

# Laboratory Outreach Communication System (LOCS) Call

Monday, February 26, 2024, at 3:00 P.M. ET

- **Welcome**
  - Sean Courtney, CDC Division of Laboratory Systems
- **ISO 35001:2019 - Biorisk Management for Laboratories and Other Related Organizations Standard**
  - Folasade Kembi, CDC Division of Laboratory Systems
- **Mpox Update**
  - Christina Hutson, CDC Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology
- **Mpox Reporting Update**
  - Shaw Gargis, CDC Division of Regulatory Science and Compliance
- **Early Detection and Surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 Variant BA.2.86**
  - Anastasia Lambrou, CDC Coronavirus and Other Respiratory Viruses Division

# About DLS

## Vision

Exemplary laboratory science and practice advance clinical care, public health, and health equity.

# Four Goal Areas



## Quality Laboratory Science

- Improve the quality and value of laboratory medicine for better health outcomes and public health surveillance



## Highly Competent Laboratory Workforce

- Strengthen the laboratory workforce to support clinical and public health laboratory practice



## Safe and Prepared Laboratories

- Enhance the safety and response capabilities of clinical and public health laboratories



## Accessible and Usable Laboratory Data

- Increase access and use of laboratory data to support response, surveillance, and patient care

# LOCS Calls

DLS Home > CDC's Laboratory Outreach Communication System (LOCS)

DLS Home

- About Us
- LIVD Mapping Tool for SARS-CoV-2 Tests
- Strengthening Clinical Laboratories
- CDC's Laboratory Outreach Communication System (LOCS)**
  - LOCS Messages Archive
  - LOCS Calls**
  - LOCS Calls Archive
  - CLCR Call Archive
  - LOCS Message Level Types
- Laboratory Communicators' Network
- Free Educational Materials for

**CLCR calls are now LOCS calls!**

Clinical Laboratory COVID-19 Response (CLCR) Calls are now Laboratory Outreach Communication System (LOCS) Calls. Find an archive of CLCR call audio files, transcripts, and slide presentations, [here](#).

CDC's Division of Laboratory Systems (DLS) convenes regular Laboratory Outreach Communication System (LOCS) calls with clinical laboratories and other audiences. The calls are an opportunity for CDC and other participants (such as federal partners and professional organizations) to provide updates and answer questions from the laboratory and testing community. These calls take place on the third Monday of each month at 3:00 PM Eastern time. DLS posts the audio, slides, and transcripts online after each call.

To submit questions for consideration, email [DLInquiries@cdc.gov](mailto:DLInquiries@cdc.gov) in advance or use the question and answer (Q&A) function in Zoom during the call. Because we anticipate a large number of participants on this call, and many questions, we may not be able to directly and immediately address every issue. However, we will note your questions and feedback and tailor the content of future calls accordingly.

On this page, you can find:

- LOCS Call information
- Transcripts
- Slides
- Audio Recordings

<https://www.cdc.gov/locs/calls>

# We Want to Hear From You!

## Training and Workforce Development

Questions about education and training?

Contact [LabTrainingNeeds@cdc.gov](mailto:LabTrainingNeeds@cdc.gov)





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- Increase their knowledge of laboratory training development tools and practices
- Gain insights from the clinical and public health laboratory community's success and resilience
- Collaborate and connect with CDC and laboratory education and training peers

REGISTRATION IS LIVE! <https://reach.cdc.gov/onelabsummit>

# DLS ECHO Biosafety Program

- Upcoming sessions:
  - **February 27** - A Stepwise Process to Improve Biorisk Management Systems
  - **March 26** - Leadership: Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities
  - **April 30** - Planning: Developing and Achieving Biorisk Management Objectives
- For questions, contact [DLSbiosafety@cdc.gov](mailto:DLSbiosafety@cdc.gov)



[www.cdc.gov/safelabs/resources-tools/echo-biosafety.html](http://www.cdc.gov/safelabs/resources-tools/echo-biosafety.html)

# How to Ask a Question

- **Using the Zoom Webinar System**
  - Click the **Q&A button** in the Zoom webinar system
  - Type your question in the **Q&A box** and submit it
  - **Please do not submit a question using the chat button**

- For media questions, please contact CDC Media Relations at [media@cdc.gov](mailto:media@cdc.gov)
- If you are a patient, please direct any questions to your healthcare provider



## Division of Laboratory Systems

Slide decks may contain presentation material from panelists who are not affiliated with CDC. Presentation content from external panelists may not necessarily reflect CDC's official position on the topic(s) covered.



## Access to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 35001:2019 Biorisk Management

**LCDR Folasade Kembi, PhD**  
Division of Laboratory Systems  
Quality and Safety Systems Branch

**February 26, 2024**



# International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 35001:2019 Biorisk Management

CDC's Division of Laboratory Systems (DLS) is offering free access to the **ISO 35001:2019 - Biorisk Management for Laboratories and related organizations** for clinical and public health laboratories

## **ISO 35001:**

- ISO 35001 defines a process to identify, assess, control, and monitor the risks associated with hazardous biological materials.
- The standard applies to laboratories or organizations that work with, store, transport, and/or dispose of hazardous biological materials.
- The offer is currently limited to interested laboratories and organizations within the United States.

# International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 35001:2019 Biorisk Management

## Process Overview:

- Select a point of contact responsible for biorisk management (e.g., Laboratory Director, Biosafety Officer).
- Point of contact email [DLSBiosafety@cdc.gov](mailto:DLSBiosafety@cdc.gov)
  - Name and physical address of the institution
  - Name and work e-mail address
  - Role in the organization
- DLS notifies the approved point of contact with details on how to access the standard.

DLS supports the enhancement of biorisk management in laboratories and encourages your institution to participate.

For questions, contact [DLSBiosafety@cdc.gov](mailto:DLSBiosafety@cdc.gov)

# Thank you!




For more information, contact CDC  
1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)  
TTY: 1-888-232-6348 [www.cdc.gov](http://www.cdc.gov)

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The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

# Division of Laboratory Systems



## Mpox Update

**Christina L. Hutson, PhD, MS**

Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology  
Poxvirus and Rabies Branch



# Division of Laboratory Systems

These slides were shared during the call but are not available for public distribution.



# Mpox Virus and Federal Select Agent Program Regulations

Shaw Gargis, PhD

Associate Director for Science (Acting)

Division of Regulatory Science and Compliance  
(DRSC)

2/26/2024



# Mpox Regulatory Language

- §73.3 HHS select agents and toxins
  - (b) HHS select agents and toxins:  
Monkeypox virus (Mpox)
  - (d) HHS select agents or toxins that meet any of the following criteria are excluded from the requirements of this part:
    - 12) Any South American genotypes of Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus and **any West African Clade of monkeypox virus provided that the individual or entity can identify that the agent is within the exclusion category.**



# Select Agent Regulations and Mpox Virus

- Currently, there are two clades of Mpox virus:
  - Congo Basin clade (Clade I) and West African clade (Clades IIa and IIb).
  - For the 2022 U.S. Mpox Outbreak, laboratory testing indicated that the outbreak was associated with the Clade IIb of the Mpox virus.
- Mpox virus is regulated as an HHS-only select agent [42 CFR 73.3(b)] and entities that possess, use, or transfer this agent must comply with the HHS Select Agent and Toxin Regulations [42 CFR 73] (“the regulations”) unless there is an applicable exemption or exclusion



# Diagnostic Specimen Exemption

- **Diagnostic Specimen Exemption:** The regulations provide that clinical or diagnostic laboratories or other entities that possess, use or transfer an HHS select agent contained in a specimen presented for diagnosis or verification will be exempt from the requirements of the regulations for such agent if the entity,
  - 1) reports the identification of the agent to the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) and other authorities as required by law,
  - 2) secures the select agent after identification, and
  - 3) transfers or destroys the material, in accordance with 42 CFR 73.5(a).
- This exemption would apply to material that has been identified as being or containing Mpox virus, but the clade has not been determined or the clade has been determined to be Congo Basin clade (Clade I).



# Regulatory Status of Materials

- An entity may retain this material if registered with FSAP and approved to possess Mpox virus.
- FSAP regulates material that has been identified as being or containing a select agent. Therefore, identifications of *Orthopoxvirus* that are presumptive identifications of Mpox virus, are not considered select agents by FSAP until identified to be Mpox virus or another select agent.



# Regulatory Status of Material

Test result	Subject to the select agent requirements?
Non-variola <i>Orthopoxvirus</i>	No
Mpox virus clade undetermined (using a generic Mpox assay)	Yes
Mpox virus Clade I (Congo Basin clade)	Yes
Mpox virus clade II (West African clade)	No



[www.selectagents.gov](http://www.selectagents.gov)

CDC Contact Information  
Division of Regulatory Science  
and Compliance

[lrsat@cdc.gov](mailto:lrsat@cdc.gov)

404-718-2000

APHIS Contact Information  
Division of Agricultural  
Select Agents and Toxins

[DASAT@usda.gov](mailto:DASAT@usda.gov)

301-851-2070



# Early Detection and Surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 Variant BA.2.86 — Worldwide, July–October 2023

**Erin South, MPH, Anastasia Lambrou, PhD, Hannah Kirking, MD**

Centers for Disease and Control and Prevention

February 26, 2024

# Outline

1. Background
2. Methods
3. Results
4. Public Health Action
5. Discussion
6. Preparedness Implications
7. Questions & Discussion

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

## Early Detection and Surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 Variant BA.2.86 — Worldwide, July–October 2023

Anastasia S. Lambrou, PhD<sup>1,2,\*</sup>; Erin South, MPH<sup>1,2,\*</sup>; Eliza S. Ballou<sup>3,4</sup>; Clinton R. Paden, PhD<sup>1</sup>; James A. Fuller<sup>5</sup>; Stephen M. Bart, PhD<sup>6</sup>; Deena M. Butryn, PhD<sup>7</sup>; Ryan T. Novak, PhD<sup>7</sup>; Sean D. Browning, MSc<sup>5</sup>; Amy E. Kirby, PhD<sup>8</sup>; Rory M. Welsh, PhD<sup>8</sup>; Daniel M. Cornforth, PhD<sup>8</sup>; Duncan R. MacCannell, PhD<sup>8</sup>; Cindy R. Friedman, MD<sup>6</sup>; Natalie J. Thornburg, PhD<sup>1</sup>; Aron J. Hall, DVM<sup>1</sup>; Laura J. Hughes, PhD<sup>1</sup>; Barbara E. Mahon, MD<sup>1</sup>; Demetre C. Daskalakis, MD<sup>3</sup>; Nirav D. Shah, MD, JD<sup>9</sup>; Brendan R. Jackson, MD<sup>3</sup>; Hannah L. Kirking, MD<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Early detection of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants is critical to guiding rapid risk assessments, providing clear and timely communication messages, and coordinating public health action. CDC identifies and monitors novel SARS-CoV-2 variants through diverse surveillance approaches, including genomic, wastewater, traveler-based, and digital public health surveillance (e.g., global data repositories, news, and social media). The SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86 was first sequenced in Israel and reported on August 13, 2023. The first U.S. COVID-19 case caused by this variant was reported on August 17, 2023, after a patient received testing for SARS-CoV-2 at a health care facility on August 3. In the following month, eight additional U.S. states detected BA.2.86 across various surveillance systems, including specimens from health care settings, wastewater surveillance, and traveler-based genomic surveillance. As of October 23, 2023, sequences have been reported from at least 32 countries. Continued variant tracking and further evidence are needed to evaluate the full public health impact of BA.2.86. Timely genomic sequence submissions to global public databases aided early detection of BA.2.86 despite the decline in the number of specimens being sequenced during the past year. This report describes

because each individual surveillance method might not capture all COVID-19 cases, and not all specimens will undergo genomic sequencing.

Each surveillance component provides distinct information, that, when considered together, enable robust situational awareness for early warning signals and support epidemiologic characterization if more widespread transmission is established. The SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86, first detected in August 2023, has more than 30 mutations in the spike protein compared with other currently circulating variants. This sequence divergence of BA.2.86 suggested potentially reduced antibody protection from previous SARS-CoV-2 infection and vaccination, especially before early laboratory-based evaluations were conducted. Consequently, CDC is actively monitoring BA.2.86 to guide public health actions and surveillance efforts (1). Continued variant tracking and further evidence, such as real-world evaluations, are needed to understand the full public health impact of BA.2.86. This report highlights the use of a diverse, multicomponent surveillance system for early warning, and describes how this approach has informed the response to the SARS-CoV-2 BA.2.86 variant.


### Methods

<https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/72/wr/mm7243a2.htm>


**Background**

# Introduction

- CDC uses a multicomponent surveillance approach to track emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants globally and in the United States.




**National SARS-CoV-2  
Genomic Surveillance  
(case-based)**



**Traveler-based Genomic  
Surveillance (TGS)**



**National Wastewater  
Surveillance System  
(NWSS)**



**Digital Public Health  
Surveillance  
(public genomic repositories,  
news, and social media)**

**Early Detection Surveillance Components**

## BA.2.86 Background

- First detected in August 2023
- >30 mutations in the spike protein compared with other circulating variants which suggested potentially reduced antibody protection
- CDC is actively monitoring BA.2.86 to guide public health actions and surveillance efforts
- Continued tracking and real-world evaluations are needed to understand the full public health impact

# Study Objectives

1. Describe how multicomponent surveillance and genomic sequencing were used in real time to track the emergence and transmission of the BA.2.86 variant.
2. Outline the early detections of the BA.2.86 variant and surveillance mechanisms.
3. Monitor the national and global spread of the BA.2.86 variant.

**Methods**

# Surveillance System Data Components

- **National SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance**
  - Multiple sources of U.S. human respiratory virus specimen data from cases
- **Travel-based Genomic Surveillance (TGS)**
  - Human sampling at U.S. international airports, six major U.S. international airports\*
- **National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS)**
  - Sewershed samples that service 40% of U.S. population
- **Digital Public Health Surveillance**
  - Global digital repositories (NCBI SRA\*\*, GISAID\*\*\*), news media, social media, global-event based and public health partner reports


\*Los Angeles (LAX), Newark (EWR), New York (JFK), San Francisco (SFO), Seattle (SEA), and Washington D.C./Dulles (IAD) airports

\*\*National Center for Biotechnology Information's Sequence Read Archive

\*\*\*Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System


# Methods

- BA.2.86 reports from Digital Public Health Surveillance collected and confirmed by CDC team
- Sequences in public databases were collected and examined daily from NCBI SRA and GISAID
- Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and used for geographic and temporal mapping
- Detailed analyses conducted on the BA.2.86 sequences reported within first two weeks after first report



# Results


# BA.2.86 Early Detection: Key Dates & Findings



# Tracking BA.2.86 Emergence


August 26, 2023

October 23, 2023




■ Respiratory Specimens   ■ Wastewater Samples   ■ Both Respiratory and Wastewater Samples


# Time Between Human Specimen Collection and Report into Public Databases



# SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variant Diversity: BA.2.86




# SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variant Diversity: JN.1



# BA.2.86 Update Since August 2023

Weighted and Nowcast Estimates in United States for 2-Week Periods in 10/29/2023 – 2/17/2024



Nowcast Estimates in United States for 2/4/2024 – 2/17/2024

USA

WHO label	Lineage #	%Total	95%PI
Omicron	JN.1	96.4%	94.9-97.4%
	HV.1	1.0%	0.8-1.2%
	JG.3	0.6%	0.4-0.7%
	BA.2.86	0.5%	0.3-0.6%
	BA.2	0.4%	0.0-2.7%
	XBB.1.16	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	GK.2	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	XBB.1.5	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	CH.1.1	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	EG.6.1	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	XBB.1.5.68	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	XBB.1.16.1	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	XBB.1.9.2	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	XBB.1.16.17	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
	XBB.1.5.72	0.0%	0.0-0.0%
Other	Other*	0.1%	0.0-0.1%

USA

WHO label	Lineage #	%Total	95%PI
Omicron	JN.1	96.4%	94.9-97.4%
	HV.1	1.0%	0.8-1.2%
	JG.3	0.6%	0.4-0.7%
	BA.2.86	0.5%	0.3-0.6%

\* Enumerated lineages are US VOC and lineages circulating above 1% nationally in at least one 2-week period. "Other" represents the aggregation of lineages which are circulating <1% nationally during all 2-week periods displayed.  
 # While all lineages are tracked by CDC, those named lineages not enumerated in this graphic are aggregated with their parent lineages, based on Pango lineage definitions, described in more detail here: <https://www.pango.network/the-pango-nomenclature-system/statement-of-nomenclature-rules/>.

# Public Health Response

# Public Health Response

## 1. Rapid risk communication

- CDC weekly Respiratory Virus Updates and public health partner debriefs

## 2. Viral isolation and characterization

- Collaborations between sequencing laboratories and CDC
- Residual virus samples were shared with CDC laboratories for isolation, early characterization, and laboratory-based neutralization studies to better understand potential immune escape
- High-quality, rapidly generated BA.2.86 sequences facilitated the understanding of its geographic distribution and aided early laboratory-based and computer-modeled studies predicting immune escape

## 3. Cross-coordination for public health action

- Within agency and public health partner collaboration, data sharing, and risk assessment

# Public Health Response – *Rapid Risk Communication*

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CDC 24/7: Saving Lives, Protecting People™

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## Respiratory Illnesses

Respiratory Illness

Respiratory Illness

Respiratory Virus Data Channel Snapshot

Activity Levels

CDC is posting updates on the respiratory illness season here every week.

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## Respiratory Illnesses

### Risk Assessment Summary for SARS-CoV-2 Sublineage BA.2.86

August 23, 2023, 10:10 AM EDT

[Español](#) [Print](#)

CDC is posting updates on respiratory viruses every week; for the latest information, please visit [CDC Respiratory Virus Updates](#).

CDC has detected a new SARS-CoV-2 variant labeled BA.2.86. CDC is continually monitoring for new variants and studying their potential impact on public health.

#### Background

All viruses, including the virus that causes COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2), change over time. These viruses with changes are called “variants.” These changes can affect how contagious a virus is, how well it responds to treatment, and how severely it affects people. Last week, a new variant of SARS-CoV-2 called BA.2.86 was detected in samples from people in Denmark and Israel. At least two cases have been identified in the United States. This variant is notable because it has multiple genetic differences from previous versions of SARS-CoV-2.

#### Current Risk Assessment

Based on what CDC knows now, existing tests used to detect and medications used to treat COVID-19 appear to be effective with this variant. BA.2.86 may be more capable of causing infection in people who have previously had COVID-19 or who have received COVID-19 vaccines. Scientists are evaluating the effectiveness of the forthcoming, updated COVID-19 vaccine. CDC’s current assessment is that this updated vaccine will be effective at reducing severe disease and hospitalization. At this point, there is no evidence that this variant is causing more severe illness. That assessment may change as additional scientific data are developed. CDC will share more as we know more.

<https://www.cdc.gov/respiratory-viruses/whats-new/covid-19-variant.html>

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## Respiratory Illnesses

### Update on SARS-CoV-2 Variant BA.2.86 Being Tracked by CDC

November 27, 2023, 1:15 PM EDT

[Español](#) [Print](#)

CDC is posting updates on respiratory viruses every week; for the latest information, please visit [CDC Respiratory Virus Updates](#).

CDC is tracking a SARS-CoV-2 variant called BA.2.86 and working to better understand its potential impact on public health. This update follows CDC’s most recent BA.2.86 update on [September 15, 2023](#).

Find more information about [virus trends in your area](#) and [tips to help you stay healthy during the holidays](#).

#### What to know about BA.2.86

- The virus that causes COVID-19 is constantly changing over time. Sometimes these changes allow new variants to spread more quickly or effectively. If that occurs, the new variant may become more common relative to other variants that are circulating.
- Since CDC’s [first post](#) on BA.2.86 in August 2023, the proportion of infections caused by BA.2.86 has slowly increased. In the [CDC Nowcast](#) posted Nov. 27, 2023, BA.2.86 is projected to account for 5-15% of currently circulating variants.
- CDC projects BA.2.86 and its offshoots like [JN.1](#) will continue to increase as a proportion of SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences.
- At this time, BA.2.86 does not appear to be driving increases in infections or hospitalizations in the United States.
- CDC contributed to and agrees with the [World Health Organization’s recent risk assessment about BA.2.86](#) [📄](#) suggesting that the **public health risk posed by this variant is low** compared with other circulating variants, based on available limited evidence.

<https://www.cdc.gov/respiratory-viruses/whats-new/covid-19-variant-update-2023-11-27.html>

# Discussion

- Despite decreased SARS-CoV-2 sequencing, U.S. genomic surveillance systems detected BA.2.86, a novel SARS-CoV-2 lineage circulating at very low levels
- Using multiple surveillance systems, integrating genomic sequencing, can successfully enhance early detection, tracking, and characterization of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants
- Early detection of variants enable timely risk assessment, resource mobilization, communication, and public health action
- SARS-CoV-2 variants continue to emerge, and it is critical to continue to monitor their circulation and impact

# Limitations

1. Varied levels of geographic, epidemiologic, clinical, and demographic information
2. Manual data gathering methods in digital public health surveillance are resource-intensive
3. Global genomic surveillance is limited by the lag time between specimen collection and reporting, impacting real-time actionability
4. Lacking standardized methods for genomic sequence data in public repositories, especially apparent for wastewater
5. Data quality, reporting, and aggregation standards are needed for multicomponent pathogen genomic surveillance

# Implications for Public Health and Preparedness

- BA.2.86 highlighted the importance of early detection through multicomponent surveillance
- Addressing timeliness, individual system limitations, and increasing cross-coordination would strengthen this approach
- Maintaining multipurpose surveillance systems require sustained resources but could be used for early warning of known and novel public health threats

# Future Directions

- Innovations in pathogen testing and genomic sequencing, capacity building, and reporting systems
  - Leveraging private sector help with more affordable, targeted, and sustainable surveillance products
- Continuous, automated data scraping for early warning signs
- Shortening lab reporting lag time from specimen collection to reporting results
- Tools to synthesize and integrate diverse early detection, genomic, epidemiologic, clinical, and other data
- Deployment of multiple innovations to strengthen early warning, preparedness, and response will be critical

# Questions?

For more information, contact CDC  
1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)  
TTY: 1-888-232-6348 [www.cdc.gov](http://www.cdc.gov)

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

# Next Scheduled Call

Monday, March 18  
3 PM - 4 PM EDT



<https://www.cdc.gov/locs/calls>

# CDC Social Media

<https://www.facebook.com/CDC>




<https://twitter.com/cdcgov>

<https://www.instagram.com/cdcgov>



<https://www.linkedin.com/company/cdc>

# Thank You For Your Time!





For more information, contact CDC  
1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)  
TTY: 1-888-232-6348 [www.cdc.gov](http://www.cdc.gov)

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