14	wordsmither on these because I think he has
15	the boilerplate in his laptop, so is this
16	MEMBER MELIUS: This is actually
17	the updated boilerplate
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: The updated,
19	okay.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: with the recent
21	changes that have
22	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Good. Very good.

MEMBER MELIUS: -- boilerplate changes.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So here -- and then we will not have to deal with this later in the week. Okay. So here is the official wording.

MEMBER MELIUS: The Board recommends that the following letter be transmitted to the Secretary of DHHS within 21 days. Should the Chair become aware of any issue that in his judgment would preclude the transmittal of this letter within that time period, the Board requests that he promptly informs the Board of the delay and the reasons for this delay, and that he immediately works with NIOSH to schedule an emergency meeting of the Board to discuss this issue.

The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, the Board, has evaluated the SEC Petition 0096 concerning workers at the Westinghouse Atomic Power Development Plant, WAPDP in East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania under

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the statutory requirements established EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 CFR Section 83.13. The Board respectfully recommends Special Exposure Cohort status be accorded to all AWE employees who worked at the WAPDP in East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from August 13th, 1942 through December 31st, 1944, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 works days occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC.

The Board notes that although NIOSH found that they were unable to completely reconstruct radiation doses for these employees, they believe that they are able to reconstruct the occupational medical dose.

This recommendation is based on the following factors,

1. The WAPDP was involved in the earliest research and development work for the manufacture of atomic weapons.

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2. NIOSH was unable to locate sufficient monitoring data or information on radiological operations at this site in order to be able to complete accurate individual dose reconstruction for the potential internal/external radiation exposures to which these workers may have been subjected. The Board concurs with this conclusion.

NIOSH determined that health may have been endangered for the workers exposed to radiations at this facility during the time period in question. The Board concurs with this determination.

Based on these considerations and discussions held at our February 18th Advisory Board meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the Board recommends that this Special Exposure Cohort petition be granted.

Enclosed is the documentation from the Board where this Special Exposure Cohort class was discussed. The documentation includes transcripts of the deliberations,

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1	copies of the petition, the NIOSH review
2	thereof, and related documents distributed by
3	NIOSH. If any of these items are unavailable
3	NIOSH. II any of these fellis are unavariable
4	at this time, they will follow shortly.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you.
6	That is the formal wording that is used.
7	I do have one question, Dr. Melius,
8	in mentioning on the bullet points the lack of
9	internal and external monitoring data and so
10	on. Did you mention process information?
11	MEMBER MELIUS: I actually
12	mentioned radiological operations.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. That's
14	fine.
15	MEMBER MELIUS: The source and
16	process.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. That's
18	fine.
19	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I wanted to make
21	sure that we covered the waterfront.
22	MEMBER MELIUS: Right, yes.

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. That is
2	the motion. We need to do a roll call vote.
3	Did we determine that Mr. Gibson was on the
4	line? Yes, Mike, are you on the line?
5	MEMBER GIBSON: I'm here, Paul.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, Mike is
7	here. Thank you. So we'll be sure to include
8	him.
9	MR. KATZ: All right, okay, so
10	calling the roll now, Ms. Beach?
11	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
12	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
13	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
14	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson?
15	MEMBER GIBSON: Yes.
16	MR. KATZ: Mr. Griffon?
17	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
18	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
19	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.
20	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
21	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
22	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?

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1	MEMBER MUNN: Aye.
2	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?
3	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
4	MR. KATZ: Mr. Presley?
5	MEMBER PRESLEY: Yes.
6	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
7	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
8	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield?
9	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes.
10	MR. KATZ: Dr. Ziemer?
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. The motion
12	carries. There are no nays and no
13	abstentions. I didn't mention how the motion
14	carried other than there were no nays.
15	Okay. Thank you very much. And we
16	will proceed to prepare and send those
17	materials to actually they go through the
18	Director of NIOSH or of OSHA actually no
19	NIOSH I'll get it right. It is Christine
20	Branche. And that will get transmitted to the
21	Secretary.

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Now I think that the -- we're a

little ahead of schedule and we don't want to 1 2 begin the Tyson Valley thing until 10:30 I 3 don't believe. We will have a petitioner on line for Tyson Valley, is that correct -- at 4 5 10:30? 6 MR. KATZ: It's a possibility. 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. So we need to keep that as a time certain. So I'm 8 wondering if -- if Mr. Cohen is agreeable, if 9 10 we could go ahead with the SC&A Technical Support Contract portion of our agenda. 11 12 Sandy, is this okay to move you up in the schedule? 13 DR. COHEN: Well, I haven't written 14 15 it yet. 16 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, that's even better probably. We don't want you to be 17 18 prepared too far in advance here. But we 19 welcome Sandy Cohen. And as many of you know, 20 it's is Sandy Cohen that SC&A and Associates that has the contract for the 21

support of this Board. So welcome, sir.

1 DR. COHEN: Thank you very much. 2 I'd like to express my appreciation 3 to the Board for you confidence in SC&A to continue our work in support of the Board. 4 You don't often get a chance to do that kind 5 6 of thing. So I wanted to do that. 7 You know it is always gratifying professional financial 8 from both and perspectives be awarded competitive 9 to а 10 contract. 11 there is special However satisfaction in being awarded a competitive 12 13 contract as an incumbent, particularly after a five-year incumbency. To me this implies that 14 15 we must have done a pretty good job over an 16 extended period of time. Our work for the Board has been 17 particularly challenging. Our deliverables 18 19 must not only meet or exceed the expectations Board but they are also carefully 20 reviewed by many other interested parties. 21

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routinely

We

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and

interact

coordinate with NIOSH and the Department of Energy and must communicate effectively with claimants, petitioners, and other interested parties. In fact, over the past couple of years, even Presidential candidates have expressed an interest in our work.

I've been in government consulting for about 37 years and thought that I had seen everything. But I have to tell you there have been aspects of the work on this contract over the past five years that were entirely new to me. And at the risk of appearing less than fully knowledgeable about the particulars of the project, I thought that I might share a few of these with you today.

We can label this discussion a view from the front office although Ι don't inhabit actually our front office. Му observations fall into the following categories: learning curve, objectivity, special interests, politics, and Sunshine, and disposition of findings.

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Not long after we initiated work on this contract, we realized that we had a big problem. Although we had naively agreed to the government schedule and level of effort and both the time the effort. estimates, actually required to perform some elements of the work turned out to be significantly greater than the government's estimates.

The discrepancy was most serious in our reviews of the adequacy and completeness of the site profiles. This work was performed in accordance with detailed procedures, which initially developed and which we were evaluated and approved by the Board. However, it took a lot more time and effort to conduct the reviews in accordance with these procedures than either we or the Board had anticipated.

Contributory to the schedule slippage were delays in obtaining some of the references in the site profiles. You may also recollect that one of our first reviews was

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the site profile for Bethlehem Steel, which was particularly challenging.

Interestingly, I recall that our ultimate review deliverable had more pages in the report than that of which we were reviewing, which was not helpful for our case.

Ordinarily, this kind of problem is worked out between the contracting officer and the contractor. This one, however, blew up and resulted in teleconferences attended by members of the Board and representatives from NIOSH in addition to the contractor and the CO. It became quite contentious and for a while there, I was concerned about the future of the contract.

Ultimately this all worked itself out. The Board realized that this was a first-of-a-kind effort and that the original level of effort estimates were informed guesses at best. And our subsequent -- and after we had experienced our own learning curve, our subsequent costs for site profile

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reviews came down, although not as far down as the original government estimate.

I like to think that the government believes that although SC&A's work under the direction of the Board has added some burden to NIOSH's workload, the overall program has benefitted from this burden.

As the work proceeded, we realized that one of our most significant challenges was to deliver balanced and objective technical evaluations unencumbered by the exuberance or preconceived notions by any of the individual contributors.

Although we had recognized the need for unquestionable technical expertise and a diversity of skills well before we wrote our proposal, we had not given as much thought to the mechanisms required to deal with differing perspectives or dare I characterize them as biases present in all of us. I believe that good technical people do their very best to overcome any biases they might have in the

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course of performing high-quality scientific work.

Nevertheless, it is good management practice to maintain vigilance on behalf of objectivity and to emphasize the need for objectivity to the individual contributors. One technique that we have implemented is a rigorous internal review of all reports for balance and objectivity as well as technical validity before they are delivered to the client.

I've been observing the extraordinary efforts that the project team has put forth to produce our work products and insist that we continue these internal reviews so that our products are technically defensible.

This brings me to another unusual aspect of this contract. The Board is charged with advising HHS on the scientific validity and quality of dose reconstructions and SEC petition reviews performed by NIOSH. Although

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our job is to support the Board in these endeavors, because the Board has no contracting authority, our contract is necessarily with NIOSH.

The potential for conflict of interest was identified early on and was even dealt with in GAO evaluations. It has been my impression that the Board and NIOSH have bent over backwards to address any perception of conflict of interest.

NIOSH has assigned designated federal officials who are unaffiliated with the NIOSH Office of Compensation Analysis and Support as the contracting officers' technical representatives. And the OCAS cooperates fully in our pursuit of information and does influence not. exert any over our investigations or findings.

Another new twist, at least to me, is related to the political high profile of this contract. At least policies concerning EEOICPA -- I hate that acronym -- are

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bipartisan, all of the politicians, regardless of political party or ideology, are anxious to ensure that their constituents get deserved remuneration under EEOICPA.

I recollect the first time that John Mauro informed me that we were requested to meet with Senate staffers about a particular facility concerning the claims of constituents. He asked for my advice on what to do. I said absolutely not.

My response to John is based on a general rule that most contractors abide by. That is to pass on the request for information from the from Congress press or to our clients. While members of our project team were encouraged by the government to attend these meetings and my advice which, by the way I still hold to, was ignored.

We have since met with several Congressional staffers, even those of a couple of Presidential aspirants, including one incumbent. We have also met with the staffs

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of the House Committee on the Judiciary, who were responding to a relevant GAO report.

The project team must achieve a balance between the control of sensitive information, that is information covered by the Privacy Act and also classified material, and the need to perform all work in the sunshine.

There is also attention between the need for the Board's work to be performed independently of NIOSH and DOE while at the same time coordinating those activities with NIOSH and DOE for the sake of efficiency.

My understanding is that considerable effort has been put forth by all parties and procedures have been developed to define how NIOSH and its contractors and the Board and its contractor will coordinate site visits, data capture, and worker interviews at DOE sites while maintaining the independence of the Board's investigations.

These procedures also address the

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complexity of having SC&A draft work products reviewed by DOE for sensitive information and also by NIOSH for Privacy Act information without infringing on the Board's independent oversight mission. I expect that there will be continuing challenges in achieving these competing requirements.

this technical support originally envisioned, contract was my recollection is that there was no explicit consideration given to the way in which our findings would be resolved. The original statement of work described the various reviews required specified the and contractor's deliverables associated with these reviews.

And, by the way, it has been my observation that for many of our contracts in the past, the report goes on the shelf and that's the end of it. However, in this case, it didn't take long for the Board to realize that there had to be a mechanism established

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for the resolution of the contractor's findings and recommendations.

have observed that the issues resolution process and the tools used to track and document that process has also placed a burden on project resources. I understand that methods used to resolve and document the resolution of issues is a work in progress. I look forward to hearing more about the effectiveness of these methods in helping the document achieve and issues program resolution.

I'd like to conclude by once again expressing my appreciation to the Board for selecting SC&A as your contractor. I assure you that SC&A's management will thoroughly support the project team in meeting the numerous technical and administrative challenges that we're certain to encounter in the future.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very

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much, Sandy. We appreciate those comments. I know that your comments are not designed to provoke any discussion but nonetheless since we have you here, it would seem appropriate -- and I'm kind of in the habit of asking the Board and I think if you are agreeable, to give the Board members opportunities if they do wish to ask you anything about the operation as you see it or anything related.

DR. COHEN: I'd be glad to attempt to answer some questions.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And I'm not going to ask you a question but I do want to express the thanks for the Board to you for the teams that you've put together and the ability of those folks to develop -- to help us both develop procedures and approaches to some of the thorny problems that you identified as you addressed us.

Ms. Munn, you have your banner up there. You have a comment?

MEMBER MUNN: Yes, I do. So does

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Mr. Melius. I notice that the good doctor is not in his chair. So I don't know whether he wanted to address Dr. Cohen or not.

In any case, welcome, Dr. Cohen. It is a pleasure to see the face behind the name. And a further pleasure to see that you have identified in your brief remarks a couple of the items that appeared to be thorny issues for us as well.

I can't help but comment that personally I believe your position with respect to both those items is a parallel position of mine. And it is much appreciated.

Your organization is not in an easy spot. And as you pointed out, the confluence of conflicting goals is difficult for everyone concerned. But you have provided us with an excellent team that has worked diligently with us in an attempt to smooth out these larger problems that this confusing situation has presented.

So you certainly have the thanks

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1	from this Board member. And thank you very
2	much for being here.
3	DR. COHEN: Thank you.
4	Are there any other questions?
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Any other
6	comments? Jim had his flag up. But he had to
7	leave. Or did he?
8	MEMBER BEACH: I think it was up
9	from the last
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, from before.
11	Okay.
12	Okay, very good. Again, thank you,
13	Sandy, for being here with us this week.
14	I'm going to go ahead and let us
15	begin our break. It is a few minutes early
16	for that but since we always seem to have a
17	way of extending breaks beyond their scheduled
18	time, so I'll give you a little extra time
19	this time.
20	But we do need to come back
21	together promptly at 10:30 since that is
22	basically a time certain with the petitions

1	for the Tyson Valley Powder Farm discussion.
2	So we will recess until then.
3	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off
4	the record at 10:01 a.m., and
5	resumed at 10:34 a.m.)
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We're now ready
7	to resume our deliberations.
8	The next item on our agenda is the
9	petition on what is called the Tyson Valley
10	Powder Farm. This is an SEC 83.13 petition
11	that LaVon Rutherford will present on behalf
12	of NIOSH. And then we may hear from the
13	petitioner by phone as well.
14	MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay. Thank you,
15	Dr. Ziemer.
16	Again, I'm LaVon Rutherford. I'm
17	going to talk about Tyson Valley Powder Farm
18	Special Exposure Cohort Petition.
19	This petition was received on June
20	13th, 2008. We had a proposed class of all
21	employees who worked in any are at Tyson
22	Valley Powder during the applicable covered

period from January 1, 1942 through December 31st, 1949. That is the entire covered period designed under the DOE facility database website.

petition qualified The for evaluation on August 4th, 2008. The petitioners had provided an affidavit there was, to the best of their knowledge, no monitoring data. And based on our review, we concurred with that, that there personal or area monitoring data.

A little background about the site,
Tyson Valley Powder Farm is located in St.
Louis, Missouri. In 1941, the U.S. Army
purchased some land, undeveloped land. They
had purchased that land approximately 25 miles
southwest of St. Louis.

It was established as the Tyson Valley Army Powder Storage Farm, also known as Tyson Valley Powder Farm. The original primary function of this site was to receive, store, issue, and test explosives.

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On May 10th, 1946, the U.S. Army declared the Tyson Valley Powder Farm site as surplus. During that time, the Atomic Energy Commission was looking for an area to store some byproduct material and scrap material. And so the Atomic Energy Commission began using the buildings at Tyson Valley Powder Farm immediately after closure.

Our earliest reference to the AEC's desire to use that facility is February 13th, 1946. At some time between February 13th, 1946 and June 28th, 1946, the AEC began to store radioactive material on the site. So what we have used is we have used the February 13th, 1946 as basically our start date for the purpose of this, as I just mentioned.

Our sources that we used to get information, again, we always look through site profiles, technical information, bulletins, and procedures for information. We also performed interviews, looked at the existing claimant files. As you notice, we

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have one claimant.

We looked at documentation provided by the petitioner. We also did our site -- looked through our site research database.

And we performed data capture efforts.

Our data capture efforts included a historian for St. Louis Area Weapons Work. She's not truly a historian. She is actually a professor of political science. That is Dr. Denise DeGarmo, who is the audience.

The Missouri Department of Natural Resources, St. Louis Office, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Louis County Library, DOE Germantown, Legacy Management, NSA, NRC, a lot of these you'll notice are very -- are ones that you would see on the previous petition because, again, these are sources that over time we realize provide information on more than one site. And so we go back to those sources.

Washington State University,
Washington University libraries, National

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Archives, DOE OpenNet, internet searches, CDER database, and various DOE locations.

A previous dose reconstruction, we have one claim for this site. And that claimant is actually -- the survivor is actually the petitioner. And that claim meets the class definition.

And one-dose reconstruction was completed. We have no internal or external monitoring data from that plant.

A little background on Tyson Valley Powder Farm, documents indicate that the AEC may have used as many as five igloos to store uranium and uranium byproducts. These igloos, we know for sure at least two of them and these igloos contained storage area of a maximum of 100,000 pounds.

There is no information as to how the material was placed, stored, or removed from the site. And the AEC continued to use this site until its permit was revoked on July 1, 1948. We do have some documentation that

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indicates that the material was actually moved in that June time frame from the site.

NIOSH did not find any evidence of other areas at Tyson Valley Powder Farm being used for radioactive material storage or operations. The radioactive material stored on this site, uranium scrap materials, they were scrap materials contaminated with uranium. We had the bottom third of the slag biscuit.

And you'll notice that some of these have quantities because we did, through our review of documentation, we were able to uncover some source quantities for some of the material. You'll also notice that some of them will say unknown. Slag biscuit and also the C-slag, which was the top two-thirds of the slag.

Pitchblende residues, these residues were generated prior to 1948 with an unknown amount. And the raffinates or byproducts of the uranium ore processing, if

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you'll remember during Mallinckrodt period, the 1946-48 period was a prime time when the high-grade pitchblende ore was being processed at Mallinckrodt.

We do not have clear documentation that says the high-grade ore was stored at this site but we do know -- or the pitchblende or byproducts were stored at this site but we do know that pitchblende or byproducts were stored there during this period.

And that is the period when high-grade pitchblende ore was being processed. So because of that, we had to assume that the high-grade pitchblende ore byproducts were there.

Potential internal radiation exposures during the class period -- and I want to go back to the one claimant we have, who just happens to be the caretaker of this site during that period -- I forgot to mention that.

Tyson Valley Powder Farm workers

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for internal radiation had the potential from uranium residues through exposure inhalation and ingestion of airborne uranium from dust and exposures radon and progeny while working at this site.

Uranium metal scrap would present a low risk from an internal exposure because most of that was in metal from. However the pitchblende ore residues would present the greatest potential for internal exposure from the potentially high levels of radon generated.

External exposures could have resulted from drums and barrels containing uranium scrap and residues. The exposure rates would have varied depending Photon exposures source term. may resulted from radionuclides in the uranium decay chain and beta exposures as well.

And based on the information that we have, we do not believe neutron exposures would have been in any significant from at

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Tyson Valley.

Personal area monitoring data, internal monitoring data, we have no bioassay data for the class. We have no general area or breathing zone air sampling for the class period.

External monitoring data, no film badge or pocket dosimeter data. And no area radiation surveys.

Again, as earlier, it is a twoprong test. Is it feasible to reconstruct the
radiation doses for individual members with
sufficient accuracy? If no, is there a
reasonable likelihood that their health was
endangered?

Our determination, we found that the available monitoring records, process descriptions, and source-term data are not adequate to complete dose reconstruction with sufficient accuracy for the evaluated class. We will use existing procedures to reconstruct external exposures from medical X-rays.

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And our table, again, February 13th, 1946 -- again, that February 13th date is the date where know the AEC had we contacted to use the Tyson Valley Powder Farm so it would be the earliest possible date that material could have been on site through June 30th, 1948, which is when we know the material was removed from the site and no longer at Tyson Valley Powder Farm.

You'll notice in comparison to the covered period, the covered period on DOE facility database is 1942 through -- up to 1949. Our review of records and information indicates that there was no material -- AEC material on site prior to that February 13th period.

Health endangerment, the evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates some workers may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intakes of radionuclides and direct exposure to radioactive material. Consequently, we have determined that their

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1	health may have been endangered.
2	Our proposed class is all AWE
3	employees who worked at Tyson Valley Powder
4	Farm in St. Louis, Missouri from February
5	13th, 1946 through June 30th, 1948 for the
6	number of work days aggregating at least 250
7	work days.
8	Again, our recommendation,
9	feasibility is no, health endangerment is yes.
10	Questions?
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Again, we thank
12	you, LaVon, for that presentation.
13	Josie, you have the first question.
14	MEMBER BEACH: Hi, LaVon. I
15	realize with just one employee, do you know
16	how many employees worked during that time
17	period?
18	MR. RUTHERFORD: You know there
19	were a number of buildings on the site but I
20	do not know how many people actually worked
21	during that period.
22	MEMBER BEACH: And also did you

1	hold any worker outreach meetings?
2	MR. RUTHERFORD: We didn't hold any
3	worker outreach specifically for that area.
4	We did try to find people to interview. And
5	we actually went to the St. Louis Bureau
6	and I'm trying to remember the exact names and
7	talked to a few people that were familiar with
8	the assessments that went on during that
9	period.
10	And asked them for additional
11	potential contacts that they may have that we
12	could talk to and we did not get any hits on
13	that.
14	MEMBER BEACH: Okay. Thanks.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: John Poston?
16	MEMBER POSTON: Wanda.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, Wanda is
18	next? Okay.
19	MEMBER MUNN: LaVon, do you have
20	any concept of how the igloos were constructed
21	and how they were sealed? Ordinarily, storage
22	igloos of that type are not areas where

personnel are likely to be entering unless they are bringing things in and bringing things out, which is a relatively short period of time. Do you have any of that information?

MR. RUTHERFORD: No, we do not have any information on whether they were open or if they were sealed or, you know, recognizing the fact that the radon generation from the

And if there were any inspections at all that would have occurred, it would have been an exposure potential to the caretaker.

pitchblende ores, if they were sealed, would

have built up in the igloos as well.

Now the possibility would be can you limit that class based on that to just people that could have entered those igloos.

If we were to have enough knowledge that said that they were closed and sealed, which we don't, but we actually went to -- our proposed class at the Department of Labor was individuals that entered those five igloos.

And the Department of Labor came

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1	back to us and said there is no way was can
2	administer that class as defined. And,
3	therefore, they recommended that we change the
4	class to what we have defined it as, as all
5	AWE employees.
6	MEMBER MUNN: Thank you.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Poston?
8	MEMBER POSTON: I think Ms. Munn
9	asked my question because being familiar with
10	these igloos, they are normally sealed after
11	they are filled and there's no entering except
12	to go get the material when you take it out.
13	So this is, in my estimation, sort
14	of a presumptive exposure. If this were a
15	criminal investigation, you would have no
16	proof that a crime has been committed. So it
17	is sort of a strange situation we haven't
18	always faced before.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
20	Other comments or questions?
21	LaVon will catch Mark but very
22	quickly is there any evidence that there was

1	contamination left behind or any remedial
2	action that occurred later?
3	MR. RUTHERFORD: I don't recall. I
4	don't remember reading anything on that at
5	all.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
7	Mark?
8	MEMBER GRIFFON: I think first off,
9	I will follow up on Paul's I mean there is
10	some indication that there was some FUSRAP
11	investigation on this site, right? And I
12	don't know if you found any reports on that
13	and whether they, in any way, quantified the -
14	_
15	MR. RUTHERFORD: No, I know that
16	the land was actually cleaned I mean that
17	the land was deemed cleaned and turned over to
18	the City of St. Louis.
19	MEMBER GRIFFON: But you had no
20	reports on that? You couldn't find any on
21	that?

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No.

MR. RUTHERFORD:

1	MEMBER GRIFFON: I guess the other
2	questions are along the same lines that have
3	already been asked but, you know, if I heard
4	you right, I heard you say you can actually
5	limit you know, you've got potentially five
6	igloos, 100,000 pounds per igloo. And if I
7	assume worst case, it is all pitchblende. Why
8	can't I bound doses on I'm just trying to
9	rationalize this compared to other sites that
10	we work on.
11	MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay. Well, I
12	mean from a sufficiently accurate if you
13	are looking at 100,000 pounds of high-grade

mean from a sufficiently accurate -- if you are looking at 100,000 pounds of high-grade pitchblende ore, what are your radon concentrations going to be to the lung? I don't think that's -- I mean I think that Dr. Neton would agree with me that I think that would step outside the bounds of sufficiently accurate.

MEMBER GRIFFON: So that's not plausible probably?

MR. RUTHERFORD: Correct.

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1	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay. I'm just
2	trying to get a sense of this compared to
3	other evaluations that we look at.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, if you knew
5	the masses and assumed that was all
6	MR. RUTHERFORD: Sure. And the
7	other issue is
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: you could
9	calculate the radon output but you don't know
LO	much about the igloos in terms of the buildup
L1	and diffusion out and so on.
L2	DR. NETON: Yes, the air exchange
L3	rates as well.
L4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
L5	DR. NETON: But, LaVon, refresh my
L6	memory, we don't do we know much at all
L7	about the process involved in the loading of
L8	these igloos?
L9	MR. RUTHERFORD: And that was the
20	other point
21	DR. NETON: How this material was
22	really transferred, that's one of the big

1	issues.
2	MR. RUTHERFORD: We don't know how
3	it was transferred, the storage inspections
4	that were done, and how the material was
5	removed at all. And that was mentioned
6	earlier. And we also don't know the
7	concentrations that was, you know, the
8	processed ores.
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay. I'll give
10	you I'm just wrestling with this, you know,
11	this notion of, you know, clearly some
12	pitchblende ore went there. It may not have
13	been the highest concentration.
14	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, we don't
15	know.
16	MEMBER GRIFFON: But your
17	determination was that assuming it was all the
18	highest grade pitchblende was didn't fit
19	the method didn't fit the sufficiently
20	accurate test.
21	MR. RUTHERFORD: I wouldn't say
22	I would say that that, along with the fact

1	that we know nothing about how the material
2	was placed
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.
4	MR. RUTHERFORD: and how the
5	material was stored, inspections that were
6	performed, how the material was removed from
7	the site. And recognize during that two-year
8	period, it wasn't just we put it in one day
9	and we removed it at the end of the period.
10	It was placed over time, built up into those
11	igloos.
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay. And just
13	the last thing John has a question just
14	is the last one. I'm trying to understand the
15	`46 determination that the site was from
16	`42 through `49 or whatever
17	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right.
18	MEMBER GRIFFON: but you didn't
19	find any indication until `46 that anything
20	was stored there, is that
21	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. Based on
22	what we have, the Army was still using the

1	facility. It was the Army's facility up until
2	1946 when they declared the site was surplus.
3	And at that time at that time the AEC
4	inquired about using the facility for storage
5	of radioactive materials.
6	And the February 13th date that we
7	had identified is actually the date where we
8	have that official request by the ACE to use
9	the site. We used that date even though we
10	know material didn't go in that day but the
11	next day that we have that we know material
12	was there, it was already there. And that was
13	in June of that year.
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: But how did DOL
15	define the time frame for the site?
16	MR. RUTHERFORD: I do not know. We
17	have all of the documents the Department of
18	Labor has. And
19	MEMBER GRIFFON: But I mean if it
20	was Army before that, it shouldn't have been
21	defined as an operating period, correct?

MR. RUTHERFORD: I agree.

1	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean I think we
2	have to sort that out. That's pretty
3	important here.
4	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, we will go
5	back to the Department of Labor with a letter
6	and with all our reference material to show
7	that where we believe that the `42 through the
8	`46 period should not be a covered period.
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.
LO	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Melius?
11	MEMBER MELIUS: Just a quick follow
L2	up on that part of it, just make sure that
L3	there is a note to come back to the Board with
L4	that
L5	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes.
L6	MEMBER MELIUS: information
L7	because I think it helps us understand
L8	MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes.
L9	MEMBER MELIUS: this designation
20	site designation issue and time period
21	because we keep running into this a lot with
22	these sites.

1	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right.
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: LaVon, who is the
3	official employer at this site? Was Tyson
4	Valley Powder a company? Or just the name of
5	the location? These weren't Mallinckrodt
6	people were they?
7	MR. RUTHERFORD: You know, I do not
8	recall.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, the reason
10	I ask that when we say they are employees, who
11	are they employees of?
12	MR. RUTHERFORD: Well, Tyson Valley
13	Powder Farm. And the Department of Labor
14	determines whether a claim is accepted under
15	this program.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, I understand
17	that.
18	MR. RUTHERFORD: So they are the
19	ones that have defined the facility.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: They'll make the
21	determination.
22	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right.

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It's more of a
2	curiosity thing. I'm just wondering, you
3	know, it is fairly clear cut if you are a
4	Mallinckrodt worker that you worked for
5	Mallinckrodt. It's not clear who they are
6	working for here.
7	And I don't know if Labor is even
8	prepared to answer that now. But Jeff, you
9	don't happen to know, do you, who the employer
10	is for Tyson Valley Powder?
11	MR. KOTSCH: No, not really.
12	Actually LaVon sent us, I think, four cases.
13	We had our Denver Office look at them. And I
14	just don't remember who the, you know, who the
15	employer was listed on there.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Maybe the
17	petitioner will be able to, you know, inform
18	us on that in a moment.
19	Any other questions? John Poston?
20	MEMBER POSTON: Just a few facts.
21	I applaud Mark for trying to provide an upper
22	bound by assuming it was all pitchblende but

as LaVon stated, there was scrap materials, which were simply contaminated with uranium, and then there were the slag biscuits, which have a lower concentration of uranium.

And the pitchblende, according to LaVon's slides is only .29 percent U308, which is sort of a medium to low concentration ore.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Well, I think you are supporting my argument, John, that, you know, probably all 500,000 pounds wouldn't be pitchblende. And they've got other data that they can subtract off of that 500,000 to get that number down. And maybe, you know, it's not so unreasonable.

That was sort of my point that maybe they can reconstruct. I'm just trying to understand this juxtaposed to other sites that we've looked at where we've said that we can't do it.

The only final item I ask LaVon is on the one slide you said that you have one claim and you had one dose reconstruction that

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1	you completed. How did you complete that dose
2	reconstruction, if I might ask?
3	MR. RUTHERFORD: I figured that
4	question was going to come up.
5	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, it's on a
6	slide. I'm sure people were thinking about
7	it.
8	MR. RUTHERFORD: The one claim that
9	we have, who is the petitioner's actual
10	survivor is an A4 prostate cancer. Now
11	you'll wonder why we qualified a or why we
12	used a petitioner with a prostate cancer. And
13	if I say anything I'm not allowed to say
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It might be too
15	late.
16	MR. RUTHERFORD: I'm sure our
17	attorneys will are looking at me I will
18	make sure that
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It might be too
20	late.
21	MR. RUTHERFORD: there were
22	other issues with the claim that allowed it to

1 qualify. However, the cancer that was 2 evaluated and the dose reconstruction was 3 completed was for a prostate. 4 And as you know from an internal 5 perspective, you throw exposure can an 6 enormous amount at that. And so that is what 7 it was set at. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I want to ask now 8 I'm not if the petitioner is on the line. 9 10 sure -- I won't identify her unless she is on the line. Okay, hold on just a moment until 11 we get the mic -- okay, now if you would -- we 12 13 would be pleased to hear from you if you so desire. And you can identify yourself. 14 15 MS. BARNETT: Thank you. Ιf 16 you're not hearing me, please let me know. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, we hear you. 17 18 MS. BARNETT: My name is Eileen 19 Janette Barnett. And I'm representative for 20 [Identifying information Redacted], who is the his claimant for deceased [Identifying 21

22

information Redacted].

And I want to thank you for giving me this time for some comments. Well, this claim has been in the works for more than five years. And I know it has a way to go or not. So I'd just like to comment on here and now.

In its long process, I somehow had

the idea that if it were to ever get to NIOSH, it would be like reaching Nirvana. That here would be experts in investigation and resources of information or at least as many as were available to NIOSH.

So whatever the ultimate decision on this case, I think I had the right idea. So I want to thank all of you for all of your labors.

And my [Identifying information Redacted] and I would also like to express our appreciation for the communication we've had in letters and telephone calls, e-mails, and even personal contact.

I wish we could remember everybody's names there but especially we want

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1	to thank NIOSH Ombudsman Denise Brock who
2	well, she has a gift for explaining
3	complicated things, making this complicated
4	process a little more clear. And also for
5	clearing a path for us. Thank you, Denise.
6	Last and very important, we just
7	want to remember Clete Barnett, [Identifying
8	information Redacted]. He worked at Tyson
9	Valley Powder Farm in 1946 and `47. He was a
10	remarkable man with many unfulfilled dreams
11	for his beloved Kentucky farm.
12	He loved his farm, his family, and
13	his country. Well, he'll never be forgotten.
14	Again, thank you for this time.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you
16	very much, Eileen, for your comments.
17	MS. BARNETT: Sure.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Board members,
19	any other questions or discussion?
20	It would be in order to have a
21	motion regarding this particular petition.
22	Well, the Chair does not want this matter to

1	drop for lack of a motion. So is there anyone
2	who wishes to make a motion regarding this
3	recommendation?
4	Ms. Munn, with some fear lest it be
5	modified, let's proceed. And we can proceed
6	as we did before. We understand that we need
7	a motion on the floor. We'll get the wording
8	if it is so ordered.
9	MEMBER MUNN: It is what? My
10	motion that we accept the recommendation of
11	the NIOSH investigators and that the Secretary
12	be advised accordingly.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
14	Is there a second to the motion?
15	MEMBER LOCKEY: I second.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Lockey
17	seconds the motion.
18	Dr. Melius, do you have some
19	wording all ready for this particular one?
20	MEMBER MELIUS: I have a friendly
21	amendment, yes.
22	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.

MEMBER MELIUS: A lengthy friendly amendment.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Lengthy friendly amendment, okay, here we are.

The Board MEMBER MELIUS: Okay. recommends that the following letter be transmitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services within 21 days. Should the Chair become aware of any issue that in his judgment would preclude the transmittal of this letter within that time period, the Board requests that he promptly informs the Board of the delay and the reasons for this delay, and that he immediately works with NIOSH to schedule an emergency meeting of the Board to discuss this issue.

The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, the Board, has evaluated SEC Petition 00115 concerning workers at the Tyson Valley Powder Farm in St. Louis, Missouri, under the statutory requirements established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 CFR 83.13

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and 42 CFR 83.14. The Board respectfully recommends Special Exposure Cohort status be accorded to all atomic weapons employer, AWE employees, who worked at the Tyson Valley Powder Farm in St. Louis, Missouri, from February 13th, 1946 through June 30th, 1948, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 works days occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC.

The Board notes that although NIOSH

The Board notes that although NIOSH found that they were unable to completely reconstruct radiation doses for these employees, they believe that they are able to reconstruct the occupational medical dose.

This recommendation is based on the following factors:

- 1. Tyson Valley Powder Farm was involved in the storage of materials from the early manufacture of atomic weapons.
  - 2. NIOSH was unable to locate

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sufficient monitoring data, information operations this site, and source-term at information at this site in order to be able individual to complete accurate dose reconstruction for the potential internal/external radiation exposures to which these workers may have been subjected. Board concurs with this conclusion.

3. NIOSH determined that health may have been endangered for the workers exposed to radiation at this facility during the time period in question. The Board also concurs with this determination.

Based on these considerations and discussions held at our February 18th Advisory Board meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the Board recommends that this Special Exposure Cohort petition be granted.

Enclosed is the documentation from the Board meeting where the Special Exposure Cohort class was discussed. The documentation includes transcripts of the deliberations,

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copies of the petition, the NIOSH review 1 2 thereof, and related documents distributed by 3 NIOSH. If any of these items are unavailable at this time, they will follow shortly. 4 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very 5 6 much, Dr. Melius. insert 7 need to here -perhaps some clarification, LaVon, I'm looking 8 back in the evaluation report itself versus 9 10 the slide and I'm noticing that the evaluation report shows that you can reconstruct external 11 12 dose. And I -- Jim, what wording did we 13 have on that in the friendly amendment? 14 15 MEMBER MELIUS: They couldn't 16 construct external. They could reconstruct occupational doses. 17 I was going by the slides. 18 19 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I'm seeing -- and 20 LaVon, in the evaluation report, page 24, I'm noting that NIOSH says it can reconstruct 21 external dose, including medical X-ray, but

gamma and beta. And it only 1 also 2 internal not feasible. 3 MR. RUTHERFORD: Unfortunately, I believe we have an error in our table under 4 5 here because what we -- if you actually review 6 earlier in the report, we actually say that we could reconstruct some of the external dose. 7 But without the quantities, the significant 8 quantities, could 9 source-term we not 10 completely define the external dose. that's what it should have 11 And And so the external table should have 12 said. 13 been no. And I'm really kind of surprised. I'm wondering if somehow or another we have an 14 15 I'll have to issue a revision of the 16 report to show that the external doses are no with the exception of occupational medical X-17 18 ray. 19 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. So that 20 what you have in the slide is --MR. RUTHERFORD: Is correct. It is 21

correct.

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: what was
2	intended and what is in the letter then is
3	correct.
4	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. It is
5	correct.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And I thought
7	from the narrative in the report, it appeared
8	that you could not reconstruct external dose.
9	MR. RUTHERFORD: Right. I
10	apologize, I somehow missed that.
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sorry, I missed
12	that earlier until I was just reviewing it
13	again. So we will assume that the evaluation
14	report will be corrected or modified so that
15	it is in agreement with what we were told here
16	in the oral presentation as well as what the
17	narration in the report itself states. And
18	that's Table 7-1 in the report.
19	Board Members, you've heard the
20	motion and the official wording. Are you
21	ready to vote then? It appears that we are.
22	And we'll take a roll call vote.

1	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
2	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
4	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
5	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson?
6	MEMBER GIBSON: Yes.
7	MR. KATZ: I'm sorry, that was yes.
8	Mr. Griffon?
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: Abstain.
10	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
11	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.
12	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
14	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
15	MEMBER MUNN: Aye.
16	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?
17	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
18	MR. KATZ: Mr. Presley?
19	MEMBER PRESLEY: Yes.
20	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
21	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
22	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield?

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1 MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes. 2 MR. KATZ: And Dr. Ziemer? 3 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. The voting is 11 in favor and one 4 5 abstention. Thank you very much. The motion carries and we will proceed to transmit the 6 7 appropriate materials. I'm going to skip ahead now on the 8 agenda since we have a little time. 9 10 Let me thank Ms. Barnett for being with us today if she's still on the phone. 11 12 Thank you again for your comments. 13 We're going to move ahead then on the agenda. We have already heard from Mr. 14 15 Cohen. And we want to keep the afternoon 16 schedule basically fixed so that we will do the General Steel Industries SEC Petition at 17 1:15. We'll do the Hood Building petition at 18 19 3:00. And Blockson Chemical at 4:00. In the meantime, we have some items 20 that we can move up in the schedule. And from 21 22 tomorrow morning's agenda, one of those items

is the Science Update. And I understand Dr. 1 2 Neton is prepared to present that to us now. 3 So, Jim, if you would, we'll proceed on the Science Update. 4 5 DR. NETON: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer. 6

I'm here to present an update on a few issues that have come to fruition since the last time the Board met just a few short months ago. So there's -- it's hard to come up with earth-shaking scientific progress when the Board seems to meet so frequently these days but I do have a few things I'd like to report on today.

The first one as I mentioned, I think, in my last presentation that we were undertaking a verification and validation of the NIOSH-IREP Program itself, specifically that refers to the current version that is used by the Department of Labor and NIOSH and also the version that is posted on our website. That is version 5.5.3.

As the bullet indicates on this

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slide, this effort was undertaken to insure that the program operated with the parameters, equations, and assumptions that were described in the formal documentation of the program.

And by formal documentation, I'm referring to two or three documents actually. The first one is the -- what I call the Green Book, the National Academy of Science's Review of the NIOSH or the NCI Version of IREP that was undertaken several years ago followed by the documentation that is online for the version of NIOSH-IREP that is on our website.

And then finally, the third piece of documentation is the recent publication of the NIOSH-IREP article in a special edition of the Health Physics Journal that appeared, I think it was the July issue of Health Physics last year.

It is a very extensive, nice write up of IREP. If no one has read that yet, I would encourage you. It is very good bedtime reading.

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Okay. The approach that was undertaken here had sort of a three-prong attack. One was to compare the equations and the risk models that were used in the code to those described in the formal documentation. That is, you know, were the models actually transcribed into the program itself.

And then also to compare any numerical data that were in there -- did we transport the numerical data properly in there -- some of these assumed fractional distributions and such.

And then to make sort of a micro version of NIOSH-IREP using Excel and Crystal Ball. The program is so large it couldn't possibly run on an Excel/Crystal Ball combination. Well, it would be very difficult to make it run that way. It runs on an Analytica engine platform now.

But we created this scaled-down version of the risk models. And independently generated the equations and the numerical data

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used in the program itself.

Now if you remember, IREP is a probabilistic model so we took a two-tact approach. One was to actually do deterministic calculations, you know put in values and make sure the equations actually came out exactly correctly.

And the other aspect was to do the probabilistic runs and make sure that the outputs were within certain proscribed ranges of acceptance.

I should have mentioned up front that this was undertaken by our contractor, Senes Oak Ridge, that maintains the IREP program for NIOSH.

The verification and validation exercise basically demonstrated to us, at least, our mind, at least, that the code actually worked as intended. But with a code this size, I guess I shouldn't have been surprised that there were some inconsistencies, which we'll call findings

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1	here that were identified in the V&V of the
2	program.
3	Fortunately, they appear they
4	don't appear they did effect only isolated
5	portions of the code. There were no systemic,
6	huge issues identified. And the magnitude of
7	those expected changes
8	MR. KATZ: Jim, can you hold one
9	moment?
10	DR. NETON: Yes.
11	MR. KATZ: I'm sorry. Folks on the
12	phone, are you having a hard time hearing? Go
13	ahead and try again and let's just see.
14	DR. NETON: Okay. The magnitude of
15	the changes in the probabilistic causation
16	calculations are expected to be small. And
17	I'd just like to go over those three
18	MR. KATZ: Sorry, sorry to
19	interrupt. This is not the Blockson petition
20	but are you having a difficult time hearing
21	still on the phone?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Four o'clock.

1 MR. KATZ: At four o'clock. But 2 just want to ascertain all your I 3 quality. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You can ask Mike. 4 I don't know how we 5 MR. KATZ: 6 could -- Mike, are you having a difficult time 7 hearing as well? Okay, Jim, can you maybe just speak 8 more into the mic or something? 9 10 DR. NETON: Sure. The first finding that 11 Senes discovered was that there was an error in the 12 estimate of the risk in the calculation for 13 the acute lymphocytic leukemia model. And it 14 15 was due to something very simple, which was 16 the spelling of lymphocytic. The code said if this equal lymphocytic, go here. And since it 17 was spelled wrong, it never went there. 18 19 But it was in the quadratic term of the calculation. If you remember, all models 20 within IREP assume a linear no-threshold dose 21

response relationship with the exception of

leukemia models. The leukemia models, for acute exposures to low linear energy transfer radiation, that is photons and beta particles, has a quadratic term built into it.

So without the quadratic term in there, it would really only effect acute exposures to low linear energy transfer radiations that were a fairly high magnitude because at the linear portion -- or the low dose portion, the linear term predominates. only until you get into the higher And portions does the quadratic term kick in to any appreciable extent.

So based on this, the revised version could result in higher values for probability of causation for some cases of acute lymphocytic leukemia.

The second finding was an error that was discovered in the uncertainty equation for the age dependency modifier for Group 2 cancers. So remember, this is not the age dependency calculation. It is the

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uncertainty in the age dependency calculation.

And I just have a little footnote here that reminds folks of what Group 2 cancers are. They are listed here and those are the cancers for which there were fewer numbers of cases in the Hiroshima Nagasaki survivor dataset, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation dataset.

And because of that, the models are a little simpler than the more complex models like Group 1 that could do things like sex -- corrections for sex and stuff like that in the risk calculations.

So it would be these cancers that would be effected. It would not affect any cases that were diagnosed after 50 years of age.

I should note that the beginning of a very long equation for the GSD -- the geometric standard deviation -- is listed here. And the error was that little two was left out. And if you notice the term that the

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two is in is subtracted from the first term, it would actually result in a smaller geometric standard deviation if the two were included.

of that, the Because corrected version would result in lower probability of causations for cancers. So in this case, the PC, if, you know, any effect was observed, it would be to decrease the probability causation. But even with that, we would expect this to be small because remember, this is the uncertainty term in another term that was effected.

And the final finding that was noted in the Senes' review was an error in the uncertainty of the modifier for age dependency in the National Institutes of Health lung model. If you recall, we actually run two lung risk calculations within NIOSH-IREP.

One is the original one that was published with the code. The second one is what we call the NIH lung model because that

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is what the NIH is using. And that particular code was modified to include some additional analysis done by Preston et al from the RERF that incorporates some additional data on the effect of cigarette smoking I believe.

When we modified NIOSH-IREP, we now run both of those models and pick the one that has the higher probability of causation. The error that was in this calculation was a reversal in the sign -- a plus or minus sign associated with the terms, again, in the geometric standard deviation calculation for the age dependency modifier.

It is a little less certain in this case how the effect is going to go. The revised version could be either slightly lower or higher depending on a combination of ages at exposures and ages at diagnosis.

But nonetheless, our initial review of this indicates that the effect on any case would probably be within plus or minus .5 percent on the PC calculation itself. So a

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fairly small but not inconsequential difference.

So given that we have done this and identified these particular issues, you know, what are we going to do about it? And obviously we are going to update the current version of IREP 5.5.3 to a new version that we're going to call 5.6 that corrects these algorithms.

We already have what we call an enterprise edition in place running in the background that we're evaluating right now. And, of course, we will do a verification validation of all those corrections to make sure they function properly.

But as importantly, I think, we will identify the specific claims effected and we're working through those issues now and issue a program evaluation report and rework any claims that were effected by these errors.

It was a fairly interesting exercise. I'm really glad we did it. I

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should have mentioned up front that this was undertaken by primarily -- there were some stakeholders' concerns about this, about the adequacy of the verification/validation.

And I was quick to point out early on that it's not that it wasn't verified but not in this rigorous of a manner. I mean they were all independently verified, the calculations.

But it wasn't done by a third party un-associated with the calculations -- more like you'd see with a very rigorous V&V that we've done with sort of a nuclear power planttype application.

Senes Oak Ridge has completed all of this. We're in the process of correcting this as I indicated.

And right now we have a very short draft report out but we're expecting -- actually just before I left, I received a draft report that is 400-plus pages that goes through all of the mechanics and nuts and

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	Doits of what was done here.
2	And as soon as I can review that
3	and we approve it for release, we'll put that
4	on our website and make it available to the
5	public.
6	Mark?
7	MEMBER GRIFFON: We usually have
8	questions at the end but
9	DR. NETON: Yes, that's fine.
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: this one seems
11	pertinent now. You said an independent
12	review? I mean
13	DR. NETON: Well, it was someone
14	not associated
15	MEMBER GRIFFON: Senes developed
16	the IREP that is online, right? The NIOSH-
17	IREP?
18	DR. NETON: Yes.
19	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean there was
20	NIH-IREP but this is Senes doing the V&V on
21	Senes' product.
22	DR. NETON: Yes, I'm sorry.

1	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.
2	DR. NETON: What I really should
3	have said was that it was someone not
4	associated with developing the code in the
5	first place. The coders weren't doing the
6	V&V.
7	MEMBER GRIFFON: So it was another
8	party at
9	DR. NETON: Another party
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: Senes?
11	DR. NETON: within Senes
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.
13	DR. NETON: that was doing the
14	independent calculations, which is somewhat
15	traditional on how those things go.
16	Okay. Any other questions on IREP
17	before I move into another issue?
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler?
19	MEMBER ROESSLER: That spelling
20	error is sort of interesting. And I'm I've
21	never done a code evaluation but I assume they
22	didn't find it by going through and looking

1	for spelling errors but they did it in a
2	mathematical way and then they figured out
3	that's what happened.
4	DR. NETON: I don't know but I
5	would suspect that's probably what it was.
6	That the two you know, they reprogrammed it
7	and the numbers were coming out different. So
8	they had to go back and figure out, you know,
9	what caused that difference. And that's when
10	they identified the spelling error.
11	MEMBER ROESSLER: And once having
12	done that, then I think they might have been
13	alerted to looking for other things you
14	know, other spelling errors or something.
15	DR. NETON: Right. But remember,
16	you know, this whole undertaking was someone
17	independently coded those equations in Crystal
18	Ball and Excel and came up with answers. And
19	then ran both programs and compared the
20	numerical outputs.
21	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
22	DR. NETON: And if the numerical

1	outputs varied, then that would lead to a sort
2	of a hunt as to what was causing the issue.
3	MEMBER MELIUS: Probably Microsoft
4	spell check was you know we're using Google
5	searches now.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I might add
7	to that, it pegs my mind here or spurs my
8	recollection is that I can misspell something
9	when I go into Google or any of the search
LO	engines and they figure out what I'm really
11	after. I don't know if they're just using
L2	spell check but they seem to be pretty smart.
L3	And the minor misspelling of a word
L4	like lymphocytic, I would hope in the future
L5	that the program would be able to figure out
L6	that that is what was meant
L7	DR. NETON: Yes.
L8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: because I
L9	could see well, enough said.
20	DR. NETON: I'm not sure you want
21	programs doing that because sometimes when I
22	mistype something in Google

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I understand.
2	DR. NETON: it gives me some
3	options that aren't really what I was looking
4	for.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That aren't what
6	you want, right.
7	MEMBER ROESSLER: I think we should
8	make it clear though that it wasn't a search
9	for a spelling error. That it was a
LO	mathematical determination. And that would
11	show up other errors, too.
L2	DR. NETON: Yes.
L3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. Very
L4	good.
L5	DR. NETON: And, of course, no
L6	errors are acceptable in this program. But I
L7	was actually quite gratified that, you know,
L8	the ones that were found resulted in fairly
L9	small differences. So that speaks, I think,
20	to the level of rigor that went into it in the
21	first place I believe.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, go ahead,

Jim, you want to proceed?

DR. NETON: Okay. The next issue, which has been on the agenda for quite some time now -- it's picking up some steam now -- is the chronic lymphocytic leukemia issue, you know, should it be a covered cancer.

We're continuing to pursue the possible addition of CLL. And, you know, as I indicated on this slide, we've engaged in a couple of rounds of subject expert reviews to make a determination in that regard.

You might recall, we commissioned a review panel very early on, a couple of years ago, to actually ask a number of experts should chronic lymphocytic leukemia be considered radiogenic in the first place.

If the answer we got back from the review panel was a resounding no, then we thought our job would be done. The experts say no. And as long as we have some good scientific justification, our job would be over.

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But that's not the way it came out.

The review panel of five experts, the majority of the reviewers supported the inclusion of CLL.

And I think I reported on that a while ago, that they found no substantive reason why CLL couldn't be caused by radiation exposure, even though the epic studies that have been conducted cannot really make a determination that CLL, there isn't some kind of dose response relationship. It doesn't mean that it couldn't be radiogenic.

So the majority of the reviewers chimed in that CLL certainly could be radiogenic, and that review was completed way back in 2005. This has been a much more complicated issue, though, than I would have envisioned when we first started it.

But when we also needed a way to do dose reconstructions for chronic lymphocytic leukemia, and I reported last time that, with our contractor, Senes Oak Ridge, we developed

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a probabilistic dose reconstruction method. I reported in some detail on that.

But we wanted to, you know, we wanted to poll the experts, does what we're proposing make sense? So we did a second round of review, and requested input on some five specific issues related to the etiology, the development of chronic lymphocytic leukemias.

And as I mentioned, these based on a Senes-generated white paper that came out August 12th, 2008. It's a fairly They reviewed -- extensive thick document. review of the literature on this. But we wanted to expert hematologists' get some opinions.

Review comments were solicited, as indicated here, in October 2008, and we finally received all -- the last set of comments from the last reviewer January 2009, last month.

I just listed here the five

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questions that we asked the panel to consider. 1 2 I don't expect to make anybody hematologists 3 here, but they essentially refer to the nature 4 of what mature lymphocyte precursors 5 involved here. 6 The development of lymphocytes 7 themselves is a fairly arcane science that not many people really are aware of, and to what 8

extent these precursors circulate.

Once, you know, you identify the precursor for a chronic lymphocytic leukemia cancer, do they circulate? Are they localized in different organs? Are they systemic? What is a residence time if they do become systemic?

And then there are some posttransformation transfers. Once you get a clone, can it migrate throughout the body?

So would it be reasonable to assume or not that the point of diagnosis where the CLL was originally located was its point of origin? Those kind of questions. We're

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1	really trying to get our hands around what is
2	going on here.
3	So we've got those review comments
4	in. In general, they're supportive of the
5	approach that we've developed. I see nothing
6	in these comments so far that would invalidate
7	what we've been proposing.
8	But we are going to prepare a
9	point-by-point evaluation of these last rounds
10	of comments. They're fairly technical. And
11	then we will finalize a risk model and dose
12	reconstruction approach, and prepare a
13	transmittal package for the HHS Secretary's
14	Office to take up this issue.
15	And that's the last slide I have.
16	So I'd be happy to answer any questions if
17	anybody has any.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Jim, can you
19	remind us or is it premature to ask this
20	what would be the, quote, organ of interest
21	for which the dose is calculated?

DR. NETON: It would be a -- this

is difficult to describe, but it's probabilistic dose reconstruction model. In other words, we would calculate doses to the various organs that the tumor could have in which the originated, tumor could have originated, and assign certain probability distributions for the doses to those different locations.

Because there is no one site that one can identify, it could either be the bone marrow, or it could be generally distributed throughout any of the lymphatic tissues. And once you do that, it's a very unwieldy, complex problem, and I think it lends itself to probabilistic modeling because the science is really not that well understood.

But I think we've got enough input from the subject experts in order to put some reasonable bounds around, you know, where these tumors could have originated.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And then once you did that, then is it appropriate to assume

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1	that you would select the one for which the
2	probability of causation was the greatest?
3	DR. NETON: No.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Or are these
5	somehow combined?
6	DR. NETON: They would be combined.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
8	DR. NETON: It would be that's
9	one of the issues, and I addressed this the
10	last time. One of the locations that it could
11	a CLL tumor could originate is the
12	tracheobronchial lymph nodes.
13	And we all know from the lymphoma
14	program evaluation report that we've done that
15	you can get extremely high doses to the
16	tracheobronchial lymph nodes from inhalation,
17	because that's the ultimate deposition site
18	for insoluble material to a large degree.
19	Once you do that, you end up
20	assigning such high doses to the
21	tracheobronchial lymph nodes that virtually
22	every chronic lymphocytic leukemia case

becomes compensable with the current models, which is inconsistent with the science -- with the epidemiologic science.

In other words, you would see a huge rash of CLL tumors in weapons complex workforce if that were true. So that's why we've opted to do some apportioning of the dose to the various sites, and do it on a probabilistic basis, and move forward that way.

This is a -- you know, I feel badly that this issue is taking so long to resolve, but it's probably the most complex issue that we've undertaken in this program to do a dose reconstruction and develop an associated risk model.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Roessler?

MEMBER ROESSLER: I think you've answered my question. And I think it's -- I don't understand how you're going to do it. But it seems like you gave a lot of biology that sort of convinces you that this is the

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1	reasonable thing to do, but then you don't
2	really have any epidemiology to come up with
3	these models.
4	DR. NETON: Right. Well, the risk
5	model itself is going to well, would be a
6	lymphoma model, because CLL behaves more like
7	the risk model is more closely associated
8	with a lymphoma than a leukemia, because
9	leukemia, if you remember, is very radiogenic.
10	I mean, a one or two rem variation
11	can be a compensable dose for leukemia. So it
12	would be a lymphoma model, but with the
13	addition of a very long latency tail, because
14	CLL has a long latency period. It's known to
15	have a very long latency time.
16	So it would be an adaptation of the
17	lymphoma model that we would use.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Melius?
19	MEMBER MELIUS: First a follow up
20	with Jim, I mean I think your approach sounds,
21	you know, basically sound and so forth. I
22	think this is sort of akin to some of the work

1 that's been attempted, and actually I think you use in IREP with some of the other low-2 3 incidence cancers, and based on BEIR studies, and so forth. 4 5 BEIR and some of the other 6 current research has been trying to -- how do 7 you model those cancers when they're not strongly radiogenic, and are low incidence. 8 And this one, I think, what you're trying to 9 10 do is to fit both the epidemiology -- what you have --11 DR. NETON: Right. 12 13 MEMBER MELIUS: -- and you know what it -- you have sort of an upper limit, 14 15 you know, it's not -- you're not finding an 16 excess. But so then how do you come up with a realistic model that is then based on 17 18 biology to do? And I think it is 19 complicated. It is. 20 DR. NETON: MEMBER MELIUS: And this may have 21 been addressed last time, but at what point 22

does the Board get involved in this?

DR. NETON: I meant to review that process in my mind, because it's been quite a while since we've been engaged in rulemaking.

And maybe Ted Katz, who has been involved in the regulations, could speak to that issue.

MR. KATZ: Sure. And I can be corrected if I get something wrong with the lawyers. But this would be rulemaking; this would have to be rulemaking, because we'd have to change the probability of causation rule.

So as we did with the other rules, once there's a notice of proposed rulemaking, then there would be the comment period, and during that comment period, the way we handled it in the past is then the Board reviewed it, had meetings, discussed it, made their recommendations.

Those were taken into account before the public comment period was closed, and then final rulemaking was done. And then there a presentation subsequently, too.

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1	MEMBER MELIUS: Can I suggest that
2	you explore, because I think it would be
3	better in terms of process and so forth, is
4	involvement of the Board at an earlier stage?
5	I think prior to rulemaking, you have
6	technical reports.
7	And I think, you know, much like
8	we're reviewing sort of the science
9	implications, I think it would be helpful, and
10	I think you can do that in a way that doesn't
11	violate the rulemaking.
12	MR. KATZ: I mean I can
13	MEMBER MELIUS: I'm not asking for
14	an answer, but I'm just asking to explore that
15	issue.
16	MR. KATZ: Okay. I mean I think I
17	can speak to that a little bit right now,
18	though, because I have experience with other
19	rulemaking that NIOSH does outside of this
20	program, too, and on technical matters, before
21	we go into rulemaking, if you want to evaluate

technical matters, certainly you can.

22

That's

1	not proscribed. So yes.
2	DR. NETON: I think the various
3	pieces and parts that we've developed
4	certainly can be shared with the Board, and
5	I'd be happy to do that as long as it's
6	legally appropriate.
7	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, no, I just
8	think I mean, this is controversial,
9	because of the what's traditionally been
10	found. And I think it's worth sort of
11	exploring the talking about the science
12	independent of the regulation and so forth.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dr. Lockey?
14	MEMBER LOCKEY: I just have one
15	question. When the first Board the first
16	panel looked at this, was their conclusion
17	that it's biologically plausible, or?
18	DR. NETON: Yes. It wasn't
19	unanimous. The majority I think I said the
20	majority. I believe that three out of the
21	five definitely indicated it was biologically
22	plausible. There was no reason it's not

1	plausible. I guess that's a little different
2	take.
3	And then the other two were sort of
4	ambivalent a little bit. It could be, it
5	could not be.
6	But three were very strong that
7	there's no reason that it couldn't be
8	radiogenic. There's no unique mechanism to
9	the development of CLL that lends itself to
10	only being caused by chemicals, for example.
11	MEMBER LOCKEY: Okay. Thank you.
12	MEMBER MELIUS: And I think that
13	the argument is more of that sort of negative
14	argument. You can't say it's not. There's
15	not some risk.
16	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, no, I
17	understand that. I was trying to figure I
18	don't remember what the first Board said, so I
19	was trying so here's the question, is it
20	biologically plausible? I think the answer
21	is, yes. I would say yes to that, also.

Has it been proven? No. But is it

biologically plausible? Yes.
MEMBER MELIUS: How do you prove
there's no risk?
MEMBER LOCKEY: You can't, because
it's a rare tumor, and it doesn't occur that
often, and it's a difficult issue.
MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Other
comments or questions?
Thank you, Jim. We'll look forward
to further updates on both of these issues
then. Thank you.
In view of the time, we're
approaching the lunch hour. In any event,
we're a few minutes ahead, but we'll go ahead
and recess.
We will return, and let's plan to
be here promptly at 1:15 so that we can get
underway with the General Steel Industry's SEC
Petition. And also we will have some folks by
phone involved with that one, as well.

So we need to stick close to that

1	schedule. So we will recess until 1:15.
2	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went of
3	the record at 11:35 a.m., and
4	resumed at 1:22 p.m.)

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1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	1:22 p.m.
3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We are ready now
4	for the afternoon session.
5	The first item on our agenda this
6	afternoon is a petition, an 83.13 petition for
7	General Steel Industries.
8	We're going to hear first from Dave
9	Allen at NIOSH, who will present the NIOSE
10	evaluation report. And then we will hear from
11	a couple of the petitioners by phone following
12	that.
13	So let's proceed with hang or
14	just a moment. We need to double check on the
15	phone here and make sure the petitioners are
16	here.
17	MR. KATZ: Dan, are you with us?
18	DR. McKEEL: Yes, I'm here.
19	MR. KATZ: That's great.
20	And Patricia?
21	MS. COGGINS: Yes, I'm here.
22	MR. KATZ: Great, thank you.

1 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you. 2 Then let's proceed, and hopefully 3 the connection will be a little better than this morning. 4 And Dave, if you would stay close 5 6 to the mic so that the petitioners, 7 particularly, can be sure to hear you. MR. ALLEN: I'll try to stay close 8 to the mic, but keep reminding me. I have a 9 10 knack of pulling away from it. So if you have to remind me several times, I'd appreciate it. 11 I'm here to present the General 12 13 Steel Industries' SEC Petition, which you'll hear me refer to as GSI routinely throughout 14 15 the presentation. 16 The background for General Steel Industries is that it is classified as 17 18 atomic weapons employer from 1953 to 1966, 19 with the residual contamination period extending from the end of the cover period 20 through 1992. 21

The reason they are a covered site

is they performed radiography on uranium metal that came from the Mallinckrodt site. To do this, they used betatron machines, which I'll discuss a little more later.

Their job was to perform these X-rays and hand over the film to Mallinckrodt. They did not evaluate the film for defects, et cetera. They did develop the film, look at it, make sure they had a good X-ray shot. But they did not do the evaluation or any voids or whatever that Mallinckrodt was looking for.

Also I wanted to point out there were two betatron buildings on site. One that was referred to as the old betatron machine was built in 1952, and it was reported to have a maximum energy of 24 MeV photons, which is pretty high photon energy.

Another one that is referred to as the new betatron machine was actually built about the same time in Eddystone, Pennsylvania. In 1963, the sister site -- the work at that sister site was consolidated in

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Granite City, Illinois at this site, and so a new betatron building was built, and that betatron was moved to Granite City, Illinois to the GSI site. It is reported to have a maximum energy of 25 MeV.

On the screen, you see a couple drawings. These are schematics of the layout of the betatron buildings themselves. And I put these up here mostly to point out that these were not small X-ray units. These are actual buildings that were built for this purpose.

In the center, you will see what the operators refer to as the shooting area. That's where the radiography actually took place, where a large casting or something can be moved into, and the head of the betatron machine could be manipulated by a crane in that area to set up the X-ray shot that they wanted to take.

The thick-looking walls you see around that shooting area are, indeed, thick

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walls. They were intended to be shield walls. They're reported to be ten feet thick. They were composed of a sandwich of one foot of concrete on the inside and the outside, with the eight-foot void in between filled with sand.

The areas outside of that, you'll see some office-looking areas. Those are the control room and some offices. The electronics for the machine were actually above the control room on the second floor.

There were other sources of radiation at the site, primarily associated with the radiography of one type or another. They had some isotopic sources. They did have a 250 kVp portable X-ray unit.

What I wanted to point out mostly was that the 25 MeV is a high enough photon energy to actually cause activation in various materials, including steel. We don't usually think of it that way.

We usually think of neutron

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activation in materials. But if a photon gets to be a high enough energy, above the 10 to 13 MeV threshold value, you can actually get activation with these. And these did have a high enough photon energy to produce some activation in steel, uranium, et cetera.

There was also internal exposure from the uranium they handled. Some people thought that wouldn't be there simply because it was your large pieces of uranium metal. People aren't known to inhale 100-pound pieces of uranium metal.

But uranium is fairly active chemically. It will oxidize fairly easily. And you will get oxidation products, and any time you're handling that, then some oxidation will rub off, become lose contamination. And that can become airborne or be ingested.

A summary of the petition, it was submitted February 25th, 2008. It qualified for evaluation May 15th of 2008, and it was submitted to the Board on October 3rd, 2008.

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The class proposed by the petitioner, essentially -- it's a little long, but essentially it's all operators for the entire covered period and the residual period.

What I wanted to point out just because there may be something about this later is that she actually included the location as 1417 State Street, Granite City, Illinois. And I don't know exactly the motive for doing that, but I suspect there was a lot of misconception about this site originally.

When EEOICPA was first started, it was called the Granite City Steel Site. As it turns out, there is a Granite City Steel Site very close by. Eventually they bought out this site. And that created a great deal of confusion early on in the program to the point to where this site was officially renamed the General Steel Industries Site. And I suspect that's the reason for putting down the address is to make sure we're all talking about the same facility. If not, it was a good move

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even if wasn't.

The period we evaluated is the same. There is one exception there. If you look at the bottom, you'll see that we said the covered period is through June 30th of `66 instead of December 31st of `66.

The difference there is that the DOE website tends to just put down the year in most situations. We looked into the reason for the end date on the covered period, and it was purchase orders that actually ended at the end of the fiscal year in `66, which, at that time, was June 30th of 1966.

But the entire period is covered. That last six months we call residual versus covered -- versus operational period. That's the only difference in these two descriptions here.

Sources of available information include Appendix BB. That is the GSI appendix we put together to describe our exposure model. And that is appendix to Battelle-6000.

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We also, as usual, have ORAU Technical Information Bulletins, as well as procedures. We have information on the Site Research Database, which includes FUSRAP, as well as some worker information and some of the information DOE used to make this a site.

We have interviews with the current and former GSI employees. And I'd like to point out on that one, that was actually -- a great deal of information came from a couple of worker advocates that put together meeting of the workers and actually had those meetings transcribed.

We weren't at the first two meetings, but we were allowed to attend to second two meetings. So we were there, plus we have the transcripts.

After the appendix was written, there was another meeting of some of the workers that were most familiar with this. And we have the meeting minutes from that. And we did attend that one, also.

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We have case files from the NIOSH, claims tracking that is, primarily dealing with the individuals more than the site, but there is some site information there.

And eventually we were able to find film badge data from 1964 to 1973. This came from Landauer. It says employees here. I wanted to point out that doesn't mean every employee at GSI. Essentially it's the badged employees at GSI, which appears to be the radiographers and those closely associated with the radiography.

The basis for the petition was that people were not monitored. And other than the film badge data that I had just pointed out, that seems to be the case. The petition included affidavits from a number of workers that said they were not monitored and were never offered a dosimeter.

Testimony from workers backed that up, including that some were actually badged, but it's not a large part of the population.

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It was those -- essentially radiographers, radiographers' assistants, I think the film processors, and some of the supervision in the betatron buildings.

But it did not include everybody in the betatron buildings. There were plenty of other people that worked to move large steel castings or repair the castings that were not badged.

We found nothing as far as internal monitoring. That's kind of consistent with what they did. I don't think a lot of people thought there would be any internal dose at the facility, at least at that time.

And I already mentioned the last one, that many people were associated with these castings.

As far as the time line, the appendix was approved June 25th of 2007. And as I already mentioned, February 25th of 2008 is when we received the SEC Petition. And March 17th, 2008, SC&A submitted a review of

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Appendix BB; they submitted that to the Board.

Right about that same time frame, in March 2008 is when we received the Landauer film badge data. And I just wanted to point out that was not available to us during the appendix, and it was not available to SC&A during their review of the appendix.

26th, 2008, the June Board established a working group for the purpose of Battelle-TBDs reviewing the as well Appendix BB. And as I already pointed out, October 3rd is when submitted we the evaluation report to the Board.

Before I'm asked, I did want to point out on there that the appendix review was actually taken up by the Procedures Working Group of the Board that tasked SC&A with reviewing it. That's why you see the SC&A review was actually completed before there was a working group. The working group actually was established, and that work was handed over from the Procedures Working Group.

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The appendix is essentially a -it's a very proscriptive exposure matrix on
how we would do dose estimates for individuals
that worked at GSI. Some of the exposures
that were evaluated include external dose in
the betatron operations through the shield and
by shine.

Those of you that are not familiar with shine, all I'm saying there is it is possible for radiation, including photons, to essentially bounce. The shield walls I showed you earlier only went up one story. They did not go the whole way up the sides of the building.

They also -- there was no shielded roof. It was just a typical industrial roof, and it was possible for radiation to scatter off the castings, essentially over the shield, bounce off the air, and come back down to the ground level.

So while the ten-foot thick shield walls are very thick, and it is possible that

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1	the shine would be a more significant dose
2	than what's transmitted through the shield.
3	We also evaluated the activation of
4	the steel castings
5	MR. KATZ: Dick, could you maybe
6	just speak up or something, I think they're
7	having a hard time hearing you on the phone.
8	MR. ALLEN: Okay, I can try to get
9	a little closer here.
10	MR. KATZ: That's much better.
11	MR. ALLEN: Okay. The external
12	dose from the activated castings was also
13	evaluated. As I said, these can get activated.
14	Therefore, they're radioactive, and they're
15	emitting some radiation after the X-ray shot.
16	The same is true with the uranium
17	metal. At that point there is activation. I
18	would also include that it is above the
19	threshold to cause fission, so there's
20	actually fission products associated with this
21	uranium.

from

Internal dose

22

the uranium

corrosion products, I already mentioned that.

Also, since the uranium could be activated or have fission products in it, we had to account for the internal dose from those. Any time you're inhaling the uranium, if it were activated or if it had activation or fission products in it, you would also be inhaling those. And we had to account for that.

And the last thing I have on my list there was the internal dose from the activated castings. And by those I'm talking about the steel castings, which was the normal operation at the site, the bulk of the operation.

Their purpose in X-raying these was to find internal flaws, such as a void. If they found that, they would often try to repair a casting rather than recast a huge casting. That would involve grinding out that void and filling it with welding material. And grinding out something that was freshly X-rayed, that could be activated, obviously is a

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source of internal exposure.

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When we modeled the external dose, we used Attila and MCNP software. Both are software packages that have some advantages. One has an advantage over the other, but we used a combination of both to try to accomplish this task.

The buildings betatron were modeled, and the dose rate outside the shield determined during the operation I mentioned earlier, betatron, so as possible the shine is higher than the dose that's actually transmitted directly through the shield wall.

I say possible because we never really modeled those separately. We just modeled it all in one large chunk. That gave us the dose rates outside the shield during betatron operations.

But again, after the operations, the castings could be radioactive, the uranium obviously is radioactive before and after, and

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so we also tried to account for that externally by essentially -- we tried to do this in a bounding way by essentially hitting a large piece of steel or uranium.

By large piece, I mean something thick enough to where the beam could not be transmitted through to find a usable -- to obtain a usable X-ray, and wide enough to encompass the entire beam.

The beam of the betatrons are known to be fairly narrow compared to typical X-ray machines, and so we used a very wide, very thick piece to absorb all of the energy from the betatron machine to try to bound how much activation could be in that piece.

For the internal dose, Ι as earlier, really mentioned we had no information. What we attempted to do in the appendix was to find a bounding estimate. did mention earlier that GSI was not responsible for evaluating the uranium, internal structure it. They of were

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responsible for producing a good X-ray film and then handing that over to Mallinckrodt.

Because of this, there was no worker testimony that they ever manipulated the uranium. There's no indication that they ever did other than handling it to set up the shot and transport it to and from.

But there was no indication that they would have ground out any defects or anything like that. In fact, there was quite a bit of indication that it was actually a sample of uranium that they were X-raying. They were called betatron slices.

And from what the operators said, essentially even the uranium was too dense for the betatron to get through. They had to -- Mallinckrodt had to take a slice of the uranium ingot and X-ray that. So the only good explanation for that would be they were X-raying a sampling of an ingot for part of their QA program.

So based on that, it doesn't look

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like GSI ever did any repair of the uranium metal. I'm not sure how they would. But they wouldn't have done any kind of abrasive work. It was handling the material, handling the uranium to get it in there to X-ray it, setting up the X-ray shot, handling it to get it back out of there.

In order to bound that, we used uranium slug models from Battelle-6000. When they were producing uranium slugs, they were handling uranium metal very similar to what GSI did.

But the uranium slug also included some abrasive work, where they would cut rods to smaller pieces, and they would also machine the ends of these rods, so we included -- this airborne model here would include some cutting of uranium metal, some machining of uranium metal, and that should produce a higher airborne evolution than simply handling the uranium metal.

But there was plenty of handling in

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slug production, also. That's why we think that is a bounding case.

Dose from the uranium fission activation products, we did an estimate based on the MCNP runs on how much of the material would be uranium versus fission products or activation products, and we simply increased the dose estimate in the appendix to try to account for that, again in a bounding fashion.

Internal dose from activated steel castings, we considered that and evaluated it, and we included that in the TBD, or the appendix, I'm sorry.

I mentioned earlier we did eventually get the film badge data that was available from Landauer. The data we have indicates pretty much what we were told. The radiographers in the later years were badged, not in the earlier years. It was not all GSI employees. It was only those very closely associated with the radiography.

It appears to be on a weekly -- or

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it was on a weekly film badge exchange frequency. They reported a reporting level of ten millirem, everything ten millirem or more was reported as the number, everything less than that was simply reported as a capital M, meaning monitored.

And the vast majority -- that's how the vast majority of the readings came out. It turns out about 99.7 percent of the badges were reported as less than ten millirem on the weekly reads.

I couple example have а reconstructions for you. These were put together using the appendix. The first employee is a GSI employee from 1951 to 1982. His job description was a welder, and the CATI indicated he did work in the betatron sometimes.

Not all the weld repairs were done in the betatron building. Sometimes a lot of repairs were done outside of the building. The casting would be moved out, a number of

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repairs X-raying done while they were something else. But this individual indicated he was associated with the betatron machine at least that time, so gave him the we radiographer dose.

The appendix does not -- the appendix has two different exposure models in it for external dose. One is radiographers, and one is everybody else, essentially. And for radiographers, it's not limited to those that have a job title of radiography. It's anybody that would be associated with the steel castings within a couple hours after they were X-rayed. That's to account for the weld repairs done on these steel castings.

This particular individual, male, born in 1923, and diagnosed in 1988 with lung cancer. From the Appendix BB, that produces a dose of approximately 63 rem external dose, almost 29 rem internal dose, and an X-ray dose of a little over one rem, for a total that's 29.981 rem. That combined with his

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demographic information produced a probability of causation of 58.91 percent.

The example is next I got an employee that was working at GSI from 1963 to This particular person was a laborer, but in reality for radiographers, that's actually a very good time frame. That seems to be the time frame when they were doing a great deal of radiography. The betatron machines were working 24/7 around the clock.

This individual was a laborer, but again, he said he was associated with the betatron machines, or some of the castings that were X-rayed. He was male, born 1914, diagnosed in 1988 with prostate cancer.

The model dose from Appendix BB for this situation gives him 10.395 rem of external dose. The internal dose listed on the slide is zero, and that is largely because the uranium is the primary internal dose, and while it concentrates in the lungs, it will not concentrate in a prostate.

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There is actually some dose accounted for in there. It just ended up being less than one millirem. We also gave him the medical X-ray dose of 100 millirem. So the total was 10.495 rem. That combined with his demographic information produced a probability of causation of 11.8 percent.

And you've seen slides like this a number of times. Essentially the evaluation report was -- it used the guidelines in 42 CFR. It was issued on October 3rd, 2008.

Again, you've seen this slide, a for two-prong test SEC petitions. The evaluation determined that we could sorry -- two-prong test is whether or not it is feasible to estimate the dose, and secondly, whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood that such radiation dose would have endangered the health of the members of the class.

NIOSH's feasibility from the evaluation report found that we could

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1	reconstruct the dose to the members of the
2	class, and therefore, a determination of
3	health endangerment was not required.
4	And last slide is the summary,
5	essentially reiterating that the evaluation
6	report decided we could reconstruct all the
7	routes of exposure at GSI.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you,
9	David.
10	We'll take a few minutes for some
11	questions. I did want to mention for the
12	record, just so that the transcript agrees
13	with the slides on the dose reconstruction
14	number one, the total rem to the hypothetical
15	person was 92.981, not 29.
16	MR. ALLEN: I'm sorry.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Just so the
18	written record or the transcript agrees with
19	what we saw.
20	Okay. Wanda Munn, question or
21	comment?
22	MEMBER MUNN: Dave, I guess I don't

1 -- I'm missing something in your presentation 2 internal exposure. On the one hand, I 3 heard that the X-rays were not read there. They were read at Mallinckrodt. 4 knowing production 5 And how 6 activities occur, then it would seem logical 7 that any void or inclusion that was identified by the X-ray would not immediately be repaired 8 at this site. 9 10 So I'm trying to reconcile in my mind why the internal exposure would be based 11 12 on the premise that someone would be grinding 13 or working hands-on with this material during immediate period following 14 the very its 15 activation. Am I missing -- and I know I'm 16 missing something, but I'm not sure what I'm missing. 17 Well, you're probably 18 MR. ALLEN: 19 missing it because I didn't explain it well. 20 What I was saying in there, I think

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talking about. There's internal exposure from

different subjects is what we're

it's two

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uranium, but there's also internal exposure from grinding on the steel -- the activated steel castings that would get activated from the betatron X-rays.

From everything we're told, it is typical for them to try to repair those quickly. It depends a great deal on the situation whether they're doing a whole lot more shots on a very big casting, or whether they're doing one shot to see if the repair was good, find out it wasn't, and they run in there and try to do another quick repair on it.

like Ιt doesn't sound it was unusual on the steel castings for them to perform a repair soon after the X-ray. As far as the uranium, I was simply trying to point out that there was no information that they would repair anything with the uranium castings.

And so the slug production that we used should be a bounding situation, because

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1	there was some grinding in that. We were
2	simply very limited on the internal exposure
3	for uranium at GSI.
4	MEMBER MUNN: Well, I would think
5	that would be a very generous bound, but it's
6	surprising to me that, as a matter of course,
7	the repairs would be attempted without having
8	the benefit of the actual X-ray reading from
9	Mallinckrodt. But if that's what happened,
10	that's what happened.
11	MR. ALLEN: No, I mean, I'm not
12	sure I understand your question.
13	MEMBER MUNN: Well, the whole
14	purpose in taking the X-ray was to identify
15	whether there were voids or inclusions in the
16	metal. What's the quality of this casting?
17	MR. ALLEN: Right.
18	MEMBER MUNN: And if you take the
19	X-ray, and then send it to essentially the
20	other company to evaluate the work that's been
21	done, then
22	MR. ALLEN: Okay. I think I

1	understand. There's a little bit of
2	confusion. I mean, GSI's primary work did not
3	include this uranium. They made tank turrets,
4	they made steel turbines.
5	MEMBER MUNN: I understand. I
6	understand.
7	MR. ALLEN: And when I'm talking
8	about an immediate repair, I'm talking about
9	the steel castings that they produce. As far
10	as the uranium, there was no indication that
11	any repair was ever done. But it was
12	certainly all I was trying to say is it was
13	certainly not done at GSI if there was.
14	MEMBER MUNN: I guess my question
15	really revolves around the timing. It was
16	difficult for me to imagine why, if the X-ray
17	was going to have to be read before any
18	activity occurred, whether that would not
19	decrease the amount of radiation significantly
20	because of the time lapse from activation to

But what I think I'm hearing from  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +\left($ 

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the time they handled it.

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1	you is they went ahead and even though they
2	were not actually reading the X-rays, they
3	really and truly were responding to what they
4	saw on the X-ray, and went ahead and attempted
5	the repair before they actually sent it all
6	off to Mallinckrodt.
7	MR. ALLEN: No, no. I mean
8	Mallinckrodt when I was talking about they
9	got a good X-ray, and they sent those to
10	Mallinckrodt, that was only for the uranium.
11	I mean, GSI evaluated the X-rays for the
12	steel.
13	MEMBER MUNN: And not for the steel
14	at all?
15	MR. ALLEN: No. Mallinckrodt had
16	nothing to do with the steel castings.
17	MEMBER MUNN: All right. Fine.
18	That explains it. Thank you.
19	MR. ALLEN: Okay.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. John
21	Poston?
22	MEMBER POSTON: I have several

1	questions just to try to clarify or understand
2	what you've done.
3	You mentioned in slide 13 uranium
4	fission
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Stay close to the
6	mic there, John.
7	MEMBER POSTON: All right. You
8	mentioned in slide 13 uranium fission, and I
9	was a little bit unsure what you were talking
LO	about. Are you talking about spontaneous
L1	fission?
I	
L2	MR. ALLEN: No, we're talking
L2 L3	MR. ALLEN: No, we're talking about. It is possible for a high-energy photon
L3	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon
L3 L4	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon to cause a fission in uranium.
L3 L4 L5	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon to cause a fission in uranium.  MEMBER POSTON: Of course. But
L3 L4 L5 L6	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon to cause a fission in uranium.  MEMBER POSTON: Of course. But it's in the middle bar range. It's extremely
L3 L4 L5 L6	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon to cause a fission in uranium.  MEMBER POSTON: Of course. But it's in the middle bar range. It's extremely small, the probability is.
13 14 15 16 17	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon to cause a fission in uranium.  MEMBER POSTON: Of course. But it's in the middle bar range. It's extremely small, the probability is.  MR. ALLEN: It did not
13 14 15 16 17 18	about. It is possible for a high-energy photon to cause a fission in uranium.  MEMBER POSTON: Of course. But it's in the middle bar range. It's extremely small, the probability is.  MR. ALLEN: It did not  MEMBER POSTON: Is vanishingly

1	in great detail. It goes almost to zero.
2	MR. ALLEN: Yes, and these were 25
3	MeV.
4	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
5	MR. ALLEN: And I mean, we had to
6	account for it. It did not make a large
7	difference in it, but we did account for it.
8	MEMBER POSTON: Okay. Second
9	question, on activation products, you're
10	talking about photon activation of steel and
11	other things?
12	MR. ALLEN: Yes.
13	MEMBER POSTON: Okay. On slide 15,
14	you indicated this worker was a welder that
15	might have entered the area. Was he badged?
16	MR. ALLEN: I don't know of any
17	laborers or welders that were badged. It was
18	pretty much people assigned to what I would
19	call the NDA department. I'm not sure if
20	that's what they called that department or
21	not.
22	MEMBER POSTON: Okay. So in your

1	evaluation of the dose on the next slide, the
2	external dose, what did you do? Assume that
3	he got ten millirems a month?
4	MR. ALLEN: We gave him the
5	radiography external dose.
6	MEMBER POSTON: Well if you have
7	90-something percent 97 percent were less
8	than ten millirem
9	MR. ALLEN: Yes, but again, that's
10	the film badge data, and that came about after
11	the
12	MEMBER POSTON: Well, that's what
13	I'm asking. What assumptions did you make to
14	cover the period where they weren't badged?
15	And obviously, this worker wasn't badged
16	And obviously, this worker wasn't badged during the period that you had badges. So
16	during the period that you had badges. So
16 17	during the period that you had badges. So what I'm trying to understand what you did.
16 17 18	during the period that you had badges. So what I'm trying to understand what you did.
16 17 18	during the period that you had badges. So what I'm trying to understand what you did.  MR. ALLEN: Well, the details are

I'd like to know how you did that.

MR. ALLEN: Well, the assumption on the radiographers in the appendix was that they're right outside the shielded area during the radiography, and they're in on the casting almost immediately afterwards.

And from our indications, there were certainly laborers, possibly folks moving the castings, and possibly repairs done in that time frame. Essentially running in there right afterwards.

That was how we modeled it. It was an exposure scenario based on how long the shot took, how much dosage rate they'd be getting outside, versus how much dose they would be getting from the casting. And it does decay away fairly quickly.

But that made the exposure scenario important in these situations, how close they would be, for how long, what kind of dose rate, et cetera. Without getting into the details of the appendix, it's hard to go much

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1	more than that.
2	MEMBER POSTON: Well, I don't
3	remember the number, but you said that there
4	was 90-something percent of 97 percent of the
5	badges were marked with an M, which means that
6	they were minimal dose, below minimal
7	detectable. Is that correct?
8	MR. ALLEN: Yes, that's correct.
9	MEMBER POSTON: Okay. So if I take
10	if I assume that each worker wore the badge
11	and they got minimal dose of ten millirem,
12	that's 520 millirem a year. Well, but there's
13	52 weeks in a year, 520 millirem per year, and
14	I'm having a heck of a time getting to 63 rem.
15	That's my problem.
16	MR. ALLEN: Well, the appendix was
17	put together as a model that was intended to
18	be conservative.
19	MEMBER POSTON: Well, it sure is.
20	MR. ALLEN: And apparently it was.
21	But there are some other issues that have
22	been raised as far as the badges, whether they

	were worm arr the time, et tetera.
2	MEMBER POSTON: Because you don't
3	have any indication this guy worked there for
4	120 years.
5	MR. ALLEN: No.
6	MEMBER POSTON: So I just it
7	doesn't come together. It doesn't make any
8	sense to me.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, and
10	incidentally, on the Landauer films, the M
11	actually stands for minimal, not for
12	monitored. It represents lower limit, or they
13	were below the limit of detection.
14	Brad Clawson?
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: I just wanted to
16	know, who processed the film badges for GSI?
17	Was it done on site, or was this a
18	subcontractor?
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Landauer.
20	MR. ALLEN: Landauer.
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: Landauer did?
22	Okay. One of the questions I had was, in

1	talking with some of the petitioners and stuff
2	like that, they were talking about, in the
3	earlier years, that some of the film cradles,
4	or whatever that they were using, had nickel,
5	and aluminum, and some other and that they
6	actually activated those, too. Did we look
7	into?
8	MR. ALLEN: Well, anything exposed
9	to the beam could be activated, but the film
10	is generally on the opposite side of the steel
11	that's being X-rayed. Essentially the dose to
12	the film casing should be similar to what
13	would be necessary to expose that film.
14	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.
15	MR. ALLEN: It's going to be
16	considerably less than what the direct beam of
17	that betatron is.
18	MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, I think in
19	talking with petitioners, something about that
20	the film cradles that they were holding the
21	film in actually become activated and they

didn't know about it for quite a while, and

1	then they changed to another type of film
2	cradle that was going on there.
3	On the contamination issues and so
4	forth like that, there was actually a spread
5	outside of the facility they actually found
6	it up and down the tracks, if I'm not
7	mistaken. But from my understanding of what
8	you were saying, it was only in the calutron,
9	or
LO	MR. ALLEN: Betatron?
L1	MEMBER CLAWSON: Right.
L2	MR. ALLEN: You're talking about
L3	the uranium contamination?
L4	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
L5	MR. ALLEN: I don't know of any
L6	you're talking about that FUSRAP survey, I
L7	assume. They found during the FUSRAP survey
L8	some fixed uranium contamination on the floor
L9	of the old betatron as well as in a vacuum
20	cleaner that was a permanent structure inside
21	that betatron building.

There are also railroad tracks

inside. They found it on those. I don't remember a story about outside of -- railroad tracks outside the building, but --

MEMBER CLAWSON: My understanding was it was outside of the building. The tracks that went through, they'd actually bring the large castings in there. They'd X-ray them in there, they'd grind them, and they'd repair them. And then taking it out, there really wasn't that much of a cleaning process.

And I was just wondering if we were looking at what spread outside of this facility, or --

MR. ALLEN: Well, the way the appendix was written was to model it as if everybody was inside that betatron with the uranium contamination in there which, from what you're saying, there would still be the source of the uranium contamination. So essentially we put everybody at the source for the whole time.

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1	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Other
3	questions before we hear from the petitioners?
4	Okay. Then we will proceed with
5	Dr. McKeel. Sorry Dan?
6	DR. McKEEL: Yes, yes, sir. Can
7	you hear me all right?
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We can hear you
9	very well. Please.
10	DR. McKEEL: All right. Good
11	afternoon to the Board. We've all done a lot
12	of work thus far, and we're pleased to be
13	speaking about the SEC 105 petition.
14	My credentials include an M.D.
15	degree. I've held 36 NIH-funded research
16	grants, was on the Medical School faculty at
17	Washington University for 31 years, tenured 23
18	years, had almost 200 peer-reviewed research
19	articles and abstracts, and one book that I
20	was the lead author.
21	I was a member of the initial
22	Mallinckrodt SEC team. I've been a co-

petitioner on three SECs, 79 at DOW, 88 at Texas City, and this one, and I've made numerous comments on the EEOICPA CFR rules and Board matters.

The general comment that I would like to make is that it was, at the outset of this SEC, it was distressing that it took too long before NIOSH put the petitioner, Ms. Coggins, in contact with myself and [Identifying information Redacted], given the fact that we have been interacting with this site for about three years before the SEC was finally filed.

Thereafter, Ms. Coggins had me authorized as a co-petitioner through other contacts than NIOSH.

I want to say at the outset that the petitioners, and particularly advocate [Identifying information Redacted], have supplied the Board, its contractors, and NIOSH with truly massive amounts of GSI dose related and worker outreach information that NIOSH had

not and possibly was unable to obtain on its own.

All of this information has been well documented, has been discussed somewhat in other venues, and it's just too numerous to review here. So I'm going to concentrate on matters that just affect this SEC, and NIOSH's recommendation to deny the SEC.

I have a number of bases on which we challenge the NIOSH recommendation to deny this SEC. First and overall is that, from the very beginning in 2005, [Identifying information Redacted] and I have presented data that we hoped supported the idea that monitoring data was insufficient, and should have been the basis alone for awarding an SEC -- SEC 83.14 to GSI.

Now we are at least four years down the road from that point. NIOSH and SC&A models have been produced that conflict with one another, and I'll go into that in just a minute. And then we have Landauer film badge

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data that conflicts with both of those models.

The bottom line is that NIOSH and SC&A are still far apart on defining an accurate dose for GSI betatron workers, let alone the other workers who are treated differently for DR purposes.

This is despite the presence of TBD-6000, its Appendix BB, the SEC 105 evaluation report by NIOSH, and a white paper from NIOSH from November 2008 when the TBD-6000 work group last deliberated. It is our feeling that this evaluation report should be considered in concert with all of these tightly-related technical documents.

I wanted to review for the Board where we are today as far as arriving at an overall bounding dose for the GSI workers. And I'm referring now to two tables that were in the white paper generated by NIOSH in early November of 2008.

And I'm referring to the last two tables in that document, the first of which is

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called Estimated Annual External Exposures of Betatron Operators. And since we can't look at this together, I'm going to walk you through that table.

The column headings are Year, External Exposure in Roentgens Per Year for SC&A and NIOSH, Neutron Dose for SC&A Only, and a footnote A, note that neutron doses were not assessed by NIOSH. And you might have discerned that from Mr. Allen's presentation.

And then there were skin doses for SC&A and NIOSH, comparing hands and forearms and other skin, and the vertical columns were broken down by year, 1952 to seven, 1958, 1959 through `60, and then individually `61, `62, `63, `64, `65, and `66, the last year of the AEC contract period.

And I think overall you can say that there were huge differences between the SC&A and the NIOSH external exposure estimates that we feel cast serious doubt on their ability to accurately perform dose

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reconstruction.

And moreover, the final table, which was the film badge data, shows an even higher discrepancy. So for example, the external roentgen per year doses were two to six times higher for SC&A modeling than for NIOSH's. NIOSH doses varied more over time than SC&A doses, only SC&A calculated neutron doses, as I mentioned, and the SC&A skin doses were 1.4 to 10 times higher than NIOSH's, depending on the year that was mentioned.

So for instance, the peak external exposure calculated by SC&A was 13.6 rems per year in 1965. By NIOSH, it was 2.1, et cetera.

The film badge exposures in the next table were only .7436 and stayed steady, interestingly, by SC&A's calculations from 1952 to 1965, and then dropped by about 50 percent in 1966.

I should mention that, coincident with this data, there are some conflicting

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statements in Appendix BB and in the white paper, and actually, in this evaluation report whereby NIOSH is attempting to justify its extrapolation of film badge data in 1964, five, and six, the only that it has back to cover the period of 1953 to 1963.

And in one place it's stated that that 1964 data should be bounding, because that's the peak year, whereas the purchase order data in Appendix BB, as interpreted by Mr. Elliott, states that, in 1962, for example, there were 378 uranium hours spent, and only 28 in 1964 for the, quote, peak year.

So anyway, that data needs to all be reconciled. And the key point that I want to state just up front is that there really is a very large discrepancy.

The second point I want to bring to the Board's attention is some work from the SEC Issues Work Group from 2006 related to an SEC that was awarded to the IAAP, Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, radiographers on July the

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5th, 2005.

The work group, the SEC Issues Work Group met on January the 6th, 2006, and they developed four criteria for assessing SECs. And they named their final conclusions, Key Considerations for Board Review, and they noted timeliness, fairness, understandable, and the fourth one was consistency.

And I want to read that, quote, consistency in evaluating SEC Petitions, NIOSH and the Board must try to be consistent in applying relevant criteria to each petition. Both NIOSH and the Board must be mindful of precedents established in earlier reviews.

And I want to read you, therefore, the precedent that was established by IAAP, and this is directly relevant. Here is the transcript from that IAAP radiographer discussion by the Board from July 5th, 2005, starting on page 178.

Dr. Ziemer notes -- and they're talking now, the Board is talking about

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1	radiation sources, and what they were at IAAP
2	that the radiographers used. And this
3	discussion is between the Board and Dr. Neton
4	at NIOSH.
5	Page 178, Dr. Ziemer says, I have a
6	question. Maybe Larry or Jim can answer it.
7	Do we know whether these radiographers were
8	using X-ray equipment, or whether they used
9	nuclides, you know, industrial? Were they
10	sources or X-rays?
11	An unidentified person by the court
12	reporter says, sources, I'm sure.
13	Dr. Neton says, I believe they were
14	both. So there were some nuclides with
15	nuclide-based radiography equipment. I
16	believe that one of them may have been a
17	cobalt-60 source, if I'm not mistaken.
18	Dr. Ziemer says, so we have limited
19	information on what was used for I mean, I
20	would sort of make some raise some
21	questions similar to what Mark did.

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Dr. Neton says, yes.

1	Dr. Ziemer says, it seems to me
2	radiographers would be much easier to scope or
3	to envelope than others.
4	Mr. Elliott says, I think it again
5	shows how many were done in a given time
6	frame. We couldn't put a number on that,
7	couldn't quantify that, that amount of the
8	source.
9	Dr. Ziemer says, yes, well, you
10	know
11	And Mr. Elliott says, or which
12	source was used, whether it was X-ray or
13	cobalt-60.
14	Dr. Ziemer says, well, you know, if
15	you tried to do this in a medical facility,
16	and I'm looking
17	Dr. Anderson says, yes, right.
18	Dr. Ziemer says, you can figure it
19	pretty close, what physical how many
20	exposures you can physically make in a day. I
21	mean, there are some limits to it even for
22	fast workers. I was actually a little

1	surprised that we couldn't scope this one out,
2	but you're right. We don't know exactly.
3	Adjust
4	Mr. Elliott says, again, a hard
5	body to please.
6	And Dr. Ziemer says, obviously
7	there's a variety of issues. The shielding is
8	an issue. The distance is, apparently. No
9	dosimetry.
10	Well, the IAAP radiographers were
11	pretty much in the same situation as were the
12	GSI radiographers when all this began in 2005
13	and `06. And I think there are some
14	conclusions that form a precedent and that
15	need to be considered when you're considering
16	an SEC for the betatron operators at GSI.
17	For IAAP, NIOSH concluded it could
18	not use IAAP radiographer 1955 film badge
19	data, which it had, to extrapolate back to the
20	April 1948 back to the April 1948 to March
21	1949 SEC class period. There was, quote,

apparently no dosimetry for the SEC period,

1	just as NIOSH stated was the case for GSI
2	during all 2005 and `06 when we first began
3	interacting about GSI.
4	The same situation exists for GSI.
5	There is badge data only for 1964-`66, but
6	none for 1953-`63 of the covered period. In
7	one case, NIOSH said it could not extrapolate
8	backwards. This time, NIOSH says it can
9	extrapolate backwards to the earlier time
10	period for GSI.
11	At IAAP, of great interest, an SEC
12	was actually awarded when no nuclear weapons
13	material was onsite at IAAP, and this is an
14	integral part of the transcript.
15	At IAAP, there were four workers
16	who were deemed eligible for the SEC for
17	radiographers, even though only one had a
18	radiographer job description.
19	Number four, the IAAP radiographer
20	SEC covered a shorter period than 250 days.
21	And finally, the Board recommended
22	the IAAP radiographers' SEC on 7/5/05 without

being sure of the exact nature of all the onsite radiography sources. This is certainly the case now at GSI where the isotopes have not yet been well characterized.

This was despite the fact that the sources at IAAP had been described in an earlier worker meeting held a few months before on March the 21st `05.

And the minutes of that worker meeting, page 414, state as follows, and I quote, site description. [Identifying information Redacted] next asked the groups to address the site description section of the document. The following issues were discussed.

There was a flash X-ray. Six million mega electron volt, MeV machines were missing from the document entirely, one worker noted. Explosions in progress were X-rayed weekly, sometimes multiple shots, which would have been a significant dose.

Then they have a couple of comments

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about the number of workers in the building. And the final comment is this. One and two million electron volt X-ray units were used for high explosives, HE. A six MeV X-ray was used at the firing site on at least a weekly basis to monitor the hydro shots. And that's the end of that.

The petitioners also challenged the idea in OCAS IG-003 that all sources must be considered only in the covered production period, but not in the residual period as a misreading of the EEOICPA as amended statutes. This guidance needs to be revised, or at least much better justified.

The key points for General Steel and other sites is that, during the operational period, there's no disagreement that all sources must be considered in the dose calculations.

Point number four of their challenge is that, on October the 9th, 2008, there was a worker outreach meeting sponsored

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by SC&A, and at that meeting, a consensus was reached that the average GSI work week was 65 hours, versus only 46 hours noted in Appendix BB.

consider This fact, that we established, has not yet been incorporated into Appendix BBor into GSI reconstructions, even though more than 80 percent of all DRs given to NIOSH had been completed. That factor alone could effect the total dose for all those workers who have been denied.

five, McKeel Point number on 11/10/08 requested to the TBD-6000 Work Group that NIOSH furnish him with NIOSH film badge dataset characterizations in return for their request for him to share his data from GSI from Landauer, which he had obtained January of 2007, 14 months before obtained their dataset, according to Allen, in March of 2008.

I said that I would be unable to

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turn over my data unilaterally unless there was some reciprocity, and some conditions were met whereby we could exchange this privacy protected information, and also that I was able to learn something about the NIOSH Landauer dataset, in particular interested in the percent of that data that was readable.

SC&A admitted that their 1964 data, a lot of it was illegible. I wanted to verify with the Department -- I can't do this -- I wanted NIOSH to verify with Department of Labor that all the badge data that they had was actually for GSI employees.

And then Ι particularly was interested in disclosing the data capture process and dates whereby they obtained the Landauer data, because my data from Landauer has fewer workers represented than claims it has, which variably, according to SC&A and NIOSH, is 89 to 108 names, and in my dataset, there are only 52 names, so there's a discrepancy there.

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1	I also want to mention, again,
2	point number six, that there is a lot of
3	missing monitoring data. There is the scant
4	Landauer external film badge data for photons
5	only for `64 to `66. There is no bioassay
6	data. And I've already mentioned that the
7	peak year for the AEC uranium work was not
8	covered by the badge data available.
9	Now one thing that has not been
10	widely discussed
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dan, we're going
12	to interrupt a minute. We've got some noise -
13	- somebody's on the line that's competing with
14	your
15	DR. McKEEL: There's a sawing noise
16	on the phone.
17	MR. KATZ: Yes, it sounds like
18	someone's sharpening a pencil or something.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So others on the
20	line, if you're other than Dan, if you
21	would please mute your phones. Thank you. If
22	you do not have a mute button, use star six.

1	Okay, Dan. Proceed.
2	DR. McKEEL: Thank you very much.
3	I wanted to
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, the
5	scratching person is still scratching or
6	whatever that is. Again, please mute your
7	phones if you're not speaking.
8	Go ahead, Dan. Sorry about that.
9	DR. McKEEL: That's okay.
10	I wanted to mention that two
11	workers who were both isotope workers who
12	underwent the AEC training for isotope workers
13	at GSI actually furnished us, and we furnished
14	NIOSH, with three film dosimetry reports that
15	were headed AEC Annual Reports.
16	And at least one of those was from
17	1962, which is earlier than the 1964 date on
18	which the Landauer film badge data existed.
19	Now both of those men are alive.
20	We know them. They had kept these reports in
21	their personal possession until they shared
22	them with us.

And what I think is extremely important about that is they were not marked as being from Landauer, but from another corporation that subsequently was purchased by Mallinckrodt. And we have those reports, and they show external photon doses for the full year.

So there must have been some monitoring that was going on at GSI before 1964, and neither ourselves, nor NIOSH, nor anyone has gotten those data. So there is definitely existing but missing data somewhere and I just think that needs to be considered.

The next section I have is that we would like to point number out а of uncertainties that we believe in the are One is that, of the two doses. betatron buildings, the new building built in 1963 was located a few feet away from, and adjoined, and was connected to building number ten, where a lot of work went on.

And there have been calculations

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from SC&A, in particular, that the betatron radiation, the shine, clearly went through the wall. There was a thin ribbon door protecting the railroad tracks and leading into building ten. And that shine could go through those doors and expose the men in building ten. And we feel that those workers' doses have not been well calculated.

We also know that there was a small concrete wall roofless building in building six, sort of an inner structure that held the small cobalt-60 source, and was serviced by an overhead crane operator.

And that small source was in pretty much constant use for X-raying railroad truck assemblies, and the badges -- there were many badges -- there was an estimate of maybe 300 workers in that building who were very, you know, right around that concrete block building, who wore no badges.

So there were a group of exposed but unmonitored doses, and nobody has made an

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attempt to calculate those doses at all.

As a matter of fact, if you listen to Mr. Allen, and have read all of these documents, there are no dose calculations given for the two cobalt-60 sources, the iridium-192 source, or for the portable 250 kVp source.

Another uncertainty that I would like to correct is that all -- and this is in reference to Ms. Munn's question -- the X-rays were taken -- the film was exposed at GSI, and adjacent -- and really as part of the betatron building, and we've visited there and been there, was a film development room, an exposure room.

So the films were taken out of the machine and read instantly, and there was a class of workers at GSI called film readers. And it was their job to look at the film right away, even before it was dry, read it, see where the big defects were, and, you know, sign a checklist that was sent back to

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Mallinckrodt along with the X-rays themselves. And the final reading done was at Mallinckrodt, but the initial reading was done on the spot at GSI so that the casting could the floor then be sent out to immediately repaired, fixed, and often sent back to the betatron to be re-X-rayed to look for defects. So that's a partial answer to that.

The other point that is not very well worked out in the NIOSH document is that there were approximately, over time, perhaps a hundred betatron operators, but there were 3,000 workers maximum at the GSI plant, that the betatron workers were a small part of the workforce, and there were multiple sources there, and many workers were exposed. Some were betatron operators who would leave the betatron building. We know that they routinely left their badges when they exited the betatron building.

They would go and do work in

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building ten or building six. They could be re-exposed to shine there, or from the small cobalt source in building six. Then they would return back to the betatron building. So there's that numerical thing.

Another fact that is true that makes the dose very uncertain is that nobody has obtained the AEC licenses for the sealed isotopic sources or, you know, for the cobalt-60 or the iridium-192 sources. And those licenses would obviously help fully to characterize the other sources, including their strength and so forth, the amount of curies.

Another point that relates to Dr. Poston's comment is, although the NIOSH document recognized the fact that steel metal castings and uranium can be activated by a 24 five MeV betatron, they say that the main activation product is iron.

And there are many studies in the literature, including one by Dr. Ziemer and

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Guo, on medical X-rays, linear accelerators, that show activation of instruments in a radiography suite for medicine.

[Identifying information Redacted], who was a researcher at the Milwaukee School of Engineering, testified before the Board and shared his data with them, where he was one of the first people to show that, not only were industrial castings activated by the betatrons, very similar to the one at GSI, but there were many more activation products than iron alone.

And he mentioned in his published work carbon-11, aluminum-28 and 29, chromium-49, chromium-51, manganese-56, iron-52, nickel-57, and nickel was definitely a component of the film cassettes, cobalt-61, copper-61, copper-62, copper-64, zinc-63, zinc-65, silver-106, and silver-108, all of which he had measured produced by betatron irradiated industrial parts. And we've given those references previously to the Board, to

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NIOSH, and to SC&A.

The NIOSH evaluation report also makes the important assumption that recycled uranium was used at GSI in 1953 to `66, resulting in the following activation and fission transuranic being present onsite. And that reference would be TBD-6000, Section 5.2.1.2.

And I quote, therefore, for the timeline evaluated in this report, and in the absence of definitive information about the origin of the processed uranium, it is assumed that the uranium contained the following contaminants: plutonium-239, neptunium-237, technetium-99, thorium-232, and thorium-228, end quote.

So we asked, were the effects of the betatron 24, 25 MeV X-irradiation on these orders by SC&A or NIOSH. We think they probably were not.

And we would note that the literature includes studies on such issues,

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and we mention one in particular, The Physical Review, Volume 77, Issue 3, pages 329-336, of exactly that betatron irradiation and its effects on those transuranics.

Point D, another point is there were no real neutron doses measured. Proton/neutron ratios were not calculated, although in one technical document, it was noted that such a study was underway, but it's never been reported as far as I'm aware at GSI.

And we also have information from [Identifying information Redacted], who [Identifying information Redacted]'s boss and the Dean of the Milwaukee School of Engineering. He has testified to us and given us information about the large numbers of low energy neutrons that are measured when linear and circular accelerators activate concrete in buildings, such as the old and new betatron buildings GSI. So that's another at unaccounted for source of exposure to these

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workers.

As I've mentioned, five of the six source terms at GSI were ignored in Appendix BB, and even in the evaluation report, and Mr. Allen even just referred to them as some isotopes.

But specifically, there were two betatrons, there were two cobalt-60 sources, there was one iridium-192 gamma source, and there was a 250 kVp portable X-ray source.

Another error, we believe, in the dose calculations at GSI is that the Appendix BB, and the white paper, and SC&A's review of the evaluation report all go into calculations about the distance from the betatron cone to the external target, whether it was six or nine feet, and so forth.

But the fact of the matter is, and we've provided many photographs of this, lots of testimony from the workers, they were often, during the setup period and the take down period, when they were adjusting these

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activated film cassettes, they were lying on the castings, their bodies were in physical contact with the casting.

So all of those distance measurements are really a futile exercise, because they moved between the betatron nose cone, when it was off, the casting, and as I said, were in intimate contact with the casting.

There is some confusion that basically prohibited remains about the practice of betatron head flipping is not the same as the common practice, although somewhat dangerous, of the betatron operators imaging large castings that were on railroad cars on the railroad tracks within the building, and that they were not the same two procedures. But anyway, these doses must be accounted for, and they really have not been, we believe.

Mr. Allen mentioned that there was some indication that betatron slices of uranium were used, but the official documents,

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the purchase orders, mention, in addition to the slices, that Mallinckrodt sent over ingots and dingots, which we all know are so large that it would be hard for any beam to pass through them. But anyway, that's what the purchase orders say the purchase orders were for.

Let's see, also have we one affidavit that was shared with SC&A, and we assume, therefore, with NIOSH, of a worker, a betatron worker, who was accidently exposed in the betatron building to the large cobalt-60 source. And although this may be not to the level of exposure that would result from a criticality incident, which NIOSH seems insist on, the gentleman was sent to hospital, and according to him, an AEC report was generated from that incident.

We also have the use in the dose calculations that NIOSH came up with, the use of surrogate data from other places that really belies the fact that Mr. Elliott

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admitted several times in 2005-6 that GSI, because of the use of the betatrons and the work they did there with the large castings as well as the uranium, was a unique site.

Finally, there is confusion currently in the dose reconstructions already done as to exactly how the NIOSH is applying classes of workers that Allen outlined. That is, there are some workers classified as being betatron operators, and as Mr. Allen said, it clearly is stated that those people should include anyone exposed to the activated castings within two hours of coming out of the betatron.

But we know -- and then the other group would be the non-betatron operators who aren't exposed to the betatron or the castings within that two-hour time frame. And actually, that's pretty clear.

But we also note from individual workers who have had claims assessed that there is a confusion, and that some of them

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are being classed as non-betatron operators when, in fact, they worked as film readers in the betatron buildings. So we don't believe those criteria are being used in the way that Appendix BB indicates they should be.

The other thing I want to mention is that it's pretty clear that a whole bunch of purchase orders from Mallinckrodt and AEC And that would be particularly are missing. for the years 1953 up through 1957, when the old betatron was operating, and when even Mallinckrodt, original Mallinckrodt the Destrehan Matrix, indicates that betatron slices were made and sent over to GSI in 1953.

So those purchase orders are missing, and that introduces another uncertainty into the equation.

We also note that GSI produced other things for Mallinckrodt than just X-raying uranium. And we have one purchase order, for instance, from Weldon Spring in 1962 that specifies piston rods per MCW Sketch

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360416.

And it mentions the weight and 50pound material was austenitic manganese steel,
et cetera, and patterned per MCW sketch. So
GSI was doing other work for Mallinckrodt
Downtown and probably for Weldon Spring as
well.

And then we need to mention that nobody has recovered the large amounts of missing betatron shot records, which is the log sheet of exposures, exposure times tied to particular castings. None of the X-ray film reports that were sent back to Mallinckrodt or the checklists showing that the X-rays were actually taken have been recovered.

None of the uranium shipping manifests that would absolutely prove how much uranium was shipped back and forth to Mallinckrodt, none of those have also ever been captured.

So that's the dose uncertainty measures that we want to mention. And we are

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getting there to the end fortunately.

There are a number of still unresolved findings between SC&A, NIOSH, and the Board on GSI technical reports. Appendix BB has 13 SC&A findings, the white paper about seven. And hopefully if the SEC evaluation report is reviewed by SC&A, there will be some additional findings to be resolved.

There is an additional matter to be resolved, which is [Identifying information Redacted]'s statement, that film badges were linear to one MeV photon but were not linear for betatron 24/25 MeV photons.

And as I will say in a minute, Mr.

Neton admits that that needs to be investigated. Dr. Neton, in fact, has pledged to do so.

Finally, I'd like to mention that the TBD-6000 Appendix BB Work Group met on November the 10th and certainly discussed many of these documents, not the SEC evaluation report. But obviously there's much more work

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that needs to be done on resolving the outstanding issues.

On November the 10th, Dr. Neton gave a very useful summary of things that needed to be done to resolve this SEC from NIOSH's point of view. And from the transcript of that work group, I'll mention the following:

He said we need to develop dose calculations for the two cobalt-60 and the iridium-1992 gamma sources, the 250 kVp X-ray machine, and that appears on pages 322, 329.

He said maybe we need to go back and readdress of those unmonitored some exposures. We haven't done that yet, at least to anybody's satisfaction I can tell so far. on the cobalt-60 and the 250 key in millicurie, at least somehow address the 250 kVp and the iridium-192, either using [Identifying information Redacted] provided and other information.

And then he went on to say that we

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need to review the high doses that are in the McKeel/Landauer datasets that apparently NIOSH and SC&A have not identified. One would be a reading from 1969 of an isotope operator at GSI who got 38 rems in one year.

We need to, according to Dr. Neton and Ι agree, we need to determine implications of workers not always wearing film badges outside of the betatron facilities.

And finally Dr. Neton says, and I agree, that we need to resolve issues regarding film sufficiency to accurately capture betatron photon doses.

So, therefore, the petitioners request the Board take several actions.

One, we ask that the Board task SC&A to review the NIOSH SC&A evaluation report. In the response to the November white paper on page eight, SC&A states, some of these issues are discussed in the SEC Petition Evaluation Report for GSI, and they cite

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Buker, et al, 2008, we read but did not formally review this report.

Second, we ask that the work group on TBD-6000 complete the NIOSH SC&A dispute resolution process to include Dr. Neton's answers to carry over from that November the 10th work group meeting, to bound the doses for the two cobalt-60 and the iridium-192 and 250 sources, to establish the film kVp sensitivity as being accurate to betatron high MeV radiation, and to resolve discrepancies between my and the Landauer GSI film badge datasets.

Hopefully, the work group will eventually make a recommendation to the full Board. The petitioners strongly believe the correct recommendation will be to overturn NIOSH recommendation to deny SEC 105.

We base our belief on the timeliness considerations, on the missing 1953 to `63 purchase orders and film badge data, no bioassay or real neutron data, consistency

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1	mandate from the January 2006 SEC Issues Work
2	Group regarding the IAAP radiographers when an
3	SEC was awarded when no nuclear weapons were
4	on site from 1948 in April to March of `49,
5	and the widely discrepant Landauer, NIOSH, and
6	SC&A film badge and computer modeling dose
7	estimates at GSI.
8	And we also point to the large
9	amount of probably difficult to resolve or
10	maybe irresolvable technical issues that came
11	into focus at the November 2008 TBD-6000 Work
12	Group meeting.
13	I thank the Board for listening and
14	I certainly appreciate their time and efforts
15	on this matter.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very
17	much, Dr. McKeel.
18	I want to see if Patricia Coggins
19	is still on the line. Patricia, are you
20	there?
21	Patricia, if you have muted your
22	phone to need to un-mute it. We're not

1	hearing you if you are responding.
2	DR. McKEEL: Patricia, are you
3	there?
4	MS. COGGINS: Hello?
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, Patricia,
6	is that you?
7	MS. COGGINS: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Do you
9	have some additional comments for us this
10	afternoon?
11	MS. COGGINS: I think Dan covered
12	it quite well. Just one thing that I wanted
13	to add, I was reading through some literature
14	that I found online and I came across this
15	draft and it is really ironic that Dr. McKeel
16	was talking about uncertainties.
17	This is the possible implications
18	of draft for the ICRP recommendations, 2005.
19	And it is the Nuclear Energy Agency. But
20	basically it deals with uncertainties and they
21	do have to it's on page 13 of the draft
22	but that they have to be taken into

consideration for the dose models or the management, the assessment, require use of assumptions, this sort of thing.

And another question I suppose I have is, is it possible that I could be in the same room and receive the same dose as you but Is it effect me differently? that uncertainty? You know I wonder about things like this? Is my immune system maybe different than yours? Am I more susceptible due to my DNA?

That's why I have problems with the dose reconstruction. It's almost like it is all just black and white. And that we aren't all different.

Another part of that draft under the exclusions page is -- it was at B at the bottom. And it says in terms of exclusion of natural sources based on specific activity, it was agreed that it is hard to control the health impact of radionuclides by only considering the specific activity. In

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1	different situations, the same specific
2	activity could lead to very different doses.
3	So these kinds of things when I
4	read it, I just you know without proper
5	without enough data, without correct
6	monitoring, I don't know how they come to this
7	conclusion, you know?
8	So that's just basically all I had
9	to say.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, okay. Thank
11	you.
12	MS. COGGINS: Yes.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We appreciate
14	your comments as well.
15	Board members, one thing is evident
16	on this particular case, and as you know, we
17	do have a work group that has been dealing
18	with TBD-6000, 6001, which includes and
19	Appendix BB, which covers General Steel
20	Industries. And SC&A has been working with us
21	on this.

However, we do not have a tasking

1	for SC&A specifically on reviewing the
2	evaluation report. It would be in order for
3	us to formally task SC&A to do that. And, in
4	fact, is the next logical step in terms of
5	where that work group has to go in order to
6	address many of these issues that have arisen
7	both in terms of the questions the Board has
8	asked of NIOSH and the issues raised by the
9	petitioners.
10	So I would like to entertain a
11	motion to task SC&A to begin the review of the
12	evaluation report. If the Board is in
13	agreement with that, I would entertain such a
14	motion.
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: How about if I
16	second it? You've already
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: The Chair doesn't
18	make motions.
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay, I'd like to
20	make a motion that we task SC&A to look into
21	this.
22	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. The

1	tasking is to ask SC&A to review the or to
2	evaluate the review let's get the right
3	words here review the review. And they
4	will work with they would then work with
5	the work group and the normal process would
6	ensue to resolve this.
7	There are issues on TBD-6000 yet
8	and that matrix has been developed. And there
9	are some open issues on that as well as on the
10	Appendix BB. So this would be an extension
11	really of that work.
12	MEMBER BEACH: I'll second that.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And the motion
14	has been seconded.
15	Any discussion on the motion?
16	All in favor just raise your hands
17	quickly.
18	Okay, and Mike, if you're on the
19	phone
20	MEMBER GIBSON: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: and Mike votes
22	yes.

1	The motion carries. And we
2	officially are tasking then SC&A to formally
3	begin that particular part of the process.
4	Also, the well, I guess I'll
5	report this later but we do have a proposed
6	date for the next meeting of that group. And
7	I'll talk about that when we report on the
8	work groups later.
9	Any other discussion on this
10	particular item right at the moment before our
11	break? Or questions for either the
12	petitioners or for NIOSH?
13	MS. DONEGAN: Yes, I have a
14	question.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, is this
16	Patricia?
17	MS. DONEGAN: No, this is Anita
18	Donegan.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, Anita, I'll
20	allow the question although normally this is
21	not the public comment period. But I will
22	allow the question.

1	MS. DONEGAN: Okay. I had I was
2	not initially able to secure my father's
3	medical records before NIOSH did their dose
4	reconstruction. And the Department of Labor
5	reviewed them.
6	And I don't think that they were
7	sufficient. I don't think that their staff or
8	whoever reviewed it, you know, reviewed it
9	correctly.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. What I'm
11	going to suggest, if you would
12	MS. DONEGAN: He worked there for
13	22 years. He's been dead 35 years.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. Since this
15	Board cannot deal with individual cases, I'm
16	going to ask that once we take our break here
17	and go offline, that you leave a contact
18	number with our designated federal official so
19	he can get you in touch with the proper person
20	to deal with your particular issue if that is
21	all right.

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So stay on the line for just a

1	moment.
2	MS. DONEGAN: All right.
3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And we're going
4	to recess here. We will recess then for 15
5	minutes. And then we need to come back
6	shortly after three. We're scheduled to
7	address the next petition on the Hood
8	Building.
9	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off
LO	the record at 2:56 p.m., and resumed at 3:14
11	p.m.)
L2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We are ready to
L3	resume. We are going to consider now an SEC
L4	Petition, an 83.14 Petition, which is
L5	designated as the Hood Building. And we'll
L6	learn a little bit more about where the Hood
L7	Building is.
L8	And the presenter on that is Dr.
L9	Glover. Sam, welcome back to the podium. And
20	he will present the evaluation report from

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DR. GLOVER: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer.

NIOSH.

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1	Am I close enough to this mic?
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, get as close
3	as you can.
4	DR. GLOVER: Get as close as I can.
5	It makes it hard because we're trying to look
6	at the report. So we'll do the best we can.
7	This is actually something we
8	started over a year ago. And it was started
9	out as an MIT 83.14. And as we presented
10	that, it was actually pulled back because of
11	the site definition. And we're going to
12	explain the nuances of that.
13	There may be some descriptions and
14	some comments by the Senators from the state.
15	So I hope to provide some response and
16	understanding of why we had to do what we did.
17	So this is an 83.14 petition. It
18	was submitted by an EEOICPA claimant whose
19	dose reconstruction could not be completed by
20	NIOSH due to sufficient dosimetry-related
21	information. The claimant was employed by MIT
22	during the DOE period as a machinist.

I want to provide a little bit of background about MIT because the Hood Building starts in 1946 but it hit the ground running because its activities were transferred from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

So MIT begins as an AWE with the formation of the Manhattan Engineering District in 1942. They had a diverse mission, including uranium extraction, which began in `42 and expanded in July of `44.

The work included melting casting uranium metals, extracting uranium from low-grade ores, and they worked with a wide range of enriched uranium for the production of uranium and uranium alloys.

One of the things that they were particularly involved with was beryllium crucible development. And that's where Los Alamos got their crucibles to actually cast the first plutonium materials.

That beryllium activity is what drove for the consolidation of all those

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activities at MIT to be put offsite in a single facility known as the Hood Building. So they actually were getting beryllium, the first occupational beryllium diseases.

So this facility was a four-story facility known as the Hood Building. The AEC purchased a former ice cream plant and warehouse from the Hood Milk Company located at 155 Massachusetts Avenue.

Now as we talk about this site description, memos indicated by NIOSH indicate that the earliest the move could have occurred was May 9th, 1946. And so that's why we start this class definition as of May 9th, 1946.

And the move was documented to be completed as of August 14th, 1946. All MIT work for the AEC was consolidated into the Hood Building in 1946.

So although the Hood Building is included in the DOE facility listing for MIT, the Department of Labor considers this a separate designated facility from 1946 to

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1963. And I provided a copy of the description by DOL what the designated facility is.

MIT operated that facility from `46 to `54 at which time it ceased to operate it and a new company known as Nuclear Metals, Incorporation assumed responsibility for the Hood facility. They left the building in 1958 at which point the Hood Building then was demolished in 1963.

So as I mentioned, the actual facility description, a facility is actually a physical entity so in this case, the Hood Building is not part of MIT.

The original SEC we were going to put forward was based on MIT. And so, therefore, it mixed two separate facilities. We had to pull that back.

We followed up with multiple organizations to get better documentation to understand this transformation and how different things occurred for the record, the information.

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We conducted interviews with 16 former workers of the Hood facility with employment starting all the way back to 1947.

And they were -- their patience -- they were just outstanding in giving us information and being willing to show us and take time, really just amazing for them to show up.

We conducted certainly a lot of additional captures, making data sure understood as best as we possibly could all of the activities that occurred in the Hood This has really provided only -- I facility. don't certainly expect you to read this. in the packet. It also describes the website where you can read the facility as it exists There are still some things that need to now. be resolved and we'll talk about those.

So as we talk about the Hood facility, diverse activities occurred. They dealt with metallurgical work involving uranium, uranium alloys, as well as thorium. They extruded uranium, highly enriched uranium

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as well. They worked with thorium powder and alloy preparations.

They did enriched uranium work, again including highly enriched uranium. They conducted research on a wide range of tracers and radioactive materials, looking at activation of fission products and organic properties, a variety of standard research-type activities — that main radiological — that big metallurgical research in thorium and highly enriched uranium, however, is the main concern.

As we talk about this -- that class definition, if you go to the cases we have now, there are currently no cases listed as the Hood Building. It is something that has to be developed -- the Department of Labor has to put people in a particular facility.

Right now they are either listed as MIT from `46 to `54 or Nuclear Metals, Inc., from `54 to `58, at which time they occupied the Hood facility. So these are things the

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Department of Labor will have to work out as we go forward with this class.

So they need to review the MIT and the NMI cases to determine their eligibility in the Hood Building. Currently MIT also does not have a residual contamination period so that's something -- that is an action that is going to be in our shop for dealing with the MIT period. So those activities that occurred in a separate facility, not part of this Hood Building description, but as part of the MIT description.

There is also a separate facility known as the 224 Albany Street. And it was basically an outgrowth.

When the business was going so well, about a quarter mile down the road, they rented a facility. That also needs to be vetted by the Department of Labor whether that's part of the Hood Building or whether it is a separate entity.

But the activities were similar,

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were part of the Hood Building. The operations would be like Los Alamos renting a facility offsite.

So information related to the radiation exposures during the DOE period -- so we have operations involving uranium ore, metals, enriched uranium, and thorium. We feel there is insufficient information to determine the source term or complete range of chemical forms of these materials.

External sources of radiation include beta and photon sources primarily from uranium and thorium progeny and from X-ray radiographing testing. Many operations and sources of internal and external dose existed throughout the Hood facility -- Hood Building I should say.

So available information for dose reconstruction, we have limited documentation on job titles or assignments. We do have some documented radionuclides, including uranium, natural and highly enriched, thorium in a

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variety of chemical forms and for many different activities, as well as other fission products.

So internal monitoring data, some claims had uranium urinalysis for natural uranium but these were very limited and only for a few years. We found a few results of uranium by activity in 1957 and 1958. And these ranged up to 200 dpm. This would have been associated with highly enriched uranium results. So they clearly were having some fairly high exposures.

No thorium or fission product bioassay monitoring is available.

External monitoring data, based on interviews, essentially everyone at the facility was issued a badge. However, we've only received results -- some results from 1947 and 1951 through `58. These are very limited. We certainly do not have all of the data.

So feasibility of internal dose

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reconstruction. NIOSH has obtained uranium bioassay and breathing zone samples for a handful of workers in the Hood Building during a few years. Doses from highly enriched uranium and thorium operations cannot be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy. Based on that, health endangerment determination is required.

So summarizing, we feel that using existing methods, that natural could be evaluated for internal dosimetry but not enriched uranium or thorium. For external, we don't have all the data but we would certainly use whatever data is available. In medical X-rays, we would use our standard approaches.

So for heath endangerment, the evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates that some workers in the class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intakes of radionuclides and direct exposure to radioactive materials.

Consequently, NIOSH is specifying

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that health may have been endangered for those workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for this class or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC.

So dose reconstruction for the Hood Building, given the lack of complete personal external monitoring records, workplace monitoring records, and incomplete source-term information, it is not feasible to completely reconstruct all external or internal doses.

For non-presumptive cancer claims, NIOSH will use individual external and internal monitoring data that are available to complete dose reconstructions. NIOSH will also reconstruct internal dose for handling operations uranium metal using existing methods such as TBD-6000.

NIOSH will reconstruct medical

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1	doses using the complex-wide TBD for
2	Occupationally Related Diagnostic X-rays,
3	which you guys are very familiar with.
4	So our recommendation for the
5	period May 9th, 1946 through December 31st,
6	1963, NIOSH finds that radiation dose cannot
7	be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy,
8	feasibility, no, and we believe there is a
9	health endangerment.
10	Our proposed class includes all
11	employees of the DOE, its predecessor
12	agencies, and their contractors and
13	subcontractors who worked in the Hood Building
14	in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from May 9th,
15	1946 through December 31st, 1963 I think we
16	read this. I won't read that all the way
17	through.
18	I'll take any questions.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very
20	much, Sam.
21	This is another one where there
22	appears to be a gap between the designated

1	years I guess it's DOL-designated years or
2	DOE, whichever. And the years covered by the
3	petition, that is the petition goes to `63 but
4	the facility let's see, looking at your
5	description, I think it went to `68, was it?
6	DR. GLOVER: It was destroyed in
7	`63. It was demolished.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, it was
9	demolished in `63.
10	DR. GLOVER: Yes, sir.
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I guess I read
12	this wrong.
13	DR. GLOVER: So for the entire
14	period of the Department of Labor has
15	established the Hood facility
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. So they do
17	coincide. I guess I read that wrong.
18	Okay, thank you.
19	Wanda Munn?
20	MEMBER MUNN: Do we have any idea
21	who was responsible for all those badges? Was
22	it a part of the MIT operation? I think it is

1	a shame they all just disappeared into the
2	dust somewhere. But I'm wondering who was
3	responsible for them originally. Do we even
4	know?
5	DR. GLOVER: Through the worker
6	interviews, I believe we do know. I believe
7	that was Landauer. MIT, they are looking at
8	some of their records to try to reconstruct
9	that.
10	During our worker interviews, they
11	actually, unbelievably remembered the task
12	number that was associated with this the
13	guys from 1947 remembered this. And so using
14	that information, that's how MIT ties their
15	dosimetry records with what task you were
16	working on. And so they are looking at those
17	to make sure that we use as much available
18	information as we can.
19	MEMBER MUNN: It's a shame they're
20	not there. Thank you.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sam, I now see
22	where what gap I was looking at. You have

1	the MIT designation for the period `46 to `54.
2	You have the NMI designation from `54 to `58.
3	Okay.
4	Now I'm really asking about what is
5	the status after `58 up to `63. Did somebody
6	else operate that or own that building?
7	DR. GLOVER: To the best of our
8	knowledge, it was unoccupied.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Unoccupied.
10	DR. GLOVER: But that is to the
11	best we certainly have not been able to
12	verify that. That was from a news clipping.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
14	Okay, Jim, you have a comment?
15	MEMBER MELIUS: The other gap would
16	be the years prior to 1946?
17	DR. GLOVER: The Hood Building was
18	not being used. But there was activity at MIT
19	and I believe that is what was covered in the
20	original evaluation report.
21	MEMBER MUNN: I don't think I've
22	heard a complete explanation for what's going

1	on there sort of what's happened to the MIT
2	years.
3	DR. GLOVER: It would, of course,
4	have to be a separate SEC evaluation. We
5	would have to have a separate class definition
6	because it is a separate facility. So by law,
7	I can't because they're separate.
8	However we have no claims at MIT.
9	And so it would create a situation where I
10	create an SEC or not that we recommend
11	an SEC for a facility with no claims.
12	MR. RUTHERFORD: One minor
12 13	MR. RUTHERFORD: One minor clarification.
13	clarification.
13 14	clarification.  CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold off a
13 14 15	clarification.  CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold off a second, they're having trouble hearing on the
13 14 15 16	clarification.  CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold off a second, they're having trouble hearing on the phone.
13 14 15 16 17	clarification.  CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold off a second, they're having trouble hearing on the phone.  MR. KATZ: Could you please just
13 14 15 16 17	clarification.  CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold off a second, they're having trouble hearing on the phone.  MR. KATZ: Could you please just try to speak a little closer to the mic if
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	clarification.  CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold off a second, they're having trouble hearing on the phone.  MR. KATZ: Could you please just try to speak a little closer to the mic if possible?

1	presumptive cancer at this time. However, we
2	are reviewing additional things with those
3	claims as well to see if things like that
4	happened that occurred with Tyson Valley
5	may occur at this facility as well.
6	But we are looking at that. And
7	but as Sam mentioned, we have no claims of
8	presumptive cancers.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Ask if everyone
10	on the phone is having trouble.
11	MR. KATZ: Is everyone on the phone
12	having difficulty hearing?
13	This is not Blockson. It's the
14	Hood Building.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: MIT.
16	MR. KATZ: MIT.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, Blockson is
18	at four o'clock local time here, which would
19	be six o'clock East Coast time and five
20	Central.
21	Okay, go ahead.
22	MEMBER MELIUS: Just a related

1	question. The other facility that was used,
2	what is the status of that in terms of its
3	designation?
4	DR. GLOVER: We're going to provide
5	all the information that we have to the
6	Department of Labor who can choose to include
7	that under the Hood facility description. But
8	it will be based on their determination.
9	Right now though it is a separate
10	entity. It is separate from the actual
11	facility. So at this time, it's not part of
12	this designation.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Can I just ask
14	procedurally what how this works in terms
15	of the SEC recommendation that we make?
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, are you
17	asking on this petition if we, for example
18	
19	MEMBER MELIUS: Are you the way
20	I just heard it described, it sounded as if
21	this petition would then somehow encompass
22	that other area. Or would we need a new

1	petition?
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It would not
3	encompass the other campus area, right Sam?
4	MEMBER MELIUS: No, I'm talking
5	about the neighboring building, not the MIT.
6	DR. GLOVER: Right.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, the
8	neighboring, oh.
9	DR. NETON: I think I can answer
10	that question. The Hood Building, as it
11	currently stands is a single stand-alone
12	facility but there is this other facility
13	the Albany Street facility or whatever it is
14	called currently that has no status at all
15	as an AWE.
16	If the Department of Labor added as
17	part of the Hood Building as a covered
18	facility, it would just be subsumed into that
19	facility definition.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but
21	DR. NETON: It would not require
22	another SEC Petition. It would be that's

1	the facility.
2	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but our
3	definition is the Hood Building.
4	DR. NETON: Right. The Hood it
5	would probably stay the Hood Building and
6	other much like what happened at Chapman
7	Valve. Chapman Value now includes that other
8	remember that other the Dean Street
9	facility was added. And they didn't change
LO	the Chapman Valve designation. They just
11	added Dean Street to the Chapman Valve
L2	coverage.
L3	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but what
L4	happens to what we're approving as an SEC?
L5	The class definition that we're basically
L6	approving, would that automatically encompass
L7	something that's this refers to the Hood
L8	Building. It wouldn't refer to the
L9	necessarily to the neighboring building. I
20	mean this is sort of an odd
21	DR. NETON: Well
22	MEMBER MELIUS: I understand why

1	you did it but
2	DR. NETON: well, what's odder
3	is currently there are no covered cases
4	covered claims under this definition.
5	MEMBER MELIUS: Well, that was one
6	of my other questions.
7	DR. NETON: That's a different
8	issue. But, you know, you raise a good
9	question. I'm not certain because we went
LO	through the Dean Street facility at Chapman
L1	and we went to great pains to determine was
L2	there really covered exposure at that
L3	additional portion. But
L4	MEMBER MELIUS: I'm just worried
L5	about our recommendation then getting
L6	DR. NETON: Well, I suspect if the
L7	recommendation covered the Hood Building and
L8	the address was provided, then it would be
L9	okay. I don't know. I guess I really can't
20	answer what happens if the Albany facility was
21	added then.
	1

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, let me

Τ.	raise a related question. In principle, we
2	don't know what went on at the other building.
3	We don't know, for example, if you could, in
4	fact, construct doses there. Perhaps you
5	would find out you had good information. I'm
6	just hypothesizing.
7	But we don't know the status of the
8	workers in the other building so to
9	automatically add it just because it is an
10	expansion of this program seems to me to have
11	some pitfalls.
12	DR. NETON: I agree, yes.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: I mean not only
14	what you say but we really, as a Board, we
15	have not considered that building. It would
16	be one thing if we had the information and DOL
17	was just -
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
19	MEMBER MELIUS: had to make a
20	decision
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, that's
22	basically the point I was making.

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, yes, right,
right.
DR. GLOVER: You raise a good
point.
MEMBER MELIUS: And then the other
question I have, while you're don't go
away, Jim.
DR. NETON: Don't go away?
(Laughter.)
MEMBER MELIUS: He is anyway.
DR. GLOVER: I would briefly speak
to that if you'd like. The 224, we did
discuss some of it in the report. We did
research that. They did use radioactive
materials. And people were transient back and
forth. It was the overflow facility.
They were doing similar works,
including extruding uranium at that facility.
They were storing uranium rods and all the
material. And I understand it is a
complexity. And I didn't know how else to

22

address it.

1	MEMBER MELIUS: Well, I think you
2	just helped a lot. Because I think we just
3	need to make sure we have on the record some
4	consideration of that and some information on
5	that particular building.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. So
7	everything you said about the, quote, Hood
8	Building, actually applied to both is what
9	you're telling us.
10	DR. GLOVER: Yes, sir.
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That's an
12	important point.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes. Can I ask a
14	follow-up question? It was why are we
15	considering this when we don't have a case? I
16	mean
17	DR. GLOVER: Those individuals did
18	work I mean I can't say they the DOL
19	puts people in places.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay, okay.
21	DR. GLOVER: But they were clearly
22	Hood facility workers.

1	DR. NETON: Yes. This is just
2	clearly an artifact of the way this situation
3	evolved.
4	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay. Okay. But
5	you just sounded more doubtful than skeptical.
6	It was like well, we don't have any.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Wanda Munn?
8	MEMBER MUNN: And isn't the concern
9	with the other building isn't the concern
10	with the other building the Department of
11	Labor's concern not ours?
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, it is. The
13	point I was trying to make is if that building
14	were tacked on after the fact and we had not
15	evaluated and Sam has assured me now that
16	we have but had we not evaluated what went
17	on there, it would be a little awkward to say
18	that we had properly addressed our
19	responsibility to assure that whatever work
20	went on there was eligible for the SEC. That
21	was the only point I was making.

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MEMBER MUNN: Well, it just seems

1	to me that the whole issue is the Department
2	of Labor's issue and not really one for us.
3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I think at
4	this point, it is, yes.
5	Other comments or questions?
6	Thank you, Sam.
7	I don't think we have a petitioner
8	for this but we do have a comment, I believe,
9	from Sharon Block of oh, Jason, you're
10	going to read a letter first. And then we'll
11	hear from Sharon. Thank you.
12	MR. BROEHM: Yes, Sharon asked me
13	to read this letter from Senators Edward
14	Kennedy and John Kerry from Massachusetts.
15	It's actually written to Dr. Christine Branche
16	as Acting Director of NIOSH but we'd like to
17	read it into the record here to get the issues
18	on the record:
19	Dear Dr. Branche:
20	We're writing to bring your
21	attention to a Special Exposure Cohort
22	Petition filed on behalf of former employees

of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology of Cambridge, Massachusetts, pursuant to the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act.

MIT was involved in radiological operations from the 1940's through the 1960's in a number of different capacities. During this time, its employees were exposed to radiation materials in their work.

On February 4, NIOSH issued an SEC Petition Evaluation Report on the MITSEC The report recommends approving the Petition. addition to the Special Exposure Cohort of all the MIT employees who worked at the Hood Building, 155 Massachusetts Avenue, from May 9, 1946 through December 31, 1963. The report will be presented to the Advisory Board on Radiation Worker Health at. the Board's February 18, 2009 meeting.

We support the recommendation by NIOSH to add the workers to the cohort, but we are concerned that the scope of NIOSH's

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recommendation is too narrow and leaves out
workers who deserve to be included. Our
concern relates to both the time period and
locations covered. Specifically, NIOSH's
recommendation does not include MIT employees
who performed uranium extraction studies from
1942 to 1946 or who conducted research and
testing on processes for melting and casting
uranium metal from 1944 to 1946. In addition,
NIOSH's recommendation does not include
workers at the facility located at 224 Albany
Street, adjacent to the Hood Building. The
NIOSH report confirms that there were
radiological activities during the 1942 to
1946 time period and at the 224 Albany Street
facility, but it gives no explanation why
workers employed during this time or at this
location were excluded from the
recommendation

When Congress enacted EEOICPA, it was our intent to compensate sick workers for their extraordinary sacrifice to the nation's

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1	nuclear weapons program. The Act's goals can
2	be met only if SEC Petitions are processed
3	fairly and expeditiously. Narrowly construing
4	the class of workers covered by the Cohort
5	does not accomplish this goal. Consequently,
6	we would appreciate an explanation of the
7	decision by NIOSH to exclude employees who
8	worked during the 1942-1946 time period or at
9	the 224 Albany Street location from its
10	definition of the scope of the MIT Special
11	Exposure Cohort Petition.
12	Thank you for your consideration of
13	this issue. If you have any questions or
14	additional information to provide, please
15	contact Sharon Block in Senator Kennedy's
16	office at 202-224-5441.
17	With respect and appreciation,
18	Sincerely,
19	Edward M. Kennedy and John Kerry
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you, Jason.
21	And am I correct in assuming that Dr. Branche
22	or her staff will be replying to that letter

1	since it's not really directed to the Board
2	per se? Is that correct?
3	Thank you.
4	Then we'll hear from Sharon Block,
5	who is on Senator Kennedy's staff. Sharon,
6	are you one the line?
7	MS. BLOCK: I am, yes.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
9	Please proceed.
10	MS. BLOCK: Thank you. And, you
11	know, I think the letter, you know, basically
12	expresses Senator Kennedy's and Senator
13	Kerry's concerns. And, you know, I want to
14	thank the Board for looking into these issues.
15	And, you know, Senator Kennedy's
16	concern always is that the process is made as
17	easy and expeditious as possible for his
18	constituents and for all the former energy
19	workers.
20	And so we just appreciate the
21	Board's consideration of this petition in a
22	way that won't require other workers to have

1	to come back and file separate petitions or
2	start this process over again. And just to be
3	sure that this one is proceeding in a way that
4	covers, you know, as many workers as are
5	eligible and deserve to be covered.
6	So anyway, we appreciate your time
7	and attention to this. And look forward to
8	getting Dr. Branche's answer to the letter.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you
10	very much for that input as well.
11	The Chair is trying to determine
12	what we can use. We want to keep the Blockson
13	discussion at a time certain at four o'clock.
14	We do have
15	MEMBER MELIUS: We need to finish
16	this up.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, we need to
18	finish this, yes. I'm we're so streamlined
19	that I thought we had already done what we're
20	thinking about doing.
21	MEMBER MELIUS: I had that quick
22	nap.

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right, okay.
2	Well, the Chair will allow us to
3	finish, I think, in all good conscience, it
4	would be good.
5	MEMBER MELIUS: That will keep us
6	alert if we could just move things around
7	enough.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Well, this
9	time of day, you know, it's six o'clock in
10	Lafayette so that's my excuse and I'm sticking
11	to it.
12	(Laughter.)
13	Okay. Here we go. Further
14	discussion on the Hood Building SEC Brad
15	Clawson?
16	MEMBER CLAWSON: I'm just
17	questioning what was going on from `42 to `46?
18	What was that building in the process or
19	what?
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sam, can you
21	answer that question?
22	DR. GLOVER: Yes, the Hood facility

1 did not become part of the process until 1946. Sam, hold on just 2 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 3 a minute. We got some talking on the line. If you're on the phone line, would you please 4 mute your phones? Thank you. 5 6 Sam? So the Hood facility 7 DR. GLOVER: was basically a milk company, which the AEC 8 purchased. So it had not activities nuclear 9 10 related to this AEC stuff until 1946. All the work, it was done at the MIT campus. And then 11 12 it was shifted to the Hood Building as of May 13 9th, 1946. MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay. So we're 14 15 separating out just the Hood Building. guess I wanted to make sure - how are we not 16 missing the work that was done at MIT? 17 Τ 18 guess the campus -- I realize there's 19 petitions or whatever but so that we don't 20 have to revisit this. DR. GLOVER: Unfortunately because 21

one is an atomic weapons employer, the other

1	is a it is a separate truly a separate
2	facility and designation. I don't think they
3	can be encompassed with one another.
4	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So the work they
6	did there at MIT specifically would have to be
7	handled in a separate petition, for example.
8	MEMBER BEACH: Okay. The only
9	other question I have on the dates as well is
10	with the Albany Street building. The
11	petitioner or this letter states it was from
12	1942 to 1946. And if we write our
13	recommendation for later years, how would
14	those earlier years be covered?
15	DR. GLOVER: That was that's the
16	MIT campus itself, not the 224 Albany Street.
17	MEMBER BEACH: Okay, I was thinking
18	
19	DR. GLOVER: 224 Albany Street
20	would have occurred during the Hood Building
21	time frame.
22	MEMBER BEACH: Okay, okay. Thank

1	you. So it's fine.
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Jim, you have an
3	additional question?
4	MEMBER MELIUS: No. Brad
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, we're good.
6	MEMBER MELIUS: stole my
7	question.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Other
9	comments?
10	PARTICIPANT: I have a question.
11	MR. KATZ: On the phone, this is
12	Board deliberation.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. If there
14	are no more questions on this one, it would be
15	in order to have an appropriate motion.
16	MEMBER PRESLEY: So moved if Jim's
17	got one ready to go.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, Mr. Presley
19	is moving. And is there a second?
20	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Second.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Phil has
22	seconded the motion to recommend approval of

this -- or recommends that we approve -- I
don't want to use the word approve -- the
motion is to recommend to the Secretary that
there be this class added to the SEC. It has
been seconded.

And, Mr., Dr. Melius -- Mr.

And, Mr., Dr. Melius -- Mr. Professor Dr. Melius, do you have an appropriately worded statement that we will use?

MEMBER MELIUS: And I would hope that Mr. Presley would consider it to be a friendly statement.

MEMBER PRESLEY: Always.

MEMBER MELIUS: The Board recommends the following letter be transmitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services within 21 days. Should the Chair become aware of any issue that in his judgment would preclude the transmittal of this letter within that time period, the Board requests that he promptly informs the Board of the delay and the reasons for this delay, and that he

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immediately works with NIOSH to schedule an emergency meeting of the Board to discuss this issue.

The Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, the Board, has evaluated SEC Petition 00101 concerning workers at the Hood Building in Cambridge, Massachusetts under the statutory requirements established by EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 CFR Section 83.13 and 42 CFR Section 83.14. The Board respectfully recommends Special Exposure Cohort status be accorded to all employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, and their contractors and subcontractors who worked at the Hood Building, Cambridge, Massachusetts from May 9th, 1946 through December 31st, 1963, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 works days occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC.

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The Board notes that although NIOSH found that they were unable to completely reconstruct radiation doses for these employees, they believe that they are able to reconstruct portions of the external and internal doses for some workers.

This recommendation is based on the following factors:

- 1. The Hood Building was involved in a variety of operations related to atomic weapons development and production.
- 2. NIOSH was unable to locate sufficient monitoring data or source-term information at this site in order to be able to complete accurate individual dose reconstructions for the potential internal and external radiation exposures to which these workers may have been subjected. The Board concurs with this conclusion.
- 3. NIOSH determined that health may have been endangered for the workers exposed to radiation at this facility during

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the time period in question. The Board also 1 concurs with this determination. 2 3 Based on these considerations and the discussions held at our February 4 18th 5 Advisory Board meeting in Albuquerque, 6 Mexico, the Board recommends that this Special 7 Exposure Cohort petition be granted. Enclosed is the documentation from 8 the Board meeting where this Special Exposure 9 10 Cohort class was discussed. The documentation includes transcripts of the deliberations, 11 12 the petition, the NIOSH review copies of 13 thereof, and related documents distributed by If any of these items are unavailable NIOSH. 14 15 at this time, they will follow shortly. 16 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. You've heard the motion as seconded. Are you ready 17 to vote? Any further discussion? 18 19 Bradley? 20 I just want to MEMBER CLAWSON: make sure, especially with this letter here, 21

that I guess we help Dr. Branche out or NIOSH

1	does, that the people understand why we have
2	to divide this like this, especially them
3	calling out the years because it was kind of
4	confusing to me and until Sam explained it to
5	us, it was totally separate the years, the
6	MIT era of it, that this be taken care of.
7	I just want to make sure that they
8	understand the legalities of why we did what
9	we did. I just
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Certainly that
11	will be in the transcripts. I would be
12	reluctant to discuss that in the letter
13	because that would probably confuse
14	MEMBER CLAWSON: Right. I just
15	want to make sure
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: that as they
18	respond to this letter
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. Right.
20	And Christine, I think, will make that clear
21	in her letter. And those who are advising her
22	will make sure that that is the case.

1	MEMBER MELIUS: Can I just
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
3	MEMBER MELIUS: I would also, after
4	we've dealt with this particular motion, I
5	would like to offer possibly a motion but
6	certainly some discussion of a way of dealing
7	with the Albany Street facility so that we
8	can, you know, be efficient in terms of how we
9	deal with that depending on what Department of
10	Labor does and so forth.
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
12	MEMBER MELIUS: But let's I
13	think we need to do that after we've dealt
14	with this.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And before we
16	vote and I want to follow that up with one
17	comment. If we're able to, we still would
18	like to get hard copies of the motions for the
19	Board members for tomorrow.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And particularly
22	for the staff people, I want to make sure Jeff

sees those.

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And if we need some alternate wording that would allow the other building once the determination is made to be tacked on readily, if we need to say anything, we need to catch that early.

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I mean the intent is there.

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, two things.

One is as soon as we finish this, I will give

Nancy the letters so we can get them printed

off and so forth for that. We're just waiting

until we got the third letter done.

Secondly, actually what I was going to propose was that we, you know, designate you, Dr. Ziemer, to, you know, depending on the timing of when this happens and what the ruling is, see I don't think we can add the Albany Street facility until DOL has made a determination.

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
2	MEMBER MELIUS: So we can't include
3	it in the letter. But if something needs to
4	be modified to do that and it can be done
5	easily, you know, then I think we can
6	designate
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, that's why
8	I want to I would like to make sure that
9	if Labor thinks, for example, it would be
10	helpful to say something like the Hood
11	Building and its associated facilities or
12	something like that
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Right.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: we could do
15	that easily. We obviously don't want to name
16	a building that is not yet part of the
17	consideration. So in any event
18	MEMBER MELIUS: Can I just say that
19	what I was going to do was offer a motion
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
21	MEMBER MELIUS: to the effect
22	that that is the understanding of the Board.

1	That should these facilities be included in
2	the definition, that then, you know, we would
3	consider them as part of this SEC.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think we will
5	formalize that so it is in the record. So
6	we'll do that as soon as we vote. Let's have
7	a roll call vote on this one.
8	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
9	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
10	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
11	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
12	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson?
13	(No verbal response.)
14	MR. KATZ: That's a yes.
15	Mr. Griffon?
16	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
17	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
18	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.
19	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
20	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
21	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
22	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.

1	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?
2	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: Mr. Presley?
4	MEMBER PRESLEY: Yes.
5	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
6	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
7	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield?
8	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes.
9	MR. KATZ: Dr. Ziemer?
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
11	The motion carries, 12 for, none
12	against, and no abstentions.
13	Now the Chair recognizes Dr.
14	Melius.
15	MEMBER MELIUS: I would like to
16	offer a motion that the Board go on record
17	that in our review of this, that should the
18	Albany Street 224 Albany Street facility be
19	included in the site designation for
20	definition for the Hood Building site, that it
21	would be, you know, the determination of this
22	Board that the Special Exposure Cohort

1	provision should also apply to work in that
2	facility.
3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
4	Is there a second?
5	MEMBER CLAWSON: I second it.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
7	Any discussion?
8	And this would appear in the
9	transcript as a supporting document so that if
10	there was a need to change that designation
11	remember the final designation really gets
12	made by the Secretary.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Right.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It's not by us
15	and it's not by NIOSH. We are both advising
16	the Secretary. We don't make the
17	determination. The Secretary will.
18	And perhaps by the time that gets
19	through the chain of things, that final
20	decision will have been made on the auxiliary
21	building.
	1

So are you ready to vote? I don't

1	think well, just for the record, let's do a
2	roll call again on this since it could effect
3	what's in the SEC.
4	MR. KATZ: Sure.
5	Ms. Beach?
6	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
7	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
8	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
9	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson?
LO	MEMBER GIBSON: Yes.
11	MR. KATZ: Mr. Griffon?
L2	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
L3	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
L4	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.
L5	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
L6	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
L7	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
L8	MEMBER MUNN: Aye.
L9	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?
20	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
21	MR. KATZ: Mr. Presley?
22	MEMBER PRESLEY: Yes.

1	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
2	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield?
4	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes.
5	MR. KATZ: Dr. Ziemer?
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
7	The motion carries. Thank you very
8	much.
9	We are pretty much on schedule here
10	now. And we are ready to move to a report on
11	Blockson Chemical SEC. At the moment, the
12	status of this is that there actually is a
13	motion that has been tabled over the last
14	couple of meetings.
15	But the work group has gone back
16	and done some additional things. So we'll
17	hear from Wanda Munn, the Chair of the work
18	group. And also, I believe we have some of
19	the petitioners who may wish to comment by
20	phone on this as well.
21	Ms. Munn, I believe, has a more
22	formal presentation here. So she'll approach

1	the podium and we have some visuals to assist.
2	MEMBER MUNN: The first dozen of
3	these slides will be absolutely nothing new.
4	Everyone on this Board has had them forwarded
5	to you. You've seen the first 12 of them at a
6	prior meeting. We're going through them
7	primarily to make sure that the record, again,
8	reports the early activities of this group and
9	what the group is consisting of.
10	The first thing I have to do is
11	decide how to get down to the next slide.
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: They're having
13	trouble hearing you on the phone, Wanda. So
14	if you can get any closer
15	MEMBER MUNN: I don't think I can
16	get much closer to it. Oh, all right. I'm
17	trying up and down instead of sideways. Thank
18	you.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Stand by. We're
20	trying to get the slides going here as well.
21	MEMBER MUNN: The work group
22	members, as you know, consist of myself as

Chair, Mike Gibson, Dr. James Melius, Dr. Genevieve Roessler, Bradley Clawson is our alternate.

that You know we had two SEC Petitions that were qualified in 2006. The technical basis document underwent a total revision before we ever undertook our work. We had a couple of near-site meetings with rather extensive conversations workers and with others.

We had the technical contractor, SC&A, review both the site profile and the SEC Petition as well as the evaluation report. They issued seven findings. Those seven findings you have seen before. I don't think I'm going to go through them. That doesn't serve us. You know what they are. We have discussed each of them at great length.

From now to the present, we have had the work group operating. We've had technical teams operating. We've interacted with the workers. We have issued white papers

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internal papers for permanent finding has resolved been to the satisfaction of both NIOSH and SC&A. And additional detailed we've had questions addressed from each meeting to each meeting.

We've brought this to the Board before and we will -- I'm going to make every effort to try to fully embrace the scope of what we've done.

As responsive action of the early morning requests from some meetings of the Board, the work revisited indicated concerns. We had three questions asked of the members at one of our earlier meetings.

We asked them about the SC&A review, the NIOSH SEC report, and the site profile. The questions specifically were of the seven identified findings of significance from SC&A, they reported all issues resolved. Do you accept this report? The answer was yes.

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Question number two was NIOSH has sought information in depth for all activities on this site. And as reported, they have adequate data to reconstruct or bound radiation doses. Do you accept this report? Two members voted yes, two said no.

With respect to the site profile, which has been completely rewritten, reviewed, and revised at length, do you accept the current site profile? Two members voted yes, two voted no.

At our meeting in June of 2008, the work group Chair made the recommendation that we accept the NIOSH position. The statement that I made at that time was accurate data exists to reasonably bound with sufficient accuracy any radiation exposure which could have resulted from employment at Blockson Chemical Company during its contract period as an atomic weapons employer. That statement is supported by our contractor.

At that time because several of the

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reports that the work group had been involved with had only recently come forward, there was some concern of Board members that they had not had full opportunity to review those materials.

At that meeting in St. Louis, we were requested to table my motion with the expectation that it would allow additional information to be disseminated to whoever wished to have it. Specifically the request was more information about radon.

Pertinent supporting documents were to be distributed and reviewed. And we left the issue as tabled. We did that.

We provided in August a radon white paper, which was produced by SC&A and was distributed to the full Board. I provided previously issued contractor reports, which indicated the closed seven initial findings and other salient internal working documents.

And at that time, several transcripts of our meetings, which had been

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backed up, were released so that simultaneously you received access to the minutes of not only the meetings of the Board that were pertinent to our discussion but also to all of the work group meeting minutes.

In September at that meeting, the Board opted to leave Blockson tabled. The report that I made to you at that time had to do with the activities that had occurred and exchanges between the work group members, NIOSH, and SC&A.

The Board felt that additional attention needed to be paid to the radon issue. They were not content with the material that we brought.

We had a teleconference on December 12th to attempt to move that issue forward. We had more technical exchanges, extensive discussion on the validity of the SC&A concurred model. NIOSH and process. Two members of our work disagreed.

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We had an additional teleconference January 23rd, 2009. We reviewed the history. We reaffirmed the radon resolution. One work group member questioned the model. requested that a written basis be provided to for our relaying that us information to you. The member indicated that would prefer to bring he his own recommendations.

NIOSH and SC&A have agreed that some site profile issues remain. But that all of the SEC issues have been resolved.

The current status is that we have additional report with the sent you an compilation of the history of what this work group has done. We sent it to each of you with specific references so that you would have easy access to the URLs that would direct you to the documents with the most effect on what we were doing. One work group member rejects the model and will comment later today.

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1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Stand by just a
2	minute. Wanda, we're having some phone line
3	trouble.
4	MR. KATZ: People on the line,
5	there is a discussion going on. Are you
6	having a hard time hearing the discussion?
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It's pretty loud
8	here in the room so I'm not sure what the
9	problem is. Is it a phone line problem? Here
10	in the room it is very loud.
11	MEMBER MUNN: Is the reporter
12	saying he also does or does not hear the phone
13	line?
14	COURT REPORTER: I hear you fine.
15	I just am not hearing the people on the
16	telephone.
17	MEMBER MUNN: He's not hearing the
18	phone lines. So the problem is with the phone
19	line.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: The phone line is
21	not picking this up. I don't know if it is
22	faulty equipment or what the problem is here.

1	MEMBER MUNN: Well, it doesn't seem
2	to be working either direction.
3	MR. KATZ: Are you hearing Ms. Munn
4	right now?
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We're trying to
6	get it as loud as we can here without
7	MEMBER MUNN: Well, the Court
8	Reporter can't hear them well.
9	COURT REPORTER: I'm hearing you
LO	fine.
11	MEMBER MUNN: But he's hearing me
L2	fine.
L3	COURT REPORTER: Yes.
L4	MEMBER MUNN: So it's not this
L5	microphone. The problem is with the phone
L6	line clearly.
L7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I think it
L8	is either the phone lines or the equipment.
L9	MR. KATZ: I can't say but I think
20	if everybody on the phone would mute if
21	everybody they have a mic here. If
22	everyone on the phone would just mute their

1	phones, Wanda will speak as loudly as she can.
2	But if it is a problem with the phone line,
3	I'll check with the people that deal with the
4	phone line. But there's nothing else we can
5	do, I think, at this point.
6	PARTICIPANT: Mr. Katz, we can hear
7	you perfectly clear. Can Wanda use your
8	chair?
9	MR. KATZ: That's fine, yes, if
10	that will work.
11	MEMBER MUNN: I'll need to move my
12	computer equipment if I do that. That doesn't
13	seem reasonable.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Will this mic
15	work? Take this mic over it's a hand held.
16	I don't know if it is the mic or the location
17	in the room or what.
18	MEMBER MUNN: Do you hear me any
19	better now on the line? Did we get any
20	response from the people on the line when I
21	speak into this microphone?
22	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Is that any

1	better?
2	MR. KATZ: Is that any better?
3	MEMBER GIBSON: It seems
4	MEMBER MUNN: How about A-B-C-D-E-
5	F-G-H-I-J
6	MR. KATZ: Is that clear?
7	MEMBER GIBSON: That's better.
8	Okay, carry on.
9	MEMBER MUNN: Better?
LO	The current status, as I was
L1	saying, is that the Board has our entire
L2	referenced history and has, I hope, had
L3	adequate opportunity now to revisit whatever
L4	you wish to revisit. One of our work group
L5	members rejects the model and wants to make
L6	comments and other recommendations today.
L7	One of our Board members who is not
L8	a member of the work group still questions
L9	stratification of radon. We've fortunately
20	had a late report from Dr. Anigstein sent to
21	all the members of the Board addressing that
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question with respect to the stratification of

radon and airflow within the building, the single building which, as you will recall, is the focus of our attention here.

We had, during that teleconference on January 23rd, we reviewed the history, and we reaffirmed the radon resolution. We still have the question respective to the model. And it is going to give us -- it was asked a written basis for that position. NIOSH and SC&A agree. Some site profile issues remain but the SEC issues are closed.

And the recommendation of the work group Chair that I had made earlier, you have already seen. That is still currently on our scope as being tabled. It's time for it to come off if we're going to make any definition with respect to a decision today.

There is no further action that can be seen that this work group can take. We have nothing further to bring to the Board.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you very much.

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1	Let me ask Board members, do you
2	have any questions for Wanda or comments at
3	this point? There is a tabled motion, which I
4	will ask or call for a motion to bring it off
5	the table unless there's other discussion
6	because we cannot debate a motion to un-table.
7	Yes, Mark?
8	MEMBER GRIFFON: I just want to
9	clarify on the presentation, Wanda; I think
10	you said there was a report on the
11	stratification. I think that was based on my
12	comments on concentration gradients.
13	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: But I don't think
15	there was a report. I know there was an e-
16	mail reply to my question. But I don't think
17	there has been any formal report from SC&A.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think your mic
19	is kicking in and out. Is it? Is his mic
20	kicking in and out?
21	MEMBER MUNN: No, it was not a
22	formal report.

1	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay, yes.
2	MEMBER MUNN: Dr. Anigstein gave to
3	us the information that he had placed, I
4	believe, in earlier reports internal
5	reports that the work group and SC&A had been
6	involved with. I don't believe that there was
7	anything new. I think it was a recompilation
8	if I am correct. Am I correct Dr. Anigstein
9	or John one of you?
10	DR. ANIGSTEIN: There were two
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Use the mic.
12	DR. ANIGSTEIN: There were two
13	later reports
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Get real close
15	and talk real loud.
16	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Excuse me?
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Get close and
18	talk loud.
19	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay. There were
20	two later reports. There was the original
21	report that was submitted in June no,
22	excuse me, in July towards the end of July

and then there was a PA cleared version of the same report produced in August.

MEMBER MUNN: Yes.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: That was in response to the direction that we got at the June St. Louis meeting to produce -- actually it was requested by Mr. Gibson, I believe -- sorry -- it was Mr. Griffon.

Was to have a more detailed model. There was a very preliminary model presented at that meeting. And then Mr. Griffon asked for more clarification and more explanation of the model, equations. And that led to the production -- that led us to produce this much longer report which included a Monte Carlo analysis, which would take in all the variability.

The idea was the first -- the one that was presented at the June meeting had a bunch of what-ifs. If the radon release was this and it was A, and if the air exchange rate was B, then the radon concentration would

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be C. And then if you had different values, there would be different radon concentrations.

And Mr. Gibson questioned that. He said well, we need more than one -- you know we can't have a bunch of numbers. We need one number. So that inspired us to say well, if you do it as Monte Carlo calculation, you can pick off say the 95th percentile or the median and you will have, you know, concrete values we can do.

So we just did a much more detailed model, documented it, presented equations. Since then -- afterwards there were some comments back from NIOSH and we went back and looked at it a little further.

And there was also a request by Dr. Roessler at the meeting where this original report was presented, I believe it was October 15th in Cincinnati that we narrow the gap -- we narrow the range of the two very variable parameters. We narrowed the ventilation rate in Building 40 and we narrowed the range of

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the radon releases from the sulphuric acid.

So did some further we investigation and decided that the radon releases can't be any higher than 70 percent that was measured in showers. And we thought that the agitated tank is not going to be any higher than that. And then also we managed to pro rate the ventilation rate based on the building size and we came with a narrow range of that.

So that report was sent out later.

And I have the report here -- in December -it was produced in December. And the -- yes,
I have it right here, December, it is dated
here December 2nd. And that was basically a
rework of the Appendix B of the previous
report. And simply produced a narrower range.

And because this was a narrow range, the 95th percentile was reduced from something like, if I recollect, 60-odd picocuries per liter and it came down to 36 picocuries per liter. And other parts of the

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distribution also came down somewhat lower. 1 2 And then there was a three-page 3 report that was produced as a result of some exchanges with NIOSH about ventilation rates. 4 NIOSH had produced a memo from Dr. 5 6 Naomi Harleyha questioning whether the 7 ventilation rates could, in fact, be as low as we had assumed when our assumptions were based 8 measurements done by Pacific Northwest 9 10 Laboratory on some buildings I think 11 Washington State. And, again, we narrowed that down -12 13 - I'm sorry, I'm losing track. I had already 14 gone over that. 15 produced a three-page report 16 answering why -- defending our ventilation And that was -- I transmitted those to 17 rates. 18 you, Wanda, just a couple of days ago. 19 had them earlier but I just thought as a 20 reminder. did But address 21 Ι not the stratification of radon. We really had no 22

basis for that.

I'll just, as long as I'm at the microphone, to save time, I'll just restate Dr. Mauro's comment was that even though there may have been different concentrations of radon in different parts of the building, workers typically did not stay in any one location.

The workers testified they had different duties and they moved around so even if there was a radon hot spot, no one worker would have been there for every one of his, you know, eight hours, 250 days a year in that one spot.

MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean that gets at my precise question. I didn't ask whether that scenario you just described, I would agree with that. But I asked if there was a chance that the gradients achieved -- you know this model assumes instantaneous mixing.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: That is correct.

MEMBER GRIFFON: So if the

gradients are established in this building, and I'm not sure number one how wide are the gradients that are there, that exist, you know, in terms of picocuries per liter, what is the range of values we might see in different operations?

And number two, if you assumed an occupancy say -- and I think John's words in the e-mail were randomly moved around the building, I don't think people would have worked randomly around the building. I think they probably would have been in different process areas for -- they worked throughout the buildings. I wouldn't dispute that.

But could they have been at one of the higher operation areas where, you know, with a higher gradient for enough hours -- say two hours out of their work day that it would, in fact, not be bounded by the current model on the table.

And then the second part of my comment here is that we don't have a current

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model on the table. That's the other problem. You know because this is SC&A's report. And I think that NIOSH is agreeing with the general model but not necessarily the parameters used in the model. I may be wrong on that one.

## DR. ANIGSTEIN: No --

MEMBER GRIFFON: But anyway my first point is that I'm not saying eight hours per day, 250 days a year. I'm saying could there be a scenario. Because we have to look at can we bound doses for all workers, you know, all cancers, that sort of thing. So that's the question.

DR. Again, ANIGSTEIN: in my opinion, there could be gradients. Actually the fact that it would always be the same concentration everywhere in the building actually it is unrealistic. So this is a simplified model.

However, the response to that objection is we recommend that you use the 95th percentile. And that already accounts

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for these variations. In other words, if we knew that this model exactly modeled within the best likelihood of what the concentrations experienced by the workers were, then it would be logical to use the 50th percentile. This is the most probable resolution.

But by using the 95th percentile, considerably higher, the which is percentile is about six picocuries per liter. The 95th percentile is 36 picocuries per liter. So allowing for these you are excursions from the, you know, from the mean, from the median.

And also just -- I can just take advantage of this opportunity to throw in an additional comment as to the wide range -- there were some wide ranges of input parameters. But the actual distribution has a GSD of approximately three, which does not seem to be an unreasonably wide range.

This wasn't done with very precise definition. I just looked at the median --

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1	because it's not actually normal but I looked
2	at the median and the 95th percentile, took
۷	at the median and the 35th percentile, took
3	the ratio, and said were it to be a log
4	normal, it would be a GSD of three.
5	And if we did it more precisely,
6	you might get a slightly different number.
7	But I don't think it would be very different.
8	MEMBER MUNN: And Dr. Neton has a
9	comment with regard to this same issue, I
10	believe.
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. Let's
12	hear from Neton and then back to Mark.
13	DR. NETON: Well, I'd just like to
14	respond to a couple things that Mark brought
15	up. First at the working group, in several
16	instances the last two times we've had
17	meetings, NIOSH has put a model on the table.
18	We're embraced the model that would
19	have a geometric mean of three picocuries per
20	liter with a 95th percentile of 17 picocuries
21	per liter, which is slightly different than

the upper bound on the SC&A model. And those

two differences really surround the ventilation rate, the lower bound of the ventilation rate.

Actually, that's the only difference we disagree on right now is what is

difference we disagree on right now is what is the lower bound of ventilation rate in the 1950s air building. So there is a model that

NIOSH has proposed to use.

And I'm on the record several times stating this I think as recently as the last Board meeting or as late as the last Board meeting.

Secondly, though, this concentration gradient thing was never really brought up in the working group session. I mean this is a new issue that you are raising here but there's a number of things that can be said about that.

First, is the model makes no adjustments for seasonal variation. I mean it assumes essentially that the ventilation rate in that building stays constant throughout the

entire year.

Secondly, one has to look at the way these tanks were structured. These digesting tanks, to my recollection now and I haven't looked at this for a little while, ran the entire length of the building. And they went almost to the ceiling of a two-story building.

So we're not talking about a small little vat in the middle of the room where somebody would be routinely looking in and mixing and adding reagents or such. It's a huge tank that would, you know, evolve radon essentially linearly throughout the entire building, going down the whole length of the building near the ceiling which had openings.

There's still some debate whether there was active exhaust ventilation but nonetheless, there were openings for that to escape. So for a worker to be exposed to a highest concentration gradient, which would be right at the release point, one would have to

be up on that deck --

MR. KATZ: Excuse me. Could the people on the telephone who are having a conversation please mute your phone? Thank you.

DR. NETON: One would have to be on the top of that deck peering into those tanks on a routine basis to have some sort of concentration gradient like you're talking about.

Thirdly, our model that we've adopted here, we feel comfortable with because it is not only based on the SC&A parameters that were put forth to develop this Monte Carlo model but there is also a weight of the evidence issues behind this.

We provided to the working group a summary of all available radon monitoring information in the wet phosphate processing industry that were available. None of the values that were recorded in those studies approached anything close to what we are

proposing to use in this model.

Admittedly, those were more laterera measurement -- I think the earliest one was in the `70s -- but nonetheless, it is consistent with what we're trying to present here.

The other issues, we had a measurement in Blockson in 1985 or thereabouts, I forget the exact date, and it was extremely low in the building that was measured at that time frame. I forget what it was but it was well below what we're proposing to use here.

The third thing that we provided to the working group was that if one looks at the evaluation done by Oak Ridge Associated Universities, not for this project, for an epidemiologic project that was done years ago of the Mallinckrodt workers, the reconstructed radon exposures for workers at Mallinckrodt are equal to or below the upper bound of the SC&A proposed value.

1	And that is a facility that
2	processed uranium ore in very high
3	concentrations of uranium. I forget the exact
4	number but hundreds if not thousands of times
5	higher more highly concentrated uranium
6	than what was processed at Blockson.
7	For those reasons, we feel very
8	comfortable that the distribution we're
9	proposing adequately bounds the radon
10	exposures for workers at Blockson Chemical.
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you,
12	Jim.
13	Mark, do you have a follow up on
14	that?
15	I want to give the petitioners an
16	opportunity to comment if they are on the
17	line. Okay, if either of the petitioners are
18	on the line and wish to comment, this would be
19	the time to do is. Are either of the
20	petitioners from Blockson on the line?
21	MS. PINCHETTI: Yes, this is Kathy
22	Pinchetti.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, Kathy.

Thank you. We'd appreciate getting your comments.

MS. PINCHETTI: Well, I think the

work group knows where I stand. I still have a problem with the comparison between Joliet and Florida. I know they had a phosphorous plant there and that's maybe where the Rocky Flats came from but there is a big difference in weather and, you know, just the ability to ventilate that often as, you know, if it was 80, 90 degrees outside as opposed to 85 below wind chill.

And also just the idea about the 25-year-old spot of radon that was found, it sounds like that's what they're basing the radiation in order to, you know, postulate what happened 60 years ago.

So I know this is all very scientific but I just can't get a grasp of, you know, why we're basing the decision on those things because it just seems like

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1	grasping on straws. And we've been at this
2	for going on three years now.
3	And I appreciate all the work that
4	the work group and the Board has put into it
5	but it just doesn't seem like we can come to a
6	conclusion where it is unanimous.
7	And so I just feel that maybe the
8	Board should consider accepting Blockson as an
9	SEC.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you,
11	Kathleen, for those comments.
12	There may be an additional
13	petitioner on the line. Is there?
14	DR. McKEEL: Dr. Ziemer, this is
15	Dan McKeel.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, Dan, I think
17	we have to limit this right now to the
18	petitioners on Blockson.
19	DR. McKEEL: Well, I'm not really
20	the petitioner but I did participate in the
21	work group and there is a major document, I
22	believe, that hasn't been discussed this

1	afternoon. So somebody needs to bring it to
2	your attention. And I'm asking to please
3	allow this exception.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: All right. We'll
5	allow it.
6	DR. McKEEL: Very quickly, SC&A has
7	mentioned John Mauro several times. They have
8	applied the draft surrogate data criteria to
9	Blockson. And I don't believe I've ever seen
10	that report made but I assume it exists.
11	And I wonder if, you know, that
12	doesn't need to be taken up and considered
13	before this SEC is voted upon because as Kathy
14	just said, the Board's conclusion and the work
15	group's conclusion depends a lot on surrogate
16	data that fills in the gaps from those few
17	numbers of urine samples that they had at
18	Blockson.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. I
20	understand your comment, Dan. I'm going to
21	let Jim Neton reply because I don't believe
22	that they are asserting that they're using

1	surrogate data per se.
2	DR. NETON: Right. There's a
3	couple of issues here. One is I was going to
4	say that the Congressional staff person who
5	talked about using the Florida phosphate data,
6	I'd like to correct for the record that we're
7	no longer proposing to use that Florida
8	phosphate data, which was surrogate data.
9	We have now fully adopted the Monte
10	Carlo source-term model, which is allowed for
11	under our regulation. So that's not a
12	surrogate data issue.
13	I thought that's where Dr. McKeel
14	was going but then he mentioned something
15	about urine data. The urine data was used at
16	Blockson was from actual Blockson workers. We
17	did not use surrogate urine data to
18	reconstruct
19	DR. McKEEL: My point was that SC&A
20	applied the surrogate data criteria and I
21	wonder why they did that if it doesn't apply.

DR. NETON: Well, I think they did

1	that because originally we had proposed
2	NIOSH had proposed a surrogate model using
3	Florida phosphate industry data, which we have
4	since abandoned.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So that no longer
6	is the approach being used. And Dr. McKeel's
7	point was that actually the surrogate data
8	criteria have not been formally approved by
9	the Board at this point. So that would have
10	been an issue otherwise.
11	So but thank you, Dan, for the
12	comment.
13	Again, let me check again to see if
14	the other petitioner is on the line.
15	Okay, apparently not.
16	Dr. Melius has a comment.
17	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, can I just
18	clarify a couple of points since I've been
19	referred to here today? One was actually what
20	Jim just said which was I think you have to
21	remember where we started with this was using
22	the procedure based on basically mostly the

1	Florida phosphate data. And that had some
2	limitations as it applied to Blockson which
3	led to where we are now.
4	To just clarify what Jim said, I
5	think, if I remember right from the last time
6	I asked you, you would still use that in other
7	circumstances. You are saying you are only
8	abandoning that procedure relative to
9	Blockson?
10	DR. NETON: We would reserve the
11	right to use that data if it were more
12	appropriately
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
14	DR. NETON: more appropriate for
15	a given facility. But right now, yes. It's
16	off the table for Blockson, that's correct.
17	MEMBER MELIUS: I just wanted to
18	avoid you being quoted a year from now or
19	DR. NETON: Thank you.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: at another site.
21	Secondly, and I'm not trying to
22	cast blame on this issue but I think it has

also been complicated by the fact that somehow SC&A got put in -- we had a reversal of roles. SC&A got put in the position of developing the methodology. And then NIOSH reviewing it.

And when Jim says they've adopted this model with certain parameters, that's true. But it has sort of been, I think, a piecemeal process is a fair way of putting it.

And I think one of the difficult things is trying to wrap your arms around this whole issue because there are bits and pieces of information in various places. And no single document that sort of adequately summarizes the proposed model nor one that —the one that NIOSH appears to be adopting nor a document that adequately and comprehensively critiques it and supports one or the other.

But I really have some serious concerns about SC&A being put in the position of developing procedures and models and so forth. I think there is a point at which that can be useful in terms of critiquing or

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pointing out alternative approaches.

But I really think we need to try and keep our roles separate. And that NIOSH should be the one developing and proposing at least the final procedures that will be developed.

As I said, I don't think this was badly intentioned but I think it certainly complicates our ability to sort of move forward and understand and have an independent review of a procedure or model that's about to be adopted.

I don't think this was something that -- I also should add that NIOSH proposed it happened.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Let me comment on that as well because I know there has been some conversation back and forth on that issue. And Board members all know that one of my ongoing issues is to make sure that our contractor does not do NIOSH's work. So I agree with that in principle.

However, we do know that over the past five years, there are a lot of things that have emerged at various sites. And I'll just cite as an example the high-fired plutonium issue which really had its origin, I think, in the SC&A critiques. And now has become part of the program in a way.

And it's often, particularly in our work group activities, it often happens as these ideas arise, it's not always clear whose idea it really is. It comes out of the joint efforts of the Board and the work group or the work group and the contractor and NIOSH to address some of these issues.

And to some extent, I think this occurred here with good intentions to try to address the issue. So whose model it is, it's not quite clear. I know that Jim had proposed things and NIOSH -- or SC&A had proposed some ideas. So they sort of came together.

DR. NETON: Yes, I'd just like to suggest that this is part and parcel to the

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way the comment resolution process has been established. I can point back to the very early days with Bethlehem Steel where exactly this sort of scenario emerged where SC&A had some serious criticisms of our models.

We went though various discussions and deliberations over a period of almost a couple years, I believe. And what emerged was sort of a composite model of NIOSH's approach that incorporated the relevant or the good portions of the comments that SC&A had provided. And I think that we were better off for it.

I don't see that this is really that different from what happened at many of the sites. Nevada Test Site is undergoing the current same situation. So I think it is a good thing. I'm not --

MEMBER MUNN: And essentially every resolution process that can be called to memory instantly, NIOSH has produced its product, SC&A has reviewed that product, has

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brought before us the issues that they felt were of major concern.

And the next step, which usually takes a number of months in complicated cases, is a resolution process which involves a great deal of technical exchange between the contractor and NIOSH.

DR. NETON: Yes.

That is the MEMBER MUNN: resolution process as has been presented to us in the past. What of that comes out resolution process, whether it was initiated by NIOSH or whether it was initiated by the contractor is our attempt to do the best science possible and to serve resolution. That appears to be what has occurred here.

MEMBER MELIUS: I'd strongly disagree. And I think if one looks at the reports and the transcripts of those various meetings, I think what one sees is that what was a critique of the use of the Florida data and suggestion of an alternative approach then

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became in the next document a fully developed model for adoption.

And then what one sees is that then NIOSH being SC&A -- well, NIOSH critiquing the SC&A model and suggesting other parameters and so forth. So as I said, I don't think it was, you know, badly intentioned or whatever.

On one hand, I can claim I wasn't at the meeting where this was assigned to SC&A to do but I can also probably say that if I was at that meeting, I'm not sure I would have objected at the time. It's just as it evolved.

And frankly I would feel different probably about it if I didn't still have ongoing concerns about the basic model and approach that's being approached. And I think it still comes back to the basic thing is I don't believe that for reasons -- a number of technical reasons that this is an adequate model. And that it provides a sufficient basis for accurate individual dose

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1 reconstruction. 2 And it is mainly this issue of 3 mixing with that -- it's very hard to model concentrations within a building. 4 And the more complicated that becomes, the less good 5 the models are. 6 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. Any other general comments? 8 I guess at this point I want to ask 9 10 the Board if you feel like you are ready to take action and to do that, we would require a 11 12 motion to remove the original motion from the 13 table. The original motion -- and I may 14 15 help in recalling this need some so I'11 16 paraphrase it but I believe the original motion that was before us was a motion to 17 concur with the NIOSH recommendations. 18 19 it is possible I have that But I believe that was the motion. 20 reversed.

It was the motion that was made as an

MEMBER MUNN:

motion.

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No, that was

1	individual, not as the Chair of the working
2	group, simply because we did not have
3	consensus of the work group.
4	It was my action. It was my
5	motion. And it was tabled at the request of
6	Josie and the majority of the Board.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. The
8	motion was tabled. And what I'm saying is if
9	you are ready to take action, then the next
10	step is for a motion to remove that from the
11	table and it will be before us for discussion.
12	MEMBER MUNN: I so move.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Motion to remove
14	the original from the table
15	MEMBER PRESLEY: Second.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: and second.
17	This is not a debatable motion. It takes a
18	majority to remove it from the table. If the
19	motion passes, then we have before us a motion
20	to concur or agree with the NIOSH
21	recommendation on Blockson.

I'm going to ask for a roll call

1	vote on the motion to bring the Blockson
2	petition or the Blockson motion from the table
3	to put it before us.
4	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
5	MEMBER BEACH: No.
6	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
7	MEMBER CLAWSON: No.
8	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson?
9	MEMBER GIBSON: No.
10	MR. KATZ: Mr. Griffon?
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: No.
12	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
13	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.
14	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
15	MEMBER MELIUS: No.
16	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
17	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
18	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?
19	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
20	MR. KATZ: Mr. Presley?
21	MEMBER PRESLEY: Yes.
22	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?

1 MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes. 2 MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield? 3 MEMBER SCHOFIELD: No. MR. KATZ: And Dr. Ziemer? 4 Yes. 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And the 6 motion, therefore, fails. And the Blockson document remains on the table which means we 7 will not act on it today. 8 I would like to ask the Board -- I 9 10 don't know if the work group is in a position to do anything further but nonetheless if this 11 Board wishes to instruct along those lines, 12 13 then it is certainly in order, yes. Mark? 14 15 MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, I think, you 16 know, the one and maybe this item, Jim, I apologize if this wasn't officially on the 17 record as a question, but, you know, I don't -18 19 - this is sort of for the good of the order 20 Ι don't think definitely too, we're

loggerheads on this. I think, you know, that

we will come to a point where we will get it

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off the table and vote on it.

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Ι still have remaining But questions about this concentration gradient issue. And, you know, I'm sitting thinking in my mind with the 95th value that SC&A lays out there, quite a bit higher than -- about double, I quess, of the one that NIOSH is proposing, you know, does that establish based on instantaneous mixing bound some of these gradient situations? And I'm not sure I accept Dr. Anigstein's argument.

But I would like to see that maybe assessed in a document that I can look at and look at the model myself. So I'm not saying that it can't be done.

The other question is, you know, I think Jim mentioned today, and I wasn't aware of, I think it is an entirely differently study that you referenced today, the ORAU study done outside of this program I guess.

DR. NETON: It was done outside this program by Oak Ridge Associates.

1	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right so some of
2	these other values
3	DR. NETON: It's included in our
4	site profile though. We've documented it and
5	I've provided that to the working group.
6	MEMBER GRIFFON: But I think part
7	of
8	DR. NETON: It's available.
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: part of the
10	confusion for me in this process has been I
11	was invited to one or two work groups maybe
12	but then I'm not formally on the work group
13	often. So sometimes I've asked these
14	questions.
15	But they weren't in the work group
16	discussions because I wasn't a member of the
17	work group. But I would like that assessed if
18	possible.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Let me suggest
20	something as a possible way forward. And it
21	appears to the Chair that further work group
22	sessions on this may not be so fruitful but

perhaps -- and the focus seems to be on the radon gradients and the model -- I wonder if it would be of help for NIOSH to give a formal presentation to the Board on the model at our next meeting with, perhaps, advanced copies of that made available.

Now I'm concerned about the possibility that then we get into a cycle saying now we need SC&A to critique this and it goes on and on. But it appears that at is part of this understanding least the parameters and the conditions of the model and its limitations and those various issues surrounding that.

And, again, I'm throwing this out because I want some reaction from the Board members. Would you find this helpful so that we can see if we can resolve this or come to some kind of closure on that issue and try to -- in fairness to the petitioners to try to not keep the Blockson thing sort of perpetually in limbo?

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Dr. Melius, a comment?

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes. I think the concept is good because Ι think it important that all of the Board members hear the technical issues because that is what we're talking about. And I think it would be And, frankly, I think helpful to at helpful. least -- I can say for myself on the work group, to hear how other people view those and other people on this Board do that.

I think it would be helpful to the extent that that is feasible to do for their also to be a document developed by NIOSH that lays out comprehensively what their proposed approach will be.

And thirdly -- and I'm not sure that this needs to be done in conjunction with what you just proposed, Dr. Ziemer -- but it is something that -- I have a major concern with -- that sort of SC&A has lost its independence in reviewing this issue. We've had -- once they moved from the group that is

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now proposing how the dose reconstructions will get done, how can they be the independent reviewer of that process?

And that we think of another mode or another way of getting an independent review of this approach, which I think, would be helpful and so forth.

I don't think I would propose that as the first step. I think what you proposed may be sufficient.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I'm a little reluctant to have us go down that path because that can continue -- people protecting their own good ideas, including ones that NIOSH picks up from the contractor in the future.

But if necessary, I think we could ask our contractor to bring in a different person to critique -- I mean you have access to other experts. I don't know the extent to which SC&A is sort of taking great pride of ownership in this idea but we need to give

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that some thought.

I understand what you're saying.

I'm not sure how one would do that it an efficient way that would be useful.

Jim?

DR. NETON: I'd just like to raise another question that is in my mind and that's the issue of the difference between this being an SEC issue versus a site profile issue.

In the past, you know, we've been able to come -- move forward if there has been general agreement that the issue at hand is no longer an SEC issue. That is it is generally agreed that we can establish some plausible upper bound for that exposure scenario.

And then move that back to a site profile issue, which would be debated, you know, just like through the comment resolution process like any other issue.

And somehow that seems to be not available in this situation. I've not heard any discussion about can there be a plausible

upper bound.

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SC&A and NIOSH still disagree on what the plausible upper bound might be but, you know, we still agree that it can be established in one way or another. So I'd like some feedback for our sake, you know, on this issue.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Mark, do you want to add to that? I think you were asking about that.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes. I mean I think you have my comment that -- I that's what I was asking to be assessed -model on the table which, you whether the know, would be NIOSH's, would bound these scenarios where have concentration you occupying gradients for workers those locations a little more frequently that --

DR. NETON: Right. But there's a difference between saying NIOSH's model could bound it or a plausible upper bound could be established using that model. I've never been

1	able to get agreement from the working group
2	that using this approach is even valid. I
3	mean it has been the legality of this
4	approach has even been challenged several
5	working group meetings ago.
6	So I'm reluctant to go and make all
7	those, you know, elaborate development on an
8	effort when the basic premise of using a Monte
9	Carlo probabilistic model is not acceptable.
10	And I have no assurance from anyone that that
11	type of approach is acceptable.
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: Well, I guess part
13	of what I'm thinking about is the reality, I
14	think, is that the radon is not going to
15	instantaneously mix.
16	So if we accept that as the first
17	premise, then that's my question is if you
18	have, you know, if the model is not realistic
19	enough, then maybe we can't use it. So I
20	think that gets to what you were just saying.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But let me point

out, and this is more generic, Mark, but you

never have instantaneous mixing in practical situations. And so all models are based on the fact that that doesn't occur.

if the mixing -- there's a difference between instantaneous and really slow. There's some things where those gradients -- well, we can't -- we don't need to have the debate here but models are exactly They are models. They are -what they are. and models are only as good effectively predict something to some agreedif level, in our case, there is sufficient accuracy. And that's sort of a debate on its own.

But whether you're talking about let's say a weather model, I almost hesitate to bring this up because this could make things worse, but I always like the quote that one of my colleagues makes about models. And he is a model person -- a model expert, not a model person. I'm going to get in big trouble here.

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1	Anyway and he says basically all
2	models are poor but some are helpful. And we
3	need to really assess that, I think, is what
4	you're saying. You're not going to have
5	instantaneous.
6	And what you're really saying is to
7	what extent is that an important issue? Does
8	this model really allow you to fairly bound
9	the doses?
10	Jim, I'm not sure when you're
11	talking about the legality of the
12	probabilistic approach or the Monte Carlo
13	approach. That's like that's a very
14	accepted technique. It's like saying can I
15	use calculus to calculate something.
16	What I didn't quite follow what
17	
18	DR. NETON: Well, there was some
19	challenges raised about use of a source-term
20	model, and in particular a source-term model
21	using probabilistic assumptions. And, you
22	know, I don't know. I mean is that on the

table? I guess I think it is.

MEMBER MUNN: It seems to be from the Chair's point of view. That's one of the reasons why I said there's no way we can go any further.

But if some of the statements that were made during work group sessions are not going to be the nexus of any presentation that NIOSH makes with respect to the model, then, of course, it makes perfect sense for the entire Board to see what the model is going to be and to have the entire Board that wishes to participate and comments with that model before them to make comments.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.

MEMBER MUNN: But if we're going to take the position that -- which has been suggested -- that no model is possible or no model is acceptable, then there's -- this is an exercise in futility.

So first one needs to accept, I think, the Board members sitting around this

table need to accept the fact that if NIOSH is 1 going to bring us something, there 2 is 3 possibility that it can be accepted. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you. 4 John, comment? 5 MEMBER POSTON: Well, with all due 6 7 respect to SC&A and also to what Dr. Melius had to say, I interpreted your comment and 8 your suggestion that we should serve as the 9 10 experts. I mean yes, we have SC&A to assist us in doing NIOSH evaluations. 11 But Mark is perfectly capable of 12 13 doing an evaluation of the model. I'm perfectly capable. And most of the people 14 15 sitting here at this table are perfectly 16 capable of looking at scientific facts and making a decision. 17 So I interpreted your remark that 18 let's do something as a 19 Board instead of

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concern about the contractor is compromised in

your suggestion eliminates that

relying on our contractor.

some

way,

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So if there is a

1	because we're not asking them to look at the
2	model. We're asking ourselves to look at the
3	model and exercise our own judgment.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I think you
5	are supporting what I said. I was concerned -
6	_
7	MEMBER POSTON: Very much so.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: that if we
9	asked NIOSH to present this, that we would not
10	say let's turn it back to SC&A for another
11	iteration. But let's see if we can come to
12	closure on it.
13	But let's look at other comments.
14	Jim?
15	MEMBER MELIUS: It's also why I
16	agreed with your suggestion, Dr. Ziemer. I
17	think that's helpful.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
19	MEMBER MELIUS: And I think
20	secondly, I would just like to clarify for the
21	record that while I would be willing I
22	would be willing to accept to a source-term

1	model in this case, I will say that I am very
2	skeptical of it. But I can be convinced. So
3	I think it is worth the time and effort to do.
4	And it is something that we're
5	going to have to look at in other situations
6	also. So we might as well deal with it now
7	and talk it through as a Board. And I think
8	that is the best way to do this.
9	I think the work group has done
10	what it could. And has accomplished a lot.
11	But there is this one issue that we really
12	need to deal with as a Board.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I don't know if
14	we are at a consensus point on that. And,
15	Jim, I'm not even completely clear what it is
16	I've asked you to do.
17	And it may be that we would want to
18	return to this tomorrow.
19	The general idea here, I think, was
20	for NIOSH to present to us what there are
21	proposing to do to bound the doses and to
22	consider these issues.

1	I'm not even sure fully what that
2	looks like. But it appears to me to be a
3	model with some parameters and perhaps some
4	conditions of how it is used and that kind of
5	thing.
6	John, did you have a comment? And
7	then we'll go back to Jim.
8	MEMBER POSTON: I want to make sure
9	that we don't let the thought drop. You
10	original suggestion was that we would be
11	provided with a document prior to this
12	briefing
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Or in advance, in
14	advance.
15	MEMBER POSTON: so that we would
16	have time to review it.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. But I
18	want
19	MEMBER POSTON: And think about it.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I'm not even
21	sure what it is that's why I say what I'm
22	asking you for. If I'm not sure, I'm not sure

Jim is sure.

DR. NETON: Well, I think I have a sense for what you are looking for. And I'm fairly confident was can provide a revised -- whether it would be a revised site profile or an addendum to the site profile or something of that nature that would outline the parameters of the model and how we would use it in dose reconstructions along with some example dose reconstructions using that model.

We'd be more than happy to do that by the next Board meeting. I'm very confident we can do that because the parameters are all there. The model has been developed.

I think we'd need to do some shoring up to address maybe some of Mark's concerns that I'm hearing today. But we'd be happy to do that.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Anyone? Let me ask if there are any Board members that would feel that that is not the direction to go at this moment. Otherwise I'm going to take it

1	by consent that we will proceed along those
2	lines. If you have additional thoughts,
3	insights, or brilliant ideas tomorrow during
4	our Board work session that pertain to this,
5	we'll have perhaps an opportunity to further
6	elucidate the path that will be followed.
7	MEMBER MELIUS: We'll schedule a
8	session tomorrow evening.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
10	(Laughter.)
11	MEMBER MELIUS: And ask for
12	brilliant ideas.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you.
14	I think that brings us to at least
15	temporary closure on this agenda item not
16	closure but closure for today.
17	We are going to recess until 7:00
18	p.m. at which time we will have our public
19	comment period. So I think you all for the
20	good work today in helping us get through all
21	these issues. And we'll see you at seven
22	o'clock.

MR. KATZ: And thank you, everyone 1 2 on the phone, for bearing with us and all our 3 technical difficulties. (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter 4 went off the record at 5:02 p.m., to resume at 5 6 7:05 p.m.) 7 E-V-E-N-I-N-G S-E-S-S-I-O-N 7:05 p.m. 8 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, okay, we're 9 10 going to give it a whirl and see what occurs here. 11 So I'd like to welcome the folks 12 13 who are here assembled as well as those who are on the phone. This is the public comment 14 15 session of the Advisory Board on Radiation and 16 Worker Health. We do need to remind you of the 17 ground rules again. First of all, we ask that 18 19 you -- if you are speaking, there is a ten-20 minute time limit. So in courtesy to others who wish to speak, please -- oh, Dr. Roessler 21

has asked to reduce that to five -- only

1	joking, Gen no, it is a ten-minute time
2	limit. And please adhere to that in order to
3	allow others the time that they need as well
4	toward the end of the session.
5	Mr. Katz, our designated federal
6	official, will remind you of the ground rules
7	as far as the redaction policy.
8	MR. KATZ: Right. Just to remind
9	everyone, there is a verbatim transcript being
10	taken. So whatever you say will be there and
11	it will be up on the NIOSH website. If you
12	give us your name, then your name will appear
13	in the transcript.
14	If you identify other people,
15	though, third parties, generally speaking
16	their name will be redacted and some of their
17	information might be redacted as well to
18	protect their privacy.
19	Let's see what else I need to cover
20	here. I think that the policy for this
21	for people who are here, the policy is on the
22	back table. And for people who are not here

1	but can get to the website, the full policy is
2	on the website with the agenda for this
3	meeting.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
5	MR. KATZ: I think that covers it
6	pretty well.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you
8	very much, Mr., Katz.
9	We have several individuals who are
10	here by phone this evening. We're going to
11	begin with Jan Lovelace. Jan, are you on the
12	line?
13	MS. LOVELACE: Yes, I am. Can you
14	hear me?
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, we can, Jan.
16	So if you would proceed, that will be fine.
17	MS. LOVELACE: I've been having a
18	terrible time with my phone and I've listened
19	in some today and it has been very sporadic in
20	what I could hear.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, please
22	proceed. We can hear you quite well here.

1	MS. LOVELACE: Okay. Well, my name
2	is Jan Lovelace. I'm 67 years old. And I'm a
3	living widow from the Oak Ridge, Tennessee
4	area.
5	I thank you for allowing me to
6	speak on behalf of my [Identifying information
7	Redacted], as his wife and authorized
8	representative.
9	I have typed notes out here as I
10	want to say the correct things and not, you
11	know, jump around.
12	He has been sick worker claims
13	program he has been in the program for
14	seven years and five months. And perhaps what
15	I have to say will help others.
16	I was hesitant as I have been told
17	by our previous attorney if you ask questions
18	or cause trouble, DOL will deny you for sure.
19	I don't want to believe that statement.
20	We've already had five denials. And
21	[Identifying information Redacted].
22	My [Identifying information

1	Redacted] has five [Identifying information
2	Redacted] and medical illnesses. He is
3	bedridden or recliner-ridden you know,
4	that's the only two places he is.
5	We've had five denials on Part B
6	and one denial on Part E. We and others
7	believe that these errors and a call to
8	NIOSH sent my head spinning last week when it
9	was confirmed over some of the things we have
10	been told.
11	I hope you'll forgive my voice as I
12	have a cough and I'm also a hillbilly,
13	speaking with a fast Southern.
14	I think this meeting is important
15	and I've been listening in as best as I could.
16	Most voices are not picking up and I hope I'm
17	speaking clearly enough.
18	I'll try to be brief and hit only
19	the high spots or as I consider the low spots
20	in our case. Perhaps at this meeting are
21	persons from DOE and DOL that can make

changes. And because of that, I am making a

statement.

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I realize this meeting is mostly for the SEC Petitions but many sick workers across this nation need to have files examined and the SEC classifications passed for more sites. We also need more forums around the country where discussions can be held and an easier claims process.

I'll try to be brief. As I stated, [Identifying information Redacted] has been in the claims system for seven years and five 15 We've had different months. claims examiners whose names I have and several talked others with. Most have we've compounded the errors.

Seven plus years is a long time to keep trying to proving your job made you sick. It's hard not to make this personal but perhaps others can be helped.

I was told by an examiner last summer and I quote, since you're wanting something from DOL, you should not be critical

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1	of errors. Well those errors have effected by
2	[Identifying information Redacted]'s files and
3	his denials. The examiner's statement has
4	scared me from making some statements and
5	relaying some events even tonight.
6	While I'm happy so many have been
7	paid, many more a denied. Much good has come
8	from the program along with much heartache,
9	tears, frustration, and even anger at times.
10	I believe missing records and
11	errors have added to the frustration of
12	claimants and I know the administration cost
13	of the program has risen from errors.
14	The problem of missing files and
15	errors appears nationwide. My question being
16	one, who is accountable or responsible to make
17	changes in claimant's files or find their
18	missing files? And I know this is going up so
19	maybe if someone can respond to that later.
20	As a former DOE worker, my section
21	head asked me to shred papers numerous times.

Some were sexual harassment files, alcohol on

the job, incident reports, lab accidents, and other reports. I followed orders, never dreaming 25 years from then other workers might need those files. We did our job, never realizing how dangerous even an office job could be.

The sick workers would much rather have had their lives and their families intact rather than continually having to make claims and live in hospitals and doctor's offices.

And many have gone to their graves.

Money cannot give back lives but it can ease the burden of sick workers' families and make the workers' last days easier.

[Identifying information Redacted] is [Identifying information Redacted] now and considered [Identifying information Redacted]. His one doctor asked me last week will he outlast the claims process. After being in the claims program for seven years and five months, I don't know. Today he told me, I will not [Identifying information Redacted]

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yet. He knows I'm truly involved in this for his sake and others.

His doctors have written letters and boxes have been furnished and the 1990 Industrial Safety Report from ORNL, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. It states he received numerous pure chemical and radiation exposures plus carbon monoxide daily.

How do the dose reconstruction personnel overlook such obvious data? Even the DMC did not have the 1990 Industrial Safety Report with his exposures or illnesses listed.

It appears that sending a remand back for dose reconstruction sometimes only produces the same words, the same denials, and even reduced probability. Lists of buildings and toxic exposures are not acknowledged.

Most recently [Identifying information Redacted]'s FAB branch examiner on October the 10th, 2007, requested another remand for his fourth cancer. That sent his

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file to storage. It did not get back to the district examiners. It took me calling daily and weekly to different people until December the 8th to find his file.

Now five months since the remand and now [Identifying information Redacted] has been diagnosed and biopsied. His file has just gone this month to NIOSH. They told me in October we would have an answer within two months from the remand. Will it be two more months added to the five already past? His [Identifying information Redacted] December 20, 2008 has taken a large toll on him. This is not the first time his file has disappeared for a month.

Thirty-two years of working for the Department of Energy in Oak Ridge, Tennessee at two sites, the Y-12 weapons plant in 1959 to 1964, and the ORNL X-10 plant from 1974 to 2000 -- and only the last eight years he worked are records available with a few scattered files from the other 24 years are

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available. How can that be a fair evaluation of a worker's claim?

His file received from we Labor contained five Department of other worker's files and social security numbers. asked who received [Identifying information Redacted]'s other records. This has happened to others also, which I'm sure you have heard about.

Who is responsible to help us? Why does a sick worker have to continually prove there are sick from working in a nuclear plant? Facts prove it, but when the records are missing, that does not mean the exposures did not happen.

We know of his exposures, and those years are missing. We also question if the other workers' medical files we received were used to deny his claim.

When you see the year in question missing from a medical file, it is a problem.

He has page eight listed as 1986, page nine

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is missing, and page ten picks up with the year of 1988.

Mr. Turcic -- I hope I said his name correct -- wrote to our Congressman, Zach Wamp in 2005 that [Identifying information Redacted] did not work a monitored job. He did. He worked the same job as a fireman for 27 years, and 1987 is the year we reported two definite exposures, his call ins, and his dosimeter readings off the chart.

All his cards now have the same zero, same handwriting and all. Why must sick workers prove they became sick from working their jobs at a nuclear facility? The facts are known. The contamination is there in laboratories, in buildings, and even on the ground, particularly the nuclear burial ground.

Over 400 buildings are to be demolished and destroyed due to contamination at Y-12 and ORNL, which is also called X-10. And that's the list I have from 2008. And

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maybe more have been added.

My question has been, before, are employees still in these buildings? Yes, they are. [Identifying information Redacted] went to the nuclear burial ground every day he worked. And even recently, 70 mason jars of radioactive material were found on the near surface.

The fireman had to drive there to check for fires and put out fires. And also to get the dead animals from under the reactors. Eight firemen working this same job at ORNL have been diagnosed with cancer below the waist. Six received their settlements in 2001 and 2002 with no problem. And I'm very happy for those.

The eighth was recently diagnosed with colon cancer, and filed his claim in December 2008. But [Identifying information Redacted] was singled out as a low exposure position. Who is accountable to make a change to classify him as a high exposure position?

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I have written and called all offices about this for many years.

These firemen were HAZMAT-trained workers, first responders trained to handle chemicals and radiation fields or alarms. Daily, the firemen answered alarms, and then sometimes they might find out what they stepped into. Surely they should all be classified as high exposure.

They go to the alarms with their badges and dosimeters underneath their fireproof turnout gear. How can that give a fair reading?

[Identifying information Redacted] remembers standing in liquids spilling out of barrels from the underground storage nuclear areas. He said that was frightening to him even then, not knowing what it was or what was going to happen.

When I called about his classification to Jacksonville into NIOSH last week, the NIOSH representative -- her

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statement stopped me cold. And I quote, you know when you file for other cancers, it usually lowers the percentages. It certainly has happened to us already.

NIOSH lowered his [Identifying information Redacted] from 30.262 rems in 2004 to 1.825 rems when we submitted [Identifying information Redacted] number two and [Identifying information Redacted] number three. And that was his denial in 2005.

The statement in each denial, and I have better computer modules we determine exposure. That sure stings. and DOL will still have him listed laborer, foreman, fire inspector, and up to commander, like he foreman, was а not the nuclear HAZMAT-trained worker going to burial grounds, and every contaminated building, lab, and grounds every day worked. A nuclear fireman for 27 years is not a low-exposure position as stated in each denial.

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Well, I stuck my pages together here, just one more please, and we've had 15 claims examiners, and each one has made an error, and even compounded the errors from the previous person.

Who has the authority to make these changes? I've asked NIOSH. They say DOL. DOL says NIOSH has to make it. Our problems have been errors and lost files. And many of my letters about errors have been written from the hospital. My laptop, my printer, and I follow the ambulance to make a personal statement.

is a terrible life to Ιt live packed up to go to the hospital for the last ten years. More horrible and heartbreaking is to go first thing each morning, all during the day, and any time I'm up at night -- and the last thing I do at night is to see [Identifying information Redacted] is [Identifying information Redacted].

So far I've been able to care for

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him by myself, as we do not qualify for any services, even from Veterans, since we have a small bank account. Private nursing is our only option, and our savings will not allow that.

Unexplained [Identifying information Redacted], and other medical problems sure ruin your life, as does months at a time in the hospital.

Tennessee Senator Bob Corker's office called today to ask for an update, if I had heard anything. Senator Lamar Alexander's office and Representative Zach Wamp's offices involved. have also been Mostly their questions have been answered by form-type letters, and no resolution to getting his job classification changed from low exposure to high exposure.

Senator Corker's aide today stated this job classification for high exposure seems to be black and white. And she also stated, we've called and written everyone at

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the top of DOL and NIOSH, and we can't get an answer. Who can?

I could go on for hours about the

problems we face, and frustration, and wanting [Identifying information Redacted] to have the best care he can have keeps me questioning. Even with insurance, our savings are going down fast. The 401(k)s we saved when we both worked have diminished, and may not last.

When you receive a 1,074 dollar, a 572 dollar, and a 275 dollar-type co-pay, which were just both from last week, it does not take long for us to have to take out 15,000 to 20,000 dollars for the last five years to pay his medical bill

Please make the claims process easier for the sick workers, and consider other sites and years for Special Cohort Exposure.

I thank you for your time, and hopefully, clarification of [Identifying information Redacted]'s file.

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1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very
2	much.
3	Just to remind others who are on
4	the line, when you're not speaking, please
5	keep your phones on mute. We are having some
6	feedback from other sidebar conversations.
7	And thank you, Jan, for your
8	comments to us.
9	Next we'll hear from Jennifer
10	Thompson, who is a petitioner representative.
11	Jennifer, are you on the line?
12	MS. THOMPSON: Yes, I am.
13	Good evening. This is Jennifer
14	Thompson. I am the designated petitioner
15	representative for Rocky Flats Special
16	Exposure Cohort Petition 00030.
17	I wanted to begin by saying that
18	I'm very disappointed in the ongoing delays
19	that have been experienced by individual Rocky
20	Flats claimants, and throughout the Rocky
21	Flats SEC Petition process. And this is just
22	one more example where delayed actions have

resulted in injustice for Rocky Flats workers.

And what I'm speaking to is the issue regarding the Ruttenberg dataset that has been a topic of conversation for the last, I guess, eight months or more. And this is just another example of where the delayed actions have resulted in an injustice for Rocky Flats workers.

It is also another in a long track record of inaccuracies from determining what facilities had ionizing radiation, to determining what particle size to use for dose reconstruction. And now the statements regarding the Ruttenberg data.

This program has had a track record of NIOSH confidently stating something as a fact that later turns out to be an error. The only question is, did the individuals making these comments know they were in error, or simply is it just a matter of ignorance?

In either case, the result is the same. Rocky Flats workers with cancer have

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1	died waiting for NIOSH and our government to
2	make good on a long-standing promise.
3	The Rocky Flats SEC petitioners
4	would like to have the following questions
5	answered:
6	Why did the Office of Compensation
7	Analysis and Support state that the NIOSH and
8	Ruttenberg dataset overlapped 100 percent?
9	What took so long for NIOSH to
10	obtain the Ruttenberg dataset and examine it
11	closely?
12	How many workers, how many Rocky
13	Flats workers have been denied compensation
14	under the SEC because of the negligence in
15	obtaining this crucial data, and in examining
16	it closely?
17	What will be the protocol for NIOSH
18	when comparing the Ruttenberg/Rocky Flats
19	dataset with the NIOSH set, and how long will
20	it take for NIOSH to make that comparison?
21	Will SC&A be tasked to participate
22	in the Rocky Flats dataset comparison of the

1	NIOSH versus Ruttenberg data, and then what
2	impact does this have on the Rocky Flats
3	Special Exposure Cohort Petition?
4	Then that's all I have.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Jennifer, while
6	you're on the line, and Mark Griffon is here,
7	who's making some notes, but on your first
8	the first question you raised, the line broke
9	up a little bit, and we didn't catch that
10	fully. Would you mind repeating that first
11	question, because Mark Griffon is making
12	MS. THOMPSON: The first question I
13	read?
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
15	MS. THOMPSON: Okay, why did the
16	Office of Compensation Analysis and Support
17	state that the NIOSH and the Ruttenberg
18	dataset overlapped 100 percent?
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you
20	very much.
21	As I said, Mark Griffon was making
22	some notes on those comments. And as you

1	know, he's working with that work group, and
2	we'll keep you apprised as things proceed.
3	Thank you very much.
4	MS. THOMPSON: You're welcome.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Next we have
6	again on the line Terrie Barrie. Terrie, are
7	you with us?
8	MS. BARRIE: Hello, Doctor. I
9	really didn't have comments prepared.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. I wasn't
11	sure. I know that perhaps you were there in
12	supporting Jan, but
13	MS. BARRIE: Questions to
14	Jennifer's questions or answers to
15	Jennifer's questions need to be forthcoming
16	immediately. This database issue has been
17	going on for some time now, and I think the
18	Rocky Flats claimants need an answer as soon
19	as possible. Thank you.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. Thank
21	you, Terrie.
22	We also are in possession of some

1	Congressional letters which will be read into
2	the record, and I believe Jason is prepared to
3	do that for us this evening.
4	And I think, Jason, are there three
5	letters that need to be read into the record?
6	MR. BROEHM: Yes, I have three
7	statements.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
9	MR. BROEHM: So the first is from
10	Congressman John Shimkus.
11	So it says, Dear Board Members,
12	Thank you so much for allowing me the chance
13	to have this letter read into the record. I
14	know you've heard from many other elected
15	officials, concerned citizens, and most
16	importantly, former workers over the last two
17	days.
18	For the last seven years, I have
19	been intricately involved in the on-going
20	battle on behalf of the workers of Dow
21	II
	Chemical in Madison, Illinois, many of whom

reconstructions finally started taking place, and within the last month, some of the former workers finally began receiving their compensation.

For your longstanding attention and work on this, I thank you. However, we still have much work to do, both legislatively with the Act itself, and through the existing process.

Dr. Denise DeGarmo is with you tonight. Dr. DeGarmo has been very helpful to many of the workers and to my office on continuing to find information that might be useful to extend the SEC for the Dow workers.

I commend her and her work, and thank her for her dedication. It is worth noting Dr. DeGarmo neither gets compensated for this, nor reimbursed for her trips to your Board meetings. She acts out of an interest for the workers.

Dr. DeGarmo submitted materials to the Department of Labor in November --

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1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hold on just a
2	minute.
3	MR. KATZ: Folks on the telephone,
4	I know it's probably not that easy to hear,
5	but it's got to be more difficult to hear if
6	you're carrying on conversations, as well.
7	So please, if you would mute your
8	phones, we will try to crank up the volume
9	here as much as possible. But that will help,
10	as well.
11	Thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sit here, Jason,
13	and maybe that will help. We're going to have
14	the individual reading the comments come
15	closer to this phone speaker. Perhaps that
16	will help.
17	I know there's apparently still a
18	buzz on the line, but we'll try this.
19	MR. BROEHM: Okay.
20	Dr. DeGarmo submitted materials to
21	the Department of Labor in November that
22	directly impact the Dow case. At that time,

she was told the review would be complete well in advance of this meeting. Unfortunately, such review is not complete, and we are in yet another waiting game, a game we find ourselves in all too often when it comes to Dow.

I realize as a Board you do not control the Department of Labor, but I would urge you to urge the Department, as I have, to proceed as expeditiously as possible on this review.

Additionally, I would like to also take this opportunity to thank Dr. McKeel for his help with the Dow case, and also urge quick action on his FOIA requests. Sincerely, John M. Shimkus, Member of Congress.

And now I have two statements from Senator Schumer, Senator Charles Schumer, from New York. The first one is on the Linde Ceramics SEC Petition.

Thank you to the Board for affording me this opportunity once again to petition for Linde Ceramics' application to

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have an extended time frame at their site added to the Special Exposure Cohort. I understand that these meetings are very long, and I appreciate how accommodating the Board has been in allowing me to offer my support for this important application.

I'm extremely supportive of the Linde SEC Petition, and I respectfully urge you to recommend adding the extended time period at this facility to the SEC. In the past, there had been some issues with this particular petition, but I hope that this year will yield some progress.

The Linde Ceramics facility, located in Tonawanda, New York, produced fuel for the Department of Energy for years. In the process, many employees, both during these years and in the residual period, were exposed to toxic and radioactive uranium.

The site profile for this facility does not adequately take into account a number of factors, and there is strong reason to

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believe that it will underestimate applicants' exposure, and thus the probability of causation.

To risk uniformly and consistently underestimating the probability of causation at a site violates the statutory requirement of a claimant-friendly process. In a case such as this, it is imperative that the Board acknowledge the shortcomings of the available information, and recommend adding the site and time in question to the SEC.

Especially in light of the fact that there is already a class of the SEC at this site, it is readily apparent to me and to many of my colleagues that there is simply a paucity of reliable information for this location.

It is unacceptable to delay adding these other time periods to the SEC, as well. These men and women are ill and dying. Simply said, they cannot afford to wait any longer.

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1	Our country built this nuclear
2	arsenal, and with it, our global dominance on
3	the backs of Linde Ceramics' plant's workers.
4	After everything that our government has done
5	to these men and women, after everything that
6	they sacrificed for our continued safety, we
7	must take action.
8	Their great sacrifice merits our
9	greatest thanks, and we can show some small
10	share of what we owe to these men and women by
11	supporting their appeals for restitution.
12	Again, thank you for allowing me to
13	submit testimony for your consideration. I
14	respectfully request that you recommend
15	granting this petition, and I thank you for
16	your time and consideration.
17	And now I have a second statement
18	from Senator Charles Schumer from New York,
19	this one relating to the Bethlehem Steel SEC
20	Petition.
21	Thank you for allowing me to

address the Board today on the critical issue

of admission to the Special Exposure Cohort for Bethlehem Steel, located in Lackawanna, New York. As you all know, I have been strongly advocating the creation of a class in the Special Exposure Cohort for Bethlehem Steel for many years now.

The veterans of this facility are sick, and many are dying. We owe it to these men and women to recognize their service and their sacrifice with an admission to the SEC.

Today, members of the Bethlehem Steel Action Group are advocating for the site's admission to the SEC. I'm humbled by the self sacrifice and tenacity of their members in continuing this fight.

I hope that I and all of my colleagues in the Congress who are supporting this application are able to live up to the high standard that these wonderful activists have set.

In constructing its site profile for Bethlehem Steel, NIOSH relied very heavily

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on data from Simonds Steel in Lockport, New York to fill in the gaps in the available data for Bethlehem.

In the years since the site profile was completed, it has become apparent that the use of surrogate data in Bethlehem site profile is much higher than in most other profiles. Furthermore, the accuracy of the comparison between Bethlehem and Simonds has been challenged time and again by former It is my strong belief that workers. surrogate profile cannot, estimated means, accurately reflect the situation in Bethlehem Steel.

In light of all of the unknown variables at this site, I think it only reasonable for the Board to acknowledge that the available data is not sufficient to create a workable profile. The profile that exists now cannot live up to the statutory mandate of a, quote, claimant-friendly, unquote, assessment.

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Bethlehem's admission into the SEC is the only appropriate course of action in such a case. The SEC's broad reach is the only tool that will guarantee that the former workers of Bethlehem Steel receive the care and compensation that Congress has rightly deemed their recompense.

Please recommend adding a class to the SEC for this site quickly as reasonably possible. The men and women who have worked for Bethlehem Steel, manufacturing for the nation's nuclear weapons, veterans of America's brutal Cold War, although they may not wear the uniforms that we commonly recognize in our veterans.

We owe our continued safety to their hard work and sacrifices. These heroes deserve our gratitude and rightful compensation. With so many of these veterans aging and ill, it is imperative that this be done as quickly as possible. Simply said, they cannot afford to wait any longer.

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1	Again, thank you for the chance to
2	address you today, and thank you for the
3	careful consideration that you give to this
4	and all of the petitions you consider.
5	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very
6	much.
7	And next, we'll hear from Wayne
8	Knox.
9	MR. KNOX: I'll go last.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Wayne wants to go
11	last, okay. Then we'll skip to Donna Hand,
12	and I'm going to suggest that all of the
13	participants now sit here by this phone
14	receiver or speaker for the benefit of those
15	on the line.
16	Those on the line are you still
17	I know there's probably still a buzz, but can
18	you hear better this way?
19	PARTICIPANT: No, we can't hear
20	you.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, well, we're
22	doing the best we can, I think, so and

we're getting the speakers right up here by 1 2 this phone unit, so that's about as good as we 3 can get it. And here's Donna Hand. 4 MS. HAND: My name is Donna Hand. 5 6 I'm from the Florida Nuclear Workers of 7 Florida organization. I'm claimant well 8 advocate, as as an authorized representative. 9 10 I would like to establish that there are some issues concerning the 11 12 Petitions qualification procedures, that 13 within the statute or the regulations 83.9, it says that, if you go underneath the claimant 14 15 end of it, that you must include certain 16 identification material. That was done in the Pinellas Plant 17 SEC Petition. However, on January the 26th, 18 19 `09, we received a letter stating that our SEC

Now according to the 83.9, you must

qualify after

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not

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evaluation.

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include the proposed definition specifying facility. We did, Pinellas Plant. Location, we did all areas within the boundary plus the temporary plant.

It was in the very sentence of the qualification period, it says, we cannot include the temporary plant because it's not in the site profile. However, in two of the site profiles and in the SC&A audit review, it has the temporary plant. This process was started at the temporary plant, and they completely ignore that.

third issue The is job titles and/or job duties. We did that. We did the job titles and our job duties. That was required, and even included first and we second tier subcontractors. This was janitors, administration, construction workers, maintenance assemblers, processors, testers, and et cetera.

Then it says the period of employment relative to a petition. We did

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that, from 1956, so the small, temporary building would be covered, all the way up until 1997.

The processes and everything ended up in about 1994. But from `94 to `97, they were decommissioning and decontaminating. Those workers stayed on and decommissioned and decontaminated that site. Therefore, 1997 would be the cutoff date.

Again, it did not qualify, and according to the regulations, the satisfying requirements under 83.9 means the petition will -- which is mandatory -- will receive a full evaluation by NIOSH, the Board, and HHS as described under 83.13 through 83.16.

We did the qualification, we met the requirement, and we included that. Then why are they denying us a qualification? Why are they denying us a full review?

You already had an issue today in the SEC Petition about a temporary building. This is coming up again. That's why I knew

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that I needed to put that temporary building in there.

And to deny the qualification because it wasn't there, I'm bringing it to their attention. If they're not using it, that means they're missing that dose reconstruction for those workers and those claimants.

If the classified information is not available to you, last night I gave you the sites and the regulations that said, this still has to be done in a timely manner. And in a timely manner means, you treat that documentation as if you don't, so therefore, if you do not have that data, you have to give them a SEC Petition, because you cannot do it with sufficient accuracy.

They keep on saying significant and primary. Nowhere in the law do I see the words significant and primary. I see, characterize your occupational environment, and if they're unmonitored, the potential

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1	exposure to radiation. And it defines
2	radiation.
3	The law, as far as I've seen so
4	please, will somebody point it out to me where
5	it says, only use significant and primary?
6	I went ahead and checked how NIOSH
7	defines significant. Well, in 10 CFR Part
8	83.5, Appendix D, significant contamination is
9	contamination in excess of those found in
10	current occupational radiation protection
11	service contamination values. So if you're
12	going to use that, then you'd better use those
13	values to say that that's significant.
14	Thank you very much.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you very
16	much, Donna.
17	Next is it looks like Danny
18	Beavers. Is it Beavers? Yes, Danny. Again,
19	if you will come up here, Danny, hopefully our
20	folks on the line will be able to hear it a
21	little better.
22	MR. BEAVERS: Thank you. I didn't

1	really know I'd signed up to talk, but I will.
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I don't
3	know.
4	MR. BEAVERS: I have dealt with
5	this program since it started, since we
6	started the program. And in working with it,
7	I worked in Los Alamos for many years as a
8	pipefitter. And I think the program was set
9	up to do the right thing, and pay people that
10	worked doing these projects, and not always
11	knowing what the outcome was going to be for
12	their health.
13	It just seems like obstacles have
14	been put in their way, and anything we can do
15	to make it easier for them to be compensated
16	for what they did, or their spouses or loved
17	one, to not have to put them through the
18	what they are having to go through now to get
19	compensated, it seems like it would be morally

And to see the money that is spent even right now through these types of meetings

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the right thing to do.

and situations all over the country, it just seems like it's going backwards. And I don't understand why it's so difficult, why it's difficult trying to be made so when the Government did the right thing by passing the law initially, and it's gotten to the point of where they have -- I've seen the difference in payments since the SEC for Los Alamos was passed recently. I know members of mine whose passed away years ago, and claims readdressed, and they are were compensated now.

Some of them, their mothers have died, and they're the survivors, so they got compensated, but their parent, or their mother went through all those years in debt for medical bills left for a spouse that passed away working in an environment that, at the time, he may not, or probably did not know what it may cause to his health while he was doing his job.

And all of us go there just to do

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1	our job. You don't know that you're going to
2	I don't think any of us would go work in an
3	environment where they would say, you're going
4	to die in ten years after you work here.
5	So I mean, the right thing to do is
6	just try and make it as easy as we can for the
7	surviving members or the person that's ill to
8	live their last days knowing that their spouse
9	or their family will be taken care of when
10	they're gone. And I think that was the intent
11	of the law initially, and I would just speak
12	in favor of the petition that was submitted
13	for Los Alamos.
14	Thank you.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you for
16	your comments.
17	And then Sammie Hayes.
18	MS. HAYES: Since I am vertically
19	challenged, I'm glad you didn't want me to
20	stand.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. You're
22	welcome to sit here by the telephone speaker.

1	MS. HAYES: I just wanted to thank
2	the Board for sitting here and listening to
3	all of us. It must be really depressing
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Just get close to
5	the phone.
6	MS. HAYES: very okay very
7	depressing to sit here and listen to all of
8	the suffering that has gone on because of
9	people's work environment.
10	I'm Sammie Hayes, and my husband
11	died May of 2005, and he was the claimant, and
12	after he passed away, I continued his claim.
13	He worked for LANL at MAC 1 in Shop
14	13. Now what is Shop 13? Shop 13 is the shop
15	where they cut all those exotic metals. One
16	of them was uranium. Others were beryllium
17	and lithium.
18	And he was an operator/technician.
19	His job included cleaning up the machines,
20	and they also had to store or pack the chips
21	that these machines put out after the machined

item was finished. He was exposed to all of

this stuff, the cleaning fluids, the radiation, and all of the nasty stuff that was there.

One of his other positions, and one of the other things within his job, he assumed the position or the task as a nuclear materials custodian. Do you know what that means?

That means that he had to account for every ounce, or very small amounts of nuclear materials that went into that shop and came out. This is a hands-on task. So further exposures.

I listened to NIOSH try to defend why they did not recommend approval of this petition, and I was very upset with the fact that they said they had new -- new data. My question is, where did that data come from? That data was not there between the years of 2001 and 2005 when this process started.

I worked for Johnson Controls in Human Resources, and I worked with the

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individuals who were gathering the data from LANL. They couldn't find it. It was not there.

So where did this data come from if they are filling in all of these holes in data? I would like to know. When did they find it? Did they pull it out of their hat or something?

The other thing is, is it reliable data? If they didn't have it in those previous years, and they now have it, where did it come from? I know this is -- I'm repeating myself, but it does not make a whole lot of sense.

I'd like to know also how they could -- how they figured my husband's dose reconstructions, either as an operator/technician, which he was, or the nuclear materials custodian. I mean, this is two -- one position that includes two very important pieces.

Where did they -- how did they do

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this? They denied his claim. They've denied it twice or three times. And they can never, ever explain exactly why they denied it, because they have all of these charts, these charts that nobody but them can read.

Frustration level is very high. I've listened to a lot of these people here who have had untold illnesses. I watched my husband die for three years. When you watch somebody you love, the person who was your soul mate, die, you want to take somebody out and wring their neck, because you know that, in their environment, they were exposed to stuff that causes -- he had three separate cancers, and he was exposed to stuff that caused stuff.

NIOSH is in the business of guesstimating. They call it probabilities. It's guessing. And they cannot prove that it's not.

I state my case.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you,

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1	Sammie, for sharing that with us.
2	The last speaker on the list is
3	Wayne Knox. And is Wayne with us? Okay.
4	We'll stand by just a minute.
5	MR. LEYBA: Do the people on the
6	phone get an opportunity to get involved?
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, we will do
8	that here in just a moment.
9	Mr. Knox, are you ready to go, or -
10	- I have someone on the phone that wishes to
11	speak. Do you have some materials that you
12	need to distribute? Why don't you start
13	distributing those, and gentleman on the
14	phone, if you wish to comment, tell us your
15	name, and then you may proceed.
16	MR. LEYBA: My name is Jerry Leyba.
17	I'm with LAPOW, Los Alamos Project on Worker
18	Safety. And I'm also a claimant.
19	I worked as an RCT, radiological
20	control technician at GA-55 and at CMR, and I
21	want to make a comment for the SEC for Los
22	Alamos National Laboratory

I feel that the Radiation Advisory Board, NIOSH should approve this SEC for LANL due to the lack of data that is correct data that was given by the Institute Occupational Medicine NIOSH for to reconstruction under the IREP model, which I feel has nothing to do with the workers at Los Alamos and other nuclear facilities around the country, because they are based on survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

And also, a lot of the people that are involved with LAPOW who have been denied, denied, denied, when we look at the statistics on Department of Labor's website, I believe there's about 17,000 who have filed claims for LANL, and only approximately 130 of them were approved, and that is less than one percent.

I feel that the things that took place at GA-55 over at CMR during the Tiger Team, all the chemicals that we had there that we took out by dump truck loads, and also with the physicians, a lot of the physicians in Los

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Alamos are not willing to give medical evaluations. And I wonder why that these doctors are not as cooperative, and make the claimants go in circles.

feel that -- I've been denied myself four times. As an RCT, I worked at doing baq outs, or filters, decontamination. I felt a lot of the exposure that came from PU-238, 239, we worked with cobalt-60, cesium-137, and I know there is a lot of exposure for people who worked there for more than 30 years, and yet when they get their records, how can their records being showing 0.001 millirem. That is incorrect data.

And we know that the Department of labor and Department of Energy had to tell the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Institute of Occupational Medicine, that the data that they were sending for dose reconstruction was not accurate.

And I feel that the LANL SEC should

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be approved, because there are many claimants who are really having a hard time. It's frustrating. They're very depressed. They don't know what more they have to do with sending medical information to you folks.

feel that it is time for the Radiation Advisory Board and NIOSH to face up, heard the comments as Ι last night [Identifying information Redacted], and what happened to her [Identifying information Redacted], and also [Identifying to information Redacted], and also the testimony that [Identifying information Redacted] gave, and the petition that [Identifying information Redacted] presented to you folks.

As a representative of the Los Alamos Project on Worker Safety Nuclear Group Study, and also for UPTE, University of Professional and Technical Employees, it is time for the Radiation Advisory Board and NIOSH to give serious consideration on this LANL SEC Petition.

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1	I thank you much for listening.
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you
3	very much for those comments.
4	Next we'll hear from Wayne Knox.
5	Wayne? Stay very close to there.
6	MR. KNOX: Okay. Great. I feel
7	privileged to be up here. Now I can make some
8	decisions.
9	Thank you very much for inviting me
10	to come up to the head table and talk.
11	The Board has heard a tremendous
12	amount about problems that have occurred at
13	the site, and I know it's difficult to believe
14	that all of these things actually go on. No
15	one, to my knowledge, has come up and shown
16	you anything in writing and proof as to what
17	really went on.
18	I have that proof, and I want to
19	present it to you in terms of documentation,
20	and in terms of a video. I have supplied to
21	you more documentation over there, and I have
22	provided four videos that actually show what

is going on in terms of the exposures of people at the DOE sites, in particular, one site.

I am not suggesting that this occurs at all DOE sites, but I'm taking one case, and running through a dichotomy of it, and show you what really has happened.

I provided you some examples of what is contained in this package. I have a stack more of this documentation available to provide further support to what I say if you need it.

let's start with number one. So Number one is a certification whenever waste analyzed, disposed of, it has certified. This certification here is certification from the Department of Plant Manager and a Project Manager which certifies that, to their best knowledge and belief, true -- that this information is true, accurate, and complete.

And they also acknowledge that they

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are submitting this with the understanding that there are possible fines and imprisonment for knowing violations.

Number two is the information that a Project Manager, was presented to me as which states the amount of tritium that was contained in the sludge that we were supposed to mix. You will note that, under tritium in the sludge, it has NA. However, if you will move over further to the right to the last that, column, you'll note in liquid the the liquid sitting potion, on top of sludge, there is some tritium.

I consider this to be unusual. Tritium generally does not behave in this manner unless there is some weird chemistry going on.

I inquired about this inconsistency, and they said they had an 800-page validation and verification report that was performed by SAIC which said no tritium was in the sludge. You needed no protection

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from tritium.

Westinghouse wrote the radiation work permit. And as you can see where I have circled there, there are no provisions for protection from tritium. There is no monitoring of tritium. And just as a note, tritium requires specialized protection, and it requires specialized monitoring.

Number four, being a good health physicist, I said that we should cut this tank in this manner just in case, because the first thing you think about as a radiological engineer is the engineering design to prevent exposures from people.

I submitted this engineering design. It was rejected. It was rejected because they said, if one of my workers were to cross hands, were to cross this imaginary boundary, it would be a confined entry violation. I don't think that's true.

The next sheet, number four, we started mixing the sludge inside of a tank.

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And this report says that the levels of organic compounds, the smell inside of the tent, rose very high, and we had to evacuate the tent. At that time, no tritium was in the sludge. There were, obviously, organic compounds.

We evacuated the tent. Westinghouse provided no organic filters, because nothing was going to be released. They provided no -- no organic filters on the exhaust of the tent, which I requested that They refused. They also refused to they do. elevate the exhaust point, so there was a ground level release of material so that the radiation technician refused to go near the exhaust to collect the sample.

Number six, you'll see the IH -the Industrial Hygiene people came over and
made measurements inside of the tent, and in
the viewing gallery where we were standing, we
could smell it. They made these measurements
inside of the tent.

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Now, these are measurements of organic compounds. Tritium can be bound with organic materials. The dose conversion factor for organic-bound tritium is greater than that of tritium and water, and certainly of tritium and air.

I have provided you a list, and number 7A and B, of all of the individuals that were exposed to this, believe it or not, there were 32 inspectors evaluating the work of seven people. All of them were exposed, unknowingly, to tritium at this point.

I have the names, the event, and you can go back to my records and see when they signed in and out of my site. I took the sludge samples and split it. I gave one to Westinghouse to analyze, and another one to a laboratory, an independent laboratory to analyze.

Westinghouse analyzed the sample and refused to give me the results of the analysis. I had to go through the Freedom of

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Information to get this. They refused to give me, the Project Manager, the analysis of the sludge.

And as you can see in 8A, you have the split sludge sample. If you flip back to the back, Westinghouse reports the tritium concentration is 4,176 picocuries per gram. Perhaps not that exciting to most, but why would you not give the results to me?

And by the way, it was in my contract that I would evaluate all of the data and turn it over to Westinghouse as the Project Manager.

And going through the Freedom of Information Act, which took about three years to get this information, I find that there is — it looked like acid. If you look at nine, where I have acid, you can go over and you can see the sample number is 1143898. It was exposed to acid.

You should never use acid in analyzing tritium -- preparing tritium. I

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talked to the radio chemist about this, and he said, that's what they used. They used acid in preparing sludge and soil samples for tritium analysis.

The procedure that they used is in number ten, which I again got through the Freedom of Information Act. It says that you that for analyzing the tritium.

Number 10B is a statement from them concerning the soil samples and they indicate that they use this procedure for tritium but tritium is lost during the process because they use concentrated nitric acid. So we are analyzing tritium in soil -- are we? Or are we boiling it off?

That material was packaged. Whenever you package tritium, you are required to monitor the offgass because tritium will go any place it wants to go, trust me. You have to monitor any container of tritium. You didn't do that because there was no tritium there. That tritium was shipped and stored

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for three years.

The results of the -- I finally got the results from the laboratory -- again going through the Freedom of Information Act -- it was 37,000 picocuries per liter -- per gram, I'm sorry, in there.

Now this material was shipped. I have the shipping record. Its number -- I brought mine out. But I have the shipping record where no tritium is specified in the shipping manifest. So you have a situation where all of these people along the line have been exposed to tritium. Sitting in the warehouse, sitting in storage for three years, and then shipped from Savannah River up to Oak Ridge.

Oak Ridge again measures the tritium before they incinerate it -- before incineration -- and they get roughly 57,000 picocuries per liter with one sample. Now this is after three years of decay and, of course, that is a 12-year half-life but you

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also have offgassing for a three-year period.

You can see the value of the tritium measured up at Oak Ridge here on page 13B. Now why did all of this happen? There were a number of possibilities. Well, they wanted to save money. They wanted to complete it fast because the faster they complete it, the more money they make.

They were under an incentive awards program, the Mod-100 program, which offered them an incentive award for getting the work done fast and cheap. And workers don't matter.

The same philosophy was adopted when we were building the bombs and maintaining it. Workers didn't matter because it is going to be difficult for anyone to go back and reconstruct what we did.

If you look at number 14, another reason. In 1996 -- by the way, this work occurred in 1998 so I have been digging for ten years now -- but in 1996, Westinghouse

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sent tritium-bearing waste to Oak Ridge and mischaracterized it. I have the report.

And Oak Ridge said no, you can't bring any more waste into this state. The State of Tennessee prohibited Westinghouse from shipping tritium-bearing waste into the state.

else can I get how rid of tritium-bearing waste is for it to be not there and for us to take advantage, we overly exposed workers in order to get rid of this tritium-bearing waste. By the way, tritium-bearing waste was burned in Oak Ridge along with plutonium -- I didn't tell you -there are a lot of other stories, sidelines to this -- but that tritium-bearing waste Ridge burned in 0ak in excess of the incinerator burn limit.

The plutonium that was there was burned in an excess. Westinghouse found cyanide in the first preliminary sample but refused to analyze it in the second sample,

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1	shipped it based upon the results of the
2	second sample, again to Oak Ridge, it was
3	burned up there. It was re-analyzed at Oak
4	Ridge and burned.
5	All along this pathway, workers
6	were exposed. I challenge you I have all
7	of the data, I have the videos, you have my
8	sworn statement, you have the names of all of
9	the people who know what went on. I challenge
10	you now to reconstruct that dose.
11	And may I say since people have
12	claimed that they could accurately do this,
13	please show me that you can accurately
14	reconstruct this dose. I have all of the
15	available data.
16	Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And thank you.
18	Wayne, were you wanting this distributed to
19	the Board members? Is that
20	MR. KNOX: Oh, well that, I would
21	assume I think Dr. Elliott said that if I
	assume I chillik Dr. Elliott salu that II I

1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. We'll pass
2	it on to NIOSH. Thank you very much.
3	I want to check with the folks on
4	the phone. Was there anyone else on the phone
5	line that wished to address the assembly this
6	evening?
7	MR. RINGER: Yes, I would.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Proceed.
9	Give us your name please.
10	MR. RINGER: Yes, my name is Jerome
11	W. Ringer, calling from Phoenix, Arizona, and
12	this is in regards to Blockson Chemical
13	Company.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
15	MR. RINGER: Okay? I kind of wrote
16	this out but this is in response to the
17	decision of our fathers and my brothers on the
18	other on the line with me here my
19	father's claim in regards to Blockson Chemical
20	Company.
21	Our father's case number, and I'll
22	just put down the last four numbers,

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[Identifying information Redacted], it was determined that our father was present. His percent was 48.4 percent. This did not come as a surprise to me or my brother. As was usual, we fell short again -- 1.6 percent.

This is hard to believe since my father started working at Blockson Chemical Company in the month and year of October of 1950, a year before the reconstruction even started. And what was different than the conditions there between `50 and `51.

As we stated in the previous letters that my father worked as a laborer, which means he was employed -- his employment conditions would have been to do what no one else would want to do. I'm sorry to be stumbling here. I'm just a little tired in Arizona here tonight.

Handling trash, sweeping, and I'm sure he was going into buildings to remove unwanted items which I believe that were contaminated. We believe just because our

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father was not assigned to a certain area, his exposure to contamination materials would have been greater than someone that was assigned to a hazardous area.

With less safety procedures that were advised, if any, to our father, he would have had no idea of what type of material he was handling and coming in contact with.

Also as a laborer, we are sure that he had many foremen that would advise him of where to go and what to do without considering the safety and the health hazards of our father.

I was employed as a laborer at Joliet Army Ammunition Plant and I can say without a doubt I was directed into two places for clean up where other personnel at the location had safety equipment and protective clothing, which I did not.

Personally what upsets me the most is my father was in the United States Navy protecting our shores and saving lives and in

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1	return his life was taken by from
2	employment from a chemical plant in the United
3	States of America with no medals or
4	compensation. What kind of justice is there
5	for our father?
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Thank you
7	very much.
8	Were there any others on the phone
9	lines that wish to comment?
10	MS. CLAYTON: Yes, this is Dorothy
11	Clayton.
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Repeat
13	your name for us.
14	MS. CLAYTON: Dorothy Clayton.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you, please
16	go ahead Dorothy.
17	MS. CLAYTON: Okay. I believe the
18	Board has a copy of SC&A Nevada Test Site SEC
19	Report, Interview, and Evaluation of Clayton
20	Records. I was wondering where the other
21	interviews are. They seem to be missing.
22	Is there anyone there from SC&A

that can -

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dorothy, we may have to get back to you on that. When we leave the line here, if you'll stay on, I'll get a contact number from you and then we'll follow up. Is that agreeable?

also MS. CLAYTON: And report, they only list minors as being exposed to high dose rates of radiation. There were all types of crafts working electricians, plumbers, pipefitters, But it only refers in here to carpenters. minors. And they were a valuable part of the test site, of course, but not the only ones there at that site.

And also, another thing, there was a news release on the DOL website dated February 4th of this year which states that 48,510 claimants across the country have been paid more than five billion dollars in compensation.

And I'd like to ask someone --

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1	maybe [Identifying information Redacted], she
2	was mentioned in this article, in this news
3	release why have only 167 dose
4	reconstruction claims been paid to the Nevada
5	Test Site claimants since the beginning of
6	this program in 2001.
7	That number, 167, comes from the
8	DOL website. I personally doubt that it is
9	that high of claimants that have been paid
10	because everyone that I'm working with, all
11	the widows, they have not been paid. Every
12	claim is being denied and has been for years
13	since I've been working with them.
14	So I'd like to find out why only
15	167 dose reconstruction claims have been paid.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: [Identifying
17	information Redacted] is not here. She was
18	here yesterday but was having to leave this
19	morning, I believe. So she's not here.
20	I will answer in kind of a general
21	sense. In essence I think what is reflected

there is that that number -- and I don't know

1	personally that's the correct number but in
2	any event, the number of claims paid by Labor
3	would reflect the number of cases for which
4	the probability of causation was found to be
5	50 percent or greater. So that is what that
6	number should be reflecting.
7	And to the best of my knowledge,
8	and I don't know how up to date their website
9	is, but it was my understanding it is fairly
10	up to date. But I can't personally verify
11	that.
12	MS. CLAYTON: I was given that
13	information from one of the employees at
14	Department of Labor.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
16	MS. CLAYTON: But it is on their
17	website. But I was sent a memo now this
18	back when the program first started but I
19	just received this just a little while back
20	that might shed a little bit of light on that.
21	This was a memo from Jeff Eagan of

the DOE when the DOE has the program instead

1	of the DOL. This memo went from Jeff Eagan to
2	Dr. Lew Pepper, Boston University NTS Project.
3	And this is what he was telling Mr. Eagan
4	was telling Dr. Pepper to do.
5	He says here is our proposed
6	process to expedite the filing of silicosis
7	claims under the EEOICPA. These cases will
8	have special handling because of the unique
9	nature of their illness. Have your workers
10	contact Ms. Judy Keating
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. Right.
12	MS. CLAYTON: ASAP. They should
13	identify themselves to her as NTS workers with
14	silicosis referred by you. She will get the
15	names, addresses, and phone numbers and
16	expedite a claims packet out to them with a
17	personalized letter offering them full support
18	to fill out these claims forms.
19	There will be special tracking for
20	this group of referrals.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dorothy, on those
22	Part E claims, I should make you aware that

1	this Board does not get involved in the Part E
2	of the program. So you would need to deal
3	directly it now is fully under the
4	Department of Labor. So you would need to
5	contact the Labor people on that particular
6	thing.
7	But if you will stay on the line
8	after we complete here this evening, I'll get
9	a phone number from you because we have a
10	person here that can follow up with you on the
11	SC&A question that you asked.
12	MS. CLAYTON: Okay. I will stay on
13	the line.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
15	Anyone else on the phone lines
16	tonight that needs to make a comment?
17	Is there anyone here in the
18	assembly yet this evening that has further
19	comments?
20	If not, I thank you all and the
21	Board will reconvene again in the morning for
22	those that are interested in participating.

1	Thank you all for your comments and
2	participation tonight. We are recessed.
3	And Dorothy, stand by.
4	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
5	matter was concluded at 8:23 p.m.)
6	

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